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This book has grown out of a dissertation submitted to the MaxPlanck Institute for Social Anthropology and Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg in 2011. My initial interest in Viet-
nam began in 2002 when I went there as part of a postgraduate pro-
gramme arranged by the Polish Ministry of Education and Sport. Since 
then, many individuals and institutions have helped me throughout 
this project. Before I thank them and acknowledge my gratitude and 
indebtedness for their constant support and encouragement, I will 
briefly describe how it happened that I decided to carry out research in 
Vietnam. 
Some failures turn out to be our best friends. When in 2001 I failed to 
win a scholarship to study in China, I thought that I would have to give 
up my dream of doing research in the country that had long fascinated 
me. I was learning Chinese and wrote my master’s thesis on Buddhism in 
China with a view to conducting research there. During that same year, 
I began attending seminars on Southeast Asia organized by Małgorzata 
Pietrasiak at the Institute of International Relations (University of 
Łódź). ‘Why you don’t apply to go to Vietnam?’ she asked me. I had 
never thought about going to Vietnam and I knew very little about it. 
Moreover, it was my last year of study at university and, according to the
rules, I was no longer eligible to apply. When I had almost given up the 
idea, my thesis supervisor Sławoj Szynkiewicz exclaimed, ‘More go-get-
ting energy, Ms. Roszko!’ Their enthusiasm, encouragement, support, 
and trust helped convince the dean of the University of Łódź to allow 
me to submit my application. Ten months later, just after my graduation, 
I received confirmation from the Polish Ministry of Education and Sport 
in Warsaw that I had won the scholarship! Without Sławoj Szynkiewicz 
and Małgorzata Pietrasiak’s help, I would not be where I am now. 
My three-year stay in Vietnam (2002–2005) would have been impos-
sible without financial support from the Polish Ministry of Education 
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and Sport, which not only provided a grant but also, in an exceptional 
gesture, extended its scholarship to me twice. I particularly want to
thank Jacek Wojtaśkiewicz (Department of International Cooperation), 
whose assistance and efficiency helped to overcome many formal con-
straints and make my stay in Vietnam possible. I would like to extend my 
thanks to the Polish Embassy in Hanoi, where I was warmly received and 
which assisted me whenever I needed during my early stay in Vietnam. 
Upon my arrival in Hanoi in 2002, I would never have been inte-
grated so quickly into Vietnamese society had it not been for the lively
environment at the Vietnamese Academy of Social Science in Hanoi, in
particular the Institute for Religious Studies, with which I was affiliated
from 2002 to 2005. I am particularly grateful to its director, Professor
Đõ Quang Hưng, who helped me innumerable times with bureaucratic
challenges. I am also grateful to the late Prof. Cao Xuan Phố and the late
Dr. Nguyễn Quốc, as well as Dr. Ngô Văn Doanh and Dr. Đào Thế Đức.
Special thanks also to the younger researchers: Dr. Nguyễn Ngọc Quỳnh,
Dr. Nguyễn Thị Minh Ngọc, Dr. Nguyễn Văn Dũng, Dr. Lê Tâm Đắc,
Mrs. Phan Tường Vân, and many other colleagues with whom I not only
had lively discussions, but also took field trips outside of Hanoi. They
were my first guides through the culture and everyday life of Vietnam. 
My adventure in Vietnam could not have taken on such serious 
and professional proportions without Andrew Hardy, the head of the 
École Française d’Extrême-Orient (EFEO) in Hanoi, who provided 
advice and support at critical moments during the first years of my 
stay in Vietnam. The EFEO also generously offered me two years of 
funding to study Vietnamese. In 2007 Andrew invited me to join his 
multidisciplinary project, ‘The Long Wall of Quảng Ngãi’, which he was 
organizing in cooperation with the Vietnam Institute of Archaeology. 
Andrew’s and Nguyễn Tiến Đông’s assistance and expertise in the field 
and their excellent relations with the Quảng Ngãi provincial authorities 
were invaluable for my PhD project. Much appreciated support in tran-
scribing interviews and in collecting various documents was provided 
by Nguyễn Hồng Nhung. For teaching me Vietnamese, I am indebted 
to two professional teachers from Hanoi National University, Lê Thị 
Thu Hoài and Nguyễn Thị Phương Thùy, who tirelessly corrected my 
pronunciation and guided me through linguistic nuances. They were 





















My doctoral studies formally began in the winter of 2006 when I be-
came enrolled in the joint PhD programme of the Max Planck Institute
for Social Anthropology and Martin Luther University in Halle. My doc-
toral fieldwork in Vietnam in 2006–2007 was made possible by financial
support from the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. Chris
Hann, my principal advisor, was most important in welcoming me to the
Max Planck Society and helping me orient myself to the research project
‘Religion and Morality’, which he initiated. What Chris Hann offered to
my dissertation in terms of a postsocialist studies approach and a solid
ethnographic focus, Burkhard Schnepel of Martin Luther University –
my second advisor – provided in guiding me through maritime history
and polytheistic religions and by sharing his enthusiasm for ‘small islands’.
In the course of my PhD trajectory I benefitted greatly from comments
and suggestions from colleagues not only in informal discussions, but
also when I presented earlier drafts of several chapters at conferences,
workshops, and seminars or sent my papers directly to them. I want
to specifically thank Fridrich Binder, Irene Becci, Pascal Bourdeaux,
Andrew Hardy, Lâle Yalçın-Heckmann, Kirsten Endres, Tobias Kölner,
Nathan Light, Agata Ładykowska, Agnieszka Pasieka, Małgorzata Rajtar,
Detelina Tocheva, Philip Taylor, Markus Schlecker and Gábor Vargyas. 
At this point, I would like to thank the Institute of Culture Studies 
and, particularly, Prof. Lê Hồng Lý, who arranged my visa during my stay 
in Vietnam from September 2006 to September 2007, and Prof. Nguyễn 
Thị Phương Châm, who continued to arrange my research visas between 
2011 and 2018. I am aware that my ‘hyper-mobility’ in Vietnam caused 
many troubles for the institute that hosted me and was responsible for 
my research and my whereabouts. I highly appreciate their patience, 
help, openness, and goodwill, all of which made this project possible. I 
would like to acknowledge that the Quảng Ngãi authorities helped me 
carry out my project in central Vietnam. I am particularly grateful to 
Nguyễn Hoàng Sơn, Dr. Nguyễn Đăng Vũ, Phan Đình Độ, Nguyễn Kim 
Sơn, Hoàng Nam Chu, and Lê Hồng Khánh. I also owe my thanks to the 
authorities of Phố Th nh commune (Đức Phổ District) and of Lý Sơn 
District, who warmly welcomed me as a foreigner and organized my stay 
in their communities. 
I owe numerous other debts of gratitude to those who helped me 
through my entire stay in Vietnam. It is impossible to mention them all, 
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so here I must limit myself to only a few names. My deepest thanks go to 
the people of Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn, whose hospitality, help, and candor 
touched me more than I can say. Specifically, I would like to mention 
Lê Tấn L i, Hồ Kiểm, Trần Nên, Trần Phẩm, Mai Phầu, Nguyễn Bảy, 
Nguyễn Dư, Nguyễn Tuấn Hải, Nguỹen Song, Đăng Năng, Nguyễn 
Bé, Hoàng Thị Hảo, Huỳnh Thị Thu Thảo, Nguyễn Mới, Ph m Hiển, 
Trường Hoài Dư, Sâm Nhung, Võ Tấn Công, and Võ Nghìn. Chị Bình 
and her family hosted me for almost a year in the Thế Vĩnh roadhouse. 
Their generosity, help, and patience were invaluable throughout my en-
tire stay in Sa Huỳnh. Lê Ở, Điển Lể, Nguyễn Công Tiền, Nguyễn Hấp, 
Pham Đình Thọ, Ngô Xương, Nguyễn Quâng Nghị, Nguyễn Thanh 
Tùng, Võ Hiển Đ t, Nguyễn Đình Trang, Ph m Thoai Tuyền, Trần 
Đồ, and Mỹ Linh gave me unwavering support during my research on 
Lý Sơn Island. Võ Văn Út and Phan Quyên and their relatives not only 
endlessly supported my fieldwork in Lý Sơn, but also took me into their 
homes and considered me a family member. There are so many more 
whom I simply do not have space to mention. I am grateful to you all. 
The project was also supported by a generous writing fellowship 
from the Research Center for Humanities and Social Science, Academia 
Sinica. I am deeply grateful to the Center of Asia and Pacific Area Studies 
(CAPAS) for providing me with an office, the impressive collections of
books in their library, and assistance throughout my two-year stay in 
Taipei. I would like to thank Cheng-Yi Lin, Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, 
Chang Wen-Chin, Ota Atsushi, and my advisor Shiu Wen-Tang. Chang 
Wen-Chin and Shiu Wen-Tang in particular not only welcomed me at 
CAPAS, but made my stay in Taipei more cheerful. I also extend my 
thanks to Lin Shu Hui, Chiang Ginger, Chen Erin Yi-Fang, and Chien 
Hsinyi, who guided me through the intricacies of administrative re-
quirements. Postdoctoral fellowships from the European Commission 
at Durham University and from the Danish Council for Independent 
Research in Culture and Humanities at the Department of Cross-
Cultural and Regional Studies at the University of Copenhagen gave me 
time and resources to revisit my field sites in Vietnam in 2014 and to turn 
the thesis into this book. Much of the rethinking and rewriting that went 
into this book happened during my visiting fellowship at the Institute 
for Religion, Politics and Society of the Australian Catholic University 






inviting me to Melbourne to work on this project. Ingolf Thuesen, the 
head of the Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies at the 
University of Copenhagen, provided me with the office space and library 
resources at a time when I most needed it. The Christian Michelsen 
Institute in Bergen created time for me to complete the book. 
Earlier versions of some parts of this book have been published 
elsewhere. Parts of the Introduction, Chapter 4, and a fragment of 
the Conclusion appear in the article ‘A Triad of Confrontation: State 
Discipline, Buddhist Purification, and Indiscipline as a Local Strategy in 
Central Vietnam’, published by the Journal of Contemporary Ethnography
(Roszko 2019). Parts of Chapter 1 and fragments of Chapter 3 appear 
in a book chapter, ‘Geographies of Connection and Disconnection: 
Narratives of Seafaring in Ly Son’ (Roszko 2016), in Connected and
Disconnected in Vietnam: Remaking Social Relationships in a Post-socialist 
Nation, edited by Philip Taylor and published by ANU Press. Parts 
of Chapter 2 appear in the article ‘From Spiritual Houses to National 
Shrines: Religious Traditions and Nation-Building in Vietnam’, pub-
lished in the journal East Asia: An International Quarterly (Roszko 2012). 
Parts of Chapter 5 appeared in the essay titled ‘Commemoration and 
the State: Memory and Legitimacy in Vietnam’, published in Sojourn: 
Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia (Roszko 2010). And some frag-
ments of Chapter 5 appear in the article ‘Maritime Territorialisation as 
Performance of Sovereignty and Nationhood in the South China Sea’, 
published in the journal Nations and Nationalism (Roszko 2015). 
Profound intellectual and personal debts of gratitude are due to Erik
Harms and Hue-Tam Ho Tai. Hue-Tam Ho Tai was the first to give help-
ful suggestions regarding how to turn my thesis into a book. Erik Harms 
read the entire manuscript and provided invaluable suggestions about 
how to refine the argument of the book. His influence on my work has 
been profound. Bill Hayton lent his critical eye for historical details and 
helped to put them into place. I would especially like to thank Brian 
Donahoe, editor and fellow anthropologist, whose sharp comments 
went far beyond editorial suggestions, as well as Gerald Jackson at NIAS 
Press for his genuine trust in me and in this project. To Jutta Turner go 
my grateful thanks for the preparation of the maps. 
I would like to finish these words on a personal note. My stay in 
Vietnam in the earlier years would not have been possible without the 
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support of my parents Henryk and Danuta Roszko, and my brother 
Daniel and his wife Ewa, who have been enormously patient and under-
standing through my long physical and intellectual journey. My nephew 
Igor Roszko – who sweetly asked me to take a ride with him on the roller 
coaster at Tivoli and, when I did, asked ‘What’s wrong with you, aunt’? 
– challenged me as nobody before. My deepest thanks go to my husband 
and harshest critic, Oscar Salemink, who brought out the best in me. 
The curiosity, intellectual rigour, fun, and joy he has brought through all 
these years of our journey together have enriched my life immensely. I 









Vietnamese is a tonal language. Formerly, the Vietnamese lan-guage was written using original Chinese characters – called chữHán – and a system of newly created and modified characters 
called Hán-Nôm, which rendered Vietnamese pronunciation. In the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries a romanized system called Quốc Ngữ
was invented by Portuguese Christian missionaries and then developed 
by a French Jesuit, Alexandre de Rhodes. Under French colonial rule, 
the script became official and was required for all public documents, but 
it only became universally used when nationalists saw it as a tool in the 
fight against French colonial power. Present-day Quốc Ngữ consists of 
the standard English alphabet plus extra letters such as â, ă, ê, ô, ơ, ư, 
đ. Diacritical marks indicate tones and particular vowel sounds. This 
means that there can be as many as six words that are written identically 
(except for the diacritical marks), but differ in tone and, therefore, in 
meaning. For example, tinh means ‘sharp-witted’, tính means ‘temper’,
tình means ‘affection’, tỉnh means ‘province’, tĩnh means ‘quiet’, and tịnh
means ‘absolutely’. To avoid any semantic confusion, I have chosen to 
transcribe Vietnamese terms with diacritical marks. The only exceptions 
are Vietnamese words which will be familiar in English to the reader. 
Thus, I write Hanoi instead of Hà Nội, Ho Chi Minh City instead of Hồ 
Chí Minh, and Vietnam instead of Việt Nam. 
In the text, terms in languages other than English are rendered in 
italics. The only exceptions are personal names and place names. Each 
term is followed by an indication of its language (if it is not clear from 
the context) and then by an English gloss of its meaning (in some cases 
the order is reversed, with the English gloss being given first and the 
Vietnamese following in parentheses). In addition, foreign terms in 
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titles or subtitles are rendered in italics. Except for the names of line-
ages and recognized historical and public figures, all personal names are 






chủ tịch chairman 
Công an Biên phòng Border Guard Command 
huyện district 
Sở Văn hóa, Thể thao Provincial Office of Culture, Sport and Tourism 
và Du Lịch 
thôn village or community 
tỉnh province 
xã often translated as “commune”; refers to an 
administrative unit denoting municipality 
consisting of various villages or làng – residential
units or “villages” or “communities.” 
Ủy Ban Nhân Dân state institution of the People’s Committee 
(UBND) 
TERRITORIAL DENOMINATIONS 
ấp hamlet (typical for southern Vietnam) 
Hoàng Sa Paracel Archipelago 
làng village 
lân sub-hamlet 
Trường Sa Spratly Archipelago 
v n self-ruling fishing organization, fishing 
community 
v n chày floating fishing community (see also religious 
denominations) 
xóm hamlet (typical for northern Vietnam) 
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TERMS FOR ORGANIZATIONS 
Giáo Hội Phật Giáo Việt Buddhist Association of Vietnam, created 
by the Party-State in 1981 
Phật Giáo Thống-nhất Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam 
Việt Nam (UBCV), unrecognized by the Party-State 
RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS 
âm hồn soul of the dead person 
chùa Buddhist pagoda 
chủ làng village senior, master of the ceremony 
chủ v n head of the fishing community 
dinh literally: “palace” – here “temple” 
đình communal house, political and religious centre 
of the village 
lăng literally: “mausoleum” or “tomb” – here com-
munal temple of the fishing community 
mê tín dị đoan superstitious/superstition 
miếu shrine, temple 
Quan Âm Quan Yin in Chinese 
tín ngưỡng religious beliefs 




Map 1: Field sites of Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn. 
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Map 3: Religious sites in An Hải Commune, Lý Sơn Island. 
Map 2 (opposite): Religious sites in Sa Huỳnh, Quảng Ngãi Province, Central 
Vietnam. 
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Map 4: Religious sites in An Vĩnh Commune, Lý Sơn Island. 
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Figure 1: A wooden statue recovered by fishermen from the South China Sea. 
 
 
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
A Triad of Confrontation 
In February 2007, fishermen from Sa Huỳnh pulled a one-metre-high wooden statue out of their net while fishing in the South China Sea – or ‘East Sea’ (Biên Đông) in Vietnamese – in the vicinity of Lý
Sơn Island, about 30 kilometres off the shore of Quảng Ngãi Province 
in central Vietnam. The wooden carving depicted a Chinese dignitary 
seated on a throne with armrests in the shape of a dragon’s mouth. The 
statue had survived quite well, although the places where the paint had 
come off were covered with shellfish. The fishing crew that made this 
unexpected discovery placed the statue in the yard of the boat owner’s 
house, next to an open-air altar dedicated to the Earth Spirit (Thô Địa). 
A fence was carefully erected around the statue, and an umbrella was 
set up to protect it against rain. The fishers believed that the statue was 
an image of a king of the Vietnamese Lê dynasty (1428–1788) and 
considered the finding a sign of luck, security, and good health for their 
families.1 This narrative was soon enriched with reports of the statue’s 
supernatural power (linh thiêng) to provide miraculous protection to 
fishers against various misfortunes. Until very recently, fishers were 
most fearful of storms, but this fear has been superseded by China’s and 
Vietnam’s competing claims to the South China Sea and the associated 
risk of capture, detention, and confiscation of their vessels by the 
Chinese coastguard. As a consequence, the fishers felt that the statue 
needed a more appropriate abode and wanted to build a proper shrine 
to better protect and honour it. They reported their finding as ‘historical 
heritage’ to the People’s Committee of Sa Huỳnh Commune and asked 
for permission to erect the shrine. However, the petition was dismissed 
1. To avoid the highly gendered language that privileges men and excludes women, 
I use the term fishers as the ‘best gender-neutral plural for people working in the 
fishing industry’ (Subramanian 2009: xiii). When I am referring specifically to 
males or females, I use the terms fishermen and fisherwomen. 
1 





by the cultural office on the grounds that building a shrine for the statue 
would constitute ‘superstition’ (mê tín dị đoan). A local policeman drew 
up a protocol of the occurrence and instructed the fishers not to display 
the statue publicly. Consequently, the group of fishers kept the statue 
out of the communal space and held private rituals for themselves. 
The sea has always been synonymous with insecurity for the humble 
fishers who ventured onto it. The wooden carving that the fishermen 
pulled out of the South China Sea likely traces its origins to one of the 
many merchant ships that went down in a storm or in pirate attack while 
navigating the coast of what today is Vietnam. The wooden statute thus 
provides a silent testimony to the hazards of seafaring, an activity which 
– if successful – could prove profitable, but which could also fail and 
cause major losses for the ship owner. As the vignette above suggests, 
the art of navigation may require not only steering a ship in the most 
literal sense against winds and currents, but also in a more symbolical 
sense between the strong hand of state authoritarian power and the 
geopolitical perils of the South China Sea dispute. Taking our cue from 
Greek mythology, the fishers had – and have – to find a way to navigate 
between the sea monsters Scylla, taking the form of a rocky cliff that may 
stand for Vietnam’s authorities, and Charybdis, a roiling whirlpool that 
in this case can symbolize the South China Sea dispute. In that sense, 
the fate of the wooden statue is a silent witness to the fishers’ efforts to 
call on their religious practices to navigate the various dangers in the 
seascape of everyday life and global politics. 
This book is about fishing communities living on the fringes of the 
South China Sea and the various ways they interact with state and reli-
gious authorities while at the same time responding to new geopolitical 
challenges. The focus is mainly on coastal people and the ways they have 
navigated religion and politics over the decades of massive change since 
their incorporation into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1975. The
sea plays a major role in this study, as does the location: a once-peripheral 
area now at the centre of a globally important struggle for sovereignty, 
legitimacy, and control in the South China Sea. The South China Sea 
is one of the busiest sea-lanes in the world, and the unimpeded flow of
maritime traffic is vital to the economies of East and Southeast Asia. A
number of countries make competing and overlapping claims of sover-






A Triad of Confrontation 
to justify access to the resources in the territorial waters surrounding 
them (Hayton 2014). The Paracel (Hoàng Sa) and Spratly (Trường
Sa) Islands in particular have become a bone of contention between 
China and Vietnam. The Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei all
claim partial sovereignty there as well, but China is the dominant mili-
tary force and Vietnam its main challenger. The maritime boundaries 
between China, Vietnam, and other countries have been only partially 
fixed. However, by law, all official Vietnamese maps must portray the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands within the national borders of Vietnam; all 
Chinese maps, conversely, must show the islands as being part of China. 
One of the principal research sites in this book is Lý Sơn Island, 
which was thrust into the national limelight as a symbol of Vietnam’s 
historical and present-day sovereign rights in the South China Sea. Lý
Sơn is a small atoll lying about 16 nautical miles (ca. 30 km) off the 
shore of Sa Kỳ port in central Quảng Ngãi province, connected to the 
mainland by a private hydrofoil service. One hundred twenty-three 
nautical miles (approximately 228 km) separate Lý Sơn from the Paracel 
archipelago, to which both Vietnam and China lay territorial claims. 
Because of its proximity to and discursive association with the Paracels, 
Vietnamese authorities consider Lý Sơn Island a sensitive border zone 
and a strategic defensive position. The second principal research site, 
Sa Huỳnh, is associated with the disputed parts of the South China Sea 
not in terms of geographical proximity, but rather in terms of its fishing 
legacy. In recent times, the fishing communities in both sites have come 
to be viewed as custodians of a maritime culture and hence as key actors 
in Vietnam’s resistance to Chinese claims over the South China Sea. 
While Lý Sơn is now depicted as a ‘heroic vanguard’ (tiên phong anh 
hùng) of Vietnam’s sovereignty, Sa Huỳnh – picturesquely located on a 
sand dune facing the sea – has become symbolic of idyllic, long-standing 
fishing communities that are now in need of cultural protection. These 
two fishing communities – Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn – are at the heart of 
this study. They are considered peripheral not so much because of their 
geographical remoteness, but for the alleged social ‘backwardness’ (lac
hâu) associated with coastal settlements and the mobile livelihoods of 
their residents. As a result, fishers only partially fit into the dominant 
imaginary of Vietnam’s territory and nation, propagated over the course 
of the various Indochina wars, as predominantly agrarian (Gourou 
3 






















1936, 1940; Mus 1948, 1952; McAlister and Mus 1970; FitzGerald 
1972; Scott 1976). 
Sa Huỳnh comprises a string of rural, coastal settlements trapped 
between the Trường Sơn mountain range (also known as Annamese 
Cordillera) to the west and the South China Sea to the east. While there 
are rice paddies along with the fish and shrimp farms and salt marshes, 
the broad sandy dunes and marshy plains create more favourable condi-
tions for fishing and salt production than for wet rice cultivation. For 
that reason the majority of Sa Huỳnh’s 20,000 people make their living 
from fishing, production of salt and fish sauce, fish breeding ponds, boat 
construction, animal husbandry, and seafood restaurants and shops. 
People in the poorest quarter of Sa Huỳnh live in sheds built right on 
the beach; those who are better off live in solidly built houses by the 
beach and further inland. 
National Route 1A and the parallel North–South Railway line cut
directly through the various settlements making up Sa Huỳnh, connect-
ing the capital Hanoi in the north with Ho Chi Minh City in the south.
National Route 1A is crowded with trucks, speeding buses, and mopeds
and motorcycles pulling small trailers that carry most of Sa Huỳnh’s fish
and other aquatic resources to the nearest markets in Đức Phổ and to
more distant centres inland. The shops that have mushroomed along
the highway offer to passing travellers a range of local products, includ-
ing dried fish and a famous local elixir made of sea horses preserved
in bottles of rice liquor. Next to these stalls, simple restaurants offer
cheap bowls of noodles. For the more discriminating traveller, there are
motels scattered along the main road where one can refresh oneself after
the journey, renting a room for the night and dining on fish, rice, and
vegetables washed down with alcohol. For some of its length, running
between tightly packed houses then continuing parallel to the coast, the
tracks of the North–South Railway mark a border between the sandy
beaches of the coast and the rice paddies to the west. Passing with a
terrible roar day and night, the trains trouble Sa Huỳnh residents and
fuel stories about the ghosts of those who failed to heed the approach-
ing train and were run over. Most of the time, however, people take
advantage of the railway line to sell their goods and refreshments to
passengers, thereby supplementing their meagre incomes. Whenever




A Triad of Confrontation 
cuttlefish, sweets, and dry pancakes (bánh tráng) to the passengers
peering out of the windows.
Beyond the tracks lie the flooded rice fields, dotted with small 
clusters of houses and groves of coconut palms stretching to the foot of 
the mountains. Shining emerald green in the bright sunlight, these rice 
paddies are irrigated by a stream that comes down out of the mountains, 
flows under the railway and highway bridges, and then turns to the south 
and flows for one kilometre parallel to the beach and finally out to the 
sea. Except in the driest months of the summer, the green section of the 
canalized stream right above the beach, covered with water ferns and 
grass, creates a perfect grazing area for cows. The canal itself functions as 
a fish trap. In the early morning, fishers paddle upstream and check their 
nets in search of small fish pushed into the canal at high tide. 
The long beach constantly changes throughout the year. In autumn 
and winter the sea is very rough and every wave – crashing against the 
shore – brings a huge mass of sand that forms dunes. At this time, the sea 
is full of unexpected holes, steep drops, seething whirlpools, and rapid 
currents that can pull a person under. With the arrival of spring, the sea 
softens. When summer comes, the kilometre-long beach resembles a 
golden caterpillar basking in the sun on the leaf of the turquoise sea. 
This is a happy time for village children, who splash in the sea and play 
football on the beach, taking advantage of the fading afternoon heat. 
Lý Sơn’s population is nearly the same size as Sa Huỳnh’s, but with 
steep volcanic hills covering two-thirds of the island, Lý Sơn residents 
have to take advantage of whatever space is available for housing and 
agriculture. The mineral-rich basalt soil of the plains, which descend 
right down to the sea, is unsuitable for rice cultivation but perfect for 
growing garlic, onions, and maize. Forming a green patchwork of fields 
stretching to the craggy cliffs of the three large volcanoes on the island, 
the long, round shoots of garlic and the flatter stalks of onions shimmer 
green-gold in the sunlight, much like the rice stalks in Sa Huỳnh. 
Rising from the sea, the bowl-shaped craters of three extinct volcanoes 
dominate the landscape of Lý Sơn. The deepest point of the largest crater 
Thới Lới, with its ragged cliffs walling off the island on its north side, 
was long ago turned into an artificial lake that functions as a source of 
water for the island’s residents. The sea cliff itself is famous for the Hang 
(Cave) pagoda and for its impressive formations of volcanic rock and 
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coral sandstone. On the other side of the island, the Giếng Tiền volcanic 
depression – covered with grass, shrubs, and coniferous and pineapple 
trees – provides both pastures for cows and a recreational space for Lý
Sơn residents and tourists. Rising to the sky and then dramatically falling 
into the sea, the crater’s steep side offers a splendid panoramic view of 
the island and the sea. At its foot stands a twenty-seven-metre-tall image 
of the bodhisattva Quan Âm (Guanyin in Chinese), erected by former 
Lý Sơn residents now living overseas to watch over and guard the South 
China Sea. Because it obstructs the view of the dramatic Giếng Tiền 
cliff side, the Buddhist statue has become a subject of heated discussion 
among residents and some guests from the mainland, with some argu-
ing that it adds to the beauty of the landscape and others viewing it as 
an eyesore that defiles the natural beauty. A similar debate is sparked by 
the mushrooming hotels, restaurants, and pubs, often built illegally right 
in the middle of the island’s most scenic spots. Newspapers in Vietnam 
lament that the massive – and often unplanned – buildings and tourist 
hotspots that taint the island’s landscape and have damaged its fragile 
marine ecosystem beyond repair.2 
On the fringes of the South China Sea, Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn have 
become the nodal points of Vietnam’s newly rediscovered maritime 
culture. This book thus charts the contours of Vietnam not from its 
firm terrestrial base of urban and agrarian centres, but by attending to 
its ‘loose ends’ – its sandy shorelines and territorial waters – to show 
how the places seen as remote or marginal are central to understanding 
Vietnam and the Vietnamese state (Harms 2011a: 12). What becomes 
visible on the ethnographic chart is not just the design formed by weav-
ing different coloured threads into a tapestry of the nation-state, but also 
where its loose ends get tied together into a knot anchoring the fabric of 
the national narrative. 
Beyond the coastal fringe of central Vietnam 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Paracels historically 
constituted fishing grounds for Lý Sơn fishermen, but the group of islets 
was also frequently visited by local fishermen from Hainan and by Malay 
2. See ‘Ly Son Island harmed by unplanned building’, available at https://en.vietnamplus. 
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and Buginese sailors who responded to the growing Chinese demand for 
luxury marine commodities (Lê Quý Đôn [1776] 1972; Warren 1981; 
Tagliacozzo 2011). Around the same time, Sa Huỳnh – located at the 
sea’s edge with access to sandy bays, estuaries, and rocky headlands, as 
well as to the mountainous forests of the Trường Sơn range – exchanged 
salt and fish with highlanders – Cham, Khor, and Hrê – who in return 
provided forest goods, buffaloes, and rice (see Hardy 2009). Rather 
than being a border zone between discrete societies, the resource-rich 
highlands and waters surrounding the Paracels were zones of interac-
tion and exchange of locally developed knowledge, technologies, and 
networks that generated livelihoods for coastal people (see Hardy 2005, 
2008, 2009; Salemink 2013, 2018a). 
In that sense neither Sa Huỳnh nor Lý Sơn really corresponds to
the stereotype of isolated and remote settlements: the coast was always
reachable from both land and sea, and the island has ‘all-round “con-
nectivity” … accessible to the seaborne’ (Pearson 2006: 358). What 
qualifies Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn as remote or peripheral is not so much 
geographical distance, but rather the presumed social ‘backwardness’
of fishing communities, which supposedly do not live up to the gener-
ally accepted conception of a monolithic ‘Vietnameseness’ that ignores 
regional, cultural, and historical differences. Colonial sources shaped 
influential territorial imaginaries of Vietnam centred on the terrestrial 
rice-growing Red River Delta as ‘the cradle of Vietnamese civilization’. 
The colonial era is also the source of the cliché of the Vietnamese
village as a politically autonomous, socially homogeneous corporate 
community surrounded by a hedge and rice paddies – thus an isolated 
and remote entity (see, for example, Gourou 1936, 1940; McAlister and 
Mus 1970; Scott 1976; Kleinen 1999a). Moreover, the classic tripartite 
division of Vietnam into North, Centre, and South – metaphorically 
characterized as ‘“two rice baskets on a pole” to describe the suppos-
edly rich agrarian North and South held together by the poor but hard-
working Centre’ – is still alive in many popular discourses and accounts 
(Wheeler 2006: 129–130). Keith Taylor (1998: 971) has convincingly 
argued against the ‘pan-Vietnamese village morphology’ that produced 
the Vietnamese hierarchy, which puts rice farmers at the top of the social 
ladder and fishers at the bottom, pointing out the many different ways of
being and acting Vietnamese that have existed through space and time.
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Taylor’s critique of stereotyped representations of Vietnamese history, 
culture, and territory that affirm unity and continuity is echoed in the 
work of Charles Wheeler (2006), Li Tana (2006), John Whitmore 
(2006), and Nhung Tuyet Tran and Anthony Reid (2006), all of whom
pay particular attention to Vietnam’s maritime frontier. By conceptual-
izing the littoral in terms of networks of transregional (dis)connectivity 
and flows, they offer a new perspective on Vietnamese society as seen 
from the sea. Like the littoral, which is in a constant state of flux, this 
society must be seen as fluid and flexible as well (Pearson 1985, 2003). 
The ethnographic material that is at the heart of this book shows 
that potent intersections of religion, economy, politics, and ecology are 
particularly visible in such a contact zone, where the state struggles to 
establish and increase its presence. The problematic conceptualization 
of a monolithic Vietnamese nation and culture (Evans 2002) tends to 
underplay the regional, historical, and cultural diversity, and to mar-
ginalize places such as coastal fishing villages because they are seen as 
representing an extreme, unusual, and unsettled situation that does not 
stand for the imagined Vietnamese territory and nation. Occasionally, 
such coastal societies might also be exoticized and viewed as guardians 
of an ancient fishing culture and a symbol of heroic sacrifice in the name 
of Vietnamese citizens, who started to identify themselves with the 
‘Vietnamese waters’ vis-à-vis China’s competing claims over the South 
China Sea. Probing the social life of such marginalized places requires 
bringing to light many pasts that were driven by ecology, politics, and
local actors themselves (Taylor and Whitmore 1995). The spatial mar-
ginality and ambivalence of such communities remains a major concern 
of the state, which tries to incorporate them through various cultural 
agendas and development programmes. These often contradictory and 
dispersed processes in the coastal communities reveal the uneven status 
of places and their different relationships with the state. 
There is nothing new in the idea that people in every society perceive 
themselves as being at the centre of the universe that they live in, see, 
and experience. At the same time, they recognize that other universes 
exist, and are sometimes more powerful than theirs is (Anderson 1991: 
13). Anna Tsing (1993), in the case of the Meratus Dayak communities 
living in the mountainous forest areas of South Kalimantan, Indonesia, 
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centre–periphery dichotomy, but is, rather, a process or a way of being. 
What constitutes in Vietnam the ‘centre’ (trung ương), the ‘local’ (địa
phương), the ‘periphery’ (ngoai vi), or a ‘remote area’ (vùng sâu vùng xa) 
very much depends on the relative vantage point of a person in relation 
to other geographic and political locations. For Lý Sơn Island, the centre 
is the Vietnamese mainland; for Sa Huỳnh it is the provincial city of 
Quảng Ngãi. But for Quảng Ngãi, the point of reference is the capital, 
Hanoi. What, then, constitutes the centre for Hanoi? Perhaps this could 
be the imagined trung ương or central state with its various agencies 
spread across the city. Neither the centre nor the periphery is a stable 
entity; they are, rather, relational categories that are always localized by 
people from their specific perspectives at various levels and in different 
locations. Likewise, it refers to their relationship with the state. 
It is for this reason that I take a closer look at two fishing communi-
ties in Quảng Ngãi Province, which before 1975 had been part of the 
Republic of Vietnam, also known as South Vietnam. Both Sa Huỳnh
and Lý Sơn expose the social, cultural, and historical unevenness of the
place and remind us that locality does not simply exist, but has to be 
produced and achieved against the backdrop of perennial change, con-
flict, and threat (Appadurai 1996). Although Sa Huỳnh did not escape 
the modern nation-state’s vision of national culture and development 
– focusing on both fisheries and tourism – these processes take on very 
different shapes on the coast. As the opening vignette shows, the desire 
of Sa Huỳnh people to turn their local worship of the statue recovered 
from the South China Sea into national ‘historical heritage’ was labelled 
‘superstitious’ and was consequently dismissed by local authorities. 
This is because Sa Huỳnh, firmly located on Vietnam’s shoreline, is not 
granted much latitude to diverge from the Vietnamese ideal. Lý Sơn, 
on the other hand, because of its perceived territorial and geopolitical 
vulnerability and ‘otherness’, needs to be absorbed and properly linked 
to the ‘centre’ (see Ardener 2012). 
No matter how alien Lý Sơn people’s livelihoods seems to be in the 
eyes of mainlanders, their ‘island indigenousness’ – whether in the form 
of seafaring tradition, fishing occupation, or beliefs – is necessary for 
Vietnam’s project of constructing a new ‘maritime’ nation. Lý Sơn’s 
connectedness with the state and the mainland has to be constantly en-
acted not only through more prosaic means such as the improvement of 
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boats, fishing operations, and a submarine cable that transmits electric-
ity from the mainland’s national power grid, but also through positive 
reinforcement of the island’s historical and cultural legacy. What might 
be considered ‘superstitious’ and ‘backwards’ in Sa Huỳnh could, on Lý
Sơn Island, provide evidence of maritime heritage and hence Vietnam’s 
long-standing sovereignty in the South China Sea, which is then invoked 
to counter China’s claims to the same territory. The ability of Lý Sơn to 
appropriate its alleged remoteness as a resource to claim various benefits 
from the state not only depends on its connectedness to surrounding 
zones, but also to the ‘dominant zone’, to use the term employed in this 
context by Ardener (2012: 532). Within this framework, both Sa Huỳnh 
and Lý Sơn stand out as ‘singularities’, an image that is reinforced by ‘per-
ceptions’ from the dominant zone about what constitutes Vietnamese 
culture. In contrast, this book features Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn in terms 
of spatial and temporal connections, without obscuring the complexity 
of geography, local histories, and ways of acting ‘Vietnamese’ (Li 2006; 
Tran and Reid 2006; Wheeler 2006). I conceptualize Sa Huỳnh and Lý
Sơn as part of coastal society whose livelihoods are connected to both 
the foreland and the hinterland. Occupying the shore and exhibiting mix 
of land and sea in their occupations, this society could be considered 
truly ‘littoral’ – a concept used by Michael Pearson to specify people 
living in coastal zones, on the beach, and along the intermediate frontier 
on land (Pearson 2006). 
By focusing my analysis on Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn, I do not aim to 
compare or homogenize the two settings, but rather to show how dif-
ferent localities stand out as ‘pluralities’ representing different levels of 
(dis)connectedness to state power. Sa Huỳnh’s and Lý Sơn’s histories and
their entanglements with modernity at the national and global scales un-
derscore the inadequacy of undifferentiated notions of state and society, 
religious and secular, and mainland and island. Contemporary religious 
practices are inscribed in the nuanced texture of everyday concerns, 
national debates, and international agendas, showing the actors’ rich 
arsenal of tactics and strategies in navigating binaries across and within 
the state–religion–village triad of contested domains. To fully recognize 
these everyday concerns and their connections with religious practices, 
one needs to pay attention to various groups of people who seek to 
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such ritual activities as conducting ceremonies, evoking and consulting 
spirits, and making offerings, but also through more profane technical 
and social practices such as building, renovating, and maintaining sacred 
spaces. The ritually transformed environs are purified when the state 
institutionalizes and nationalizes gods and spirits by selecting spirits, 
designating sacred spaces, and granting certificates in order to keep them 
under control and effectively ‘pin’ them down. In this process, villagers 
carry out their own counter-purification, as they sometimes choose to 
foreground the aesthetic or ‘national’ value of objects and spaces while 
temporarily backgrounding their religious value. By moving between 
opposing ideas of secular and religious rationalities and positioning 
themselves discursively and ritually against the backdrop of constant 
change, the villagers create and reinvent their religious practices in rec-
ognizable religious forms. In this sense, each of the settings – Sa Huỳnh 
and Lý Sơn – represents a different dimension in terms of local histories, 
practices, territory, and relations with the state and the wider world. For 
that reason, I argue, interactions across and within the triad of contested 
domains of state–religion–village assume sharper contours, and hence 
become more visible. 
Charting the contours of religion in Vietnam
The opening vignette speaks of contestations between state agents and
villagers over what constitutes legitimate religious practice in understud-
ied central Vietnam.3 My particular focus in this book is on the proliferat-
ing and shifting encounters between state and religious authorities; be-
tween religious authorities and fishers; between fishers and farmers; and
between men and women. These categories and individuals – divided by
age, gender, class, and profession – often adopt conflicting understand-
ings and strategies to achieve their goals vis-à-vis the state, represented by
central, provincial, and local officials, scholars, and journalists. These dif-
ferent confrontations involve relationships experienced and expressed in
terms of mutually exclusive binaries, the poles of which are in fact neither
mutually exclusive nor stable, as the examples below well illustrate.
While protests in Vietnam’s major cities against China’s installation of
an oil rig in what Vietnam considers its territorial waters were seen by the
3. Kwon (2006, 2009) and Avieli (2012) are among the rare studies focusing on 
central Vietnam. 
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Vietnamese authorities as politically harmful for the country’s relations
with China (Ciorciari and Weiss 2016), the delegation of Buddhist monks
that went to the Spratly archipelago to re-establish abandoned temples
was seen as helping to assert Vietnam’s sovereignty over the disputed
islands.4 This is because, in contrast to the bold anti-China protests that
challenged the Vietnamese state’s authority and legitimacy, the political
‘transcript’ (Scott 1990) of the Buddhist mission to the South China Sea
was veiled by a religious agenda that heeds a different source of authority
and indexes different moral tensions. Accordingly, the high-profile 2014
celebration for the peace of the Paracel and Spratly sailors (lê câu siêu
lính Hoàng Sa và Trương Sa) – held on Lý Sơn Island by a delegation of
Buddhist monks from Huế – was considered to be purely religious. The
people of Lý Sơn nevertheless added a personal (and political) touch to
the celebration by making sure that the Buddhist altar prepared for the
ceremony accommodated ancestral tablets (bài vị) with the names of lo-
cal fishermen who had gone missing in the vicinity of the disputed archi-
pelagos while bravely ‘clinging to the fishing grounds to defend national
sovereignty’ (bám ngư trương đê bao vê quyên tố quốc), as well as that of
the 67-year-old woman from Ho Chi Minh City who self-immolated to
show solidarity with fishermen affected by China’s deployment of the oil
rig in waters claimed by Vietnam.5 Both the 2014 anti-China protests in
the streets of Vietnam’s main cities and the woman’s self-immolation in
the same year added fuel to the debate about the disputed areas of the
South China Sea and to the allegation that Vietnam’s Party-state is weak
in its dealings with China. However, when folded into the context of the
celebration of Paracel and Spratly sailors, the potentially sensitive case
of the woman’s self-immolation became subsumed under the rubric of
religious rather than political expression, demonstrating that the oppos-
ing poles of religion and politics are not absolute and can be skilfully
navigated by both religious authorities and Lý Sơn people. Yet to treat
this ritual performance as apolitical would be to deny ‘the creative agency
of its myriad participants’ (Bowie 2017: 268). 
4. See ‘Vietnam to send Buddhist monks to Spratly Islands’, available at https:// 
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17343596, accessed 29 April 2020. 
5. See ‘Vietnamese woman dies in self-immolation protest against China’, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/23/vietnamese-woman-dies-




A Triad of Confrontation 
This book approaches binary oppositions such as institutionalized 
religion versus beliefs, religion versus politics, modern versus tradi-
tional, science versus superstition, cultural versus political, mainland 
versus island, Việt versus Cham, farmers versus fishers, masculine versus 
feminine, and ancestor versus ghost not as absolute, everlasting, or an-
tagonistic, but as constantly changing and shifting in pragmatic tactics 
employed within and across the triadic relationship between the state, 
villagers, and more institutionalized versions of religion. Binary ways 
of thinking about social phenomena have long been present in Western 
social theory. It comes as no surprise, then, that many of the debates 
about the state, religion, and society have been structured through 
the sacred–profane dichotomy posited by French sociologist Emilé
Durkheim (1995 [1915]) and through the legacy of Weberian thinking 
that places traditional/non-Western and modern/Western categories, 
or politics and religion, or individual beliefs and secularism on opposite 
ends of a spectrum (Weber 1951, 1966; Day 2002: 6). At the same time,
there has been a growing awareness among scholars that binary opposi-
tions that separate religion from politics or the sacred from the profane 
are generally not universally applicable categories, but a product of 
European thought transmitted to other parts of the world through colo-
nialism (Goody 1961; Stanner 1967; Granet 1975; Coleman and White 
2006; Turner 2006; Ashiwa and Wank 2009). Scholars have shown that 
these concepts are virtually irrelevant in practice in Asia, but they often 
nevertheless inform and transform the relations between state, religion, 
and society by creating a more universal category of ‘religion’ – one that 
is either relegated to the private realm or institutionalized and exploited 
in order to create and uphold a ‘national culture’ (DuBois 2009; Turner 
and Salemink 2015). As a result, the reductionist binaries of religion 
and secularism or religion and individual belief in Asia are constantly 
constructed and reconstructed across all levels of society and state. But 
to debunk or simply dismiss these binaries as irrelevant would mean to 
turn a blind eye to people who themselves are making and unmaking 
these categories on a day-to-day basis in their tactical engagement with 
authoritative state and religious discourses. 
Right after the end of the Second Indochina War (1975) and 
Vietnam’s formal reunification (1976), the Party-state sought to con-
trol all facets of life and relegated everything religious to the suspect 
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category of ‘superstition’. With the Đổi Mới reforms, which began in 
1986, Vietnam’s Party-state ceased to play the strong ideological role 
in people’s lives, as it adopted neoliberal reforms in partnership with 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations 
Development Programme, and foreign donors that affected the state 
and the market more than Marxist–Leninist ideology did (Salemink 
2008b: 282; see also Taylor 2001). This led to a situation in which
the state to some extent retreated from various domains such as health 
care, education, and welfare, and people themselves had to pay for the 
services they needed – a process known as xã hội hóa (socialization) 
that mostly affected the poorest sector of Vietnamese society (Salemink 
2008b: 282). However, the Party-state did not refrain from regulating
the place of religion in society; rather, it standardized and instrumental-
ized religious practices so as to provide moral and cultural reinforcement 
for the state’s various policies and projects. As sociologist Bryan Turner 
(2006: 210) argues, ‘national, secular politics is typically parasitic upon 
deeper, more embedded, religious traditions’ because political power 
lacks the persuasive authority of religious rituals. Meanwhile, religion 
itself is considered a competing source of power and morality that needs 
to be controlled, purified, and hybridized in order to exercise legitimate 
power over the population (Turner 2006: 211). 
The relationship between state, religion, and society is not a new
topic of debate in anthropology, especially in the context of an authori-
tarian country like Vietnam. Two distinct anthropological approaches 
can be identified when we talk about religion in Asia, which is home 
to all ‘world religions’ ( Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and
Confucianism) and a breeding ground for less institutionalized religious 
practices such as ancestor and spirit worship, Mother Goddess wor-
ship, and whale worship, to mention just a few among many (Turner 
and Salemink 2015). Religion in Asia is either approached through a
dichotomous and often antagonistic framework of state–religion inter-
actions (Anagnost 1994; Duara 1995; Van der Veer and Lehmann 1999; 
DuBois 2009; Salemink 2015) or through the framework of embodied 
and experienced religious practices that leaves the state out (Tsing 
1999; Morris 2000; Keane 2003, 2007, 2008; Pedersen 2011). One of 
the aims of this book is to refocus those debates by asking how people 
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it comes to religious practices. Whereas Yoshiko Ashiwa and David 
Wank (2009: 7) define the confrontation between state and religion as 
‘the process of institutionalizing the modern concept of religion in the 
state and in religion’, this book tackles the ways in which state and non-
state actors seek to navigate the ideology of the state by continuously 
rupturing and rearranging secular and religious binaries. While the state 
cannot be ignored in Asia, state–religion binaries that reduce the state to 
a Foucauldian disciplinary apparatus and people’s actions to resistance 
or co-optation obscure the full spectrum of interactions between the 
two realms. 
Navigating a triad of contested categories:
state–religion–village 
Deriving from the Latin words navis (‘ship’) and agere (‘to drive’), navi-
gation describes the process of ‘accurately determining and controlling 
the movement of a [water]craft … along the desired course. This can 
only be accomplished by finding the navigator’s position compared to 
known locations’ or landmarks.6 To ensure the vessel’s safe movements 
on the sea, successful navigation relies on accurate mapping not only of 
natural and man-made features, but also those more elusive features that 
at certain times rise above the water’s surface and on other occasions 
remain submerged. 
In a more symbolic sense, navigating could be interpreted as the
way in which we ‘act and react in relation to our current position within
social terrain, in response to current constraints, possibilities and con-
figurations of power, as well as in relation to our perception of the future 
terrain and its unfolding’ (Vigh 2010: 159). Henrik Vigh (2010: 159) 
wrote that ‘in order to move towards where we wish to go, we sometimes 
take detours, sometimes refrain from acting and sometimes engage in 
apparently illogical acts, shaped in anticipation of what is to come’. Vigh’s 
anthropological account of ‘social navigation’ (2008, 2010) indicates
that it is directed towards the condition of constrictions and confine-
ments, changes and possibilities, that arise in situations of chronic crisis 
created by a war, protracted violence, or persistent poverty. Within such 
a framework, crisis and chronicity form a ‘condition’ in which instability 
6. See ‘Navigation’,https://www.marinelink.com/articles/maritime/navigation-100154, 
accessed 30 April 2020. 
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and ‘disorder [become] the expected order of things’ (Vigh 2008: 15). 
Yet the normalization of crisis is not tantamount to indifference or apa-
thy; rather, it is a kind of agentive experience that forces people to attune
their ‘movement and action to an opaque and fluctuating social environ-
ment’ (Vigh 2008: 18). When crisis is endemic rather than episodic, it 
becomes the ‘context’ for provisional action, navigation, and meaning 
in everyday life (Vigh 2008). While I fully agree that ‘navigation’ is a 
sort of ‘motion within motion’ that can only be anchored in praxis 
(Vigh 2010: 140), I wish to show in this book how navigation can also 
be enacted in situations of relative stability and order. Here, navigation 
is directed towards the unpredictability and constriction created not by 
chronic crises, but by authoritative visions of state and religion. Such 
social navigation takes place when social actors find themselves caught 
between competing sources of authority – powerful state and religious 
figures – and between seemingly impossible alternatives and desires that 
confront them with perils no matter what direction they face. 
Here the binary oppositions arise: the mythical monsters Scylla 
and Charybdis who, on opposite sides of a narrow sea strait, work in 
tandem to block passage. To steer away from Charybdis means veering 
too close to Scylla and being dashed to pieces against the rocky outcrop 
of the six-headed giant. To avoid Scylla means steering the vessel too 
close to Charybdis and being sucked into the vortex of the sea monster’s 
whirlpool. The art of navigation thus demands from social actors a vi-
sion that not only takes these binary oppositions into account but that
also – when choosing to deal with one pole – allows them to keep one
eye on the other pole in order to safely traverse the gap between the two.
Analogically speaking, navigating the binaries of everyday life and eve-
ryday politics requires that Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn fishers establish their 
position by braving one or the other monster – that is, either powerful 
state figures or religious authorities. The other option is to adjust their
course and pass through the violent currents of new geopolitical chal-
lenges and national preoccupations, avoiding direct encounters with 
the monsters while passing within sight of them, much as Jason and his
Argonauts did when they took a detour through the Wandering Rocks 
on their way to retrieve the Golden Fleece, thereby avoiding Scylla and
Charybdis. This analogy quite neatly encapsulates the triadic relation-
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represents a model of social relations that is never fixed, that is always 
changing and changeable. 
The state–religion–village relationship is understood here as a triad
of contested categories which do not necessarily ‘collapse into dichoto-
mies of domination versus resistance’ (Harms 2012: 737), but emerge in
a proliferation of shifting binaries, such as one type of discipline versus
another; discipline versus indiscipline; secular versus religious; island
versus mainland; fishers versus farmers; local ritual versus Buddhist 
doctrine; and female versus male religious practices. While confronta-
tions do occur between different sides, they do not involve monolithic 
entities with a singular agency, like state and society, but occur between 
heterogeneous actors representing different and often conflicting ideas
and disciplines (Salemink 2013:173; see also Malarney 2001, 2002, 
2003; Day 2002; Luong 2003; Taylor 2007; Ashiwa and Wank 2009; 
Harms 2011a, 2012; Herzfeld 2016; Subramanian 2009). In this book I
argue that binary oppositions do exist in Vietnam between the state, vil-
lagers’ vernacular expressions of religion, and the more institutionalized 
versions of religion such as Buddhism, but they often shift and realign 
in unexpected and pragmatic ways. They are flexible, temporary, and 
spatially limited, as different social actors might subtly deny or selec-
tively use, accommodate, and modify authoritative religious and cultural 
languages to legitimize their various, often contradictory, interests and 
goals.
Three analytical concepts – semiotic ideology, purification, and
indiscipline – help me explain the kind of shifts in binaries required by 
state officials, different categories of villagers, and doctrinally minded 
religious authorities to navigate secular and religious rationalities as 
well as diverging practical interests. I draw on the concept of semiotic 
ideology to analyse the words, signs, and meanings that various social 
actors use to achieve their goals. Webb Keane (2003, 2007, 2008) 
employs semiotic ideology to denote the dynamic interconnections 
across authoritative religious languages in the context of the cultural 
encounter between Protestantism and local ancestor worship practices 
in Indonesia. However, my use of semiotic ideology captures the words, 
signs, and meanings that build on both religious and state ideologies. 
In Vietnam, the appropriation of religion as a representation of culture 
and nation transcends political, linguistic, and religious boundaries and 
17 









has generated a vast repertoire of religious traditions and practices that 
compete with the state’s semiotic ideology (Salemink 2015; see Chapter 
2 for a detailed discussion). As Michael Herzfeld shows, such binarism 
itself is not static, but ‘creates a kaleidoscopic range of possibilities’, 
some of which may be institutionalized by one group of people and 
completely rejected by another (Herzfeld 2016: 24). The vignette at the 
beginning of this introduction gives a snapshot of how different actors 
move between the opposing poles of shifting secular–religious bina-
ries. Aware of the state policy of protection and promotion of cultural 
heritage, fishers used the secular argument to get permission to build a
shrine for the statue they recovered from the sea. This was, however, not
enough to convince the local state representatives, who considered such
a project ‘superstitious’ and potential grounds for opportunism and self-
ish motives in the name of ‘religious beliefs’. On the other hand, as this 
book shows, there are occasions when villagers successfully negotiate 
their religious practices, proving themselves to be remarkably skilled 
at re-adapting the national discourse on heritagization for their own 
purposes (see Herzfeld 2016). Institutionalized religions, vernacular 
expressions of religion, and the ideologies of the post-socialist state
are mediated, interpreted, and rationalized across different social fields
by political and religious semiotic ideologies. The ability of state and
non-state actors to navigate these semiotic ideologies and to ‘recognize 
[their] forms as “the same” depends on certain ways of framing them, 
since their very materiality means they are always open to other unreal-
ized possibilities’ (Keane 2007: 21). This book tackles the multiplicity 
of ways in which semiotic ideologies are mobilized in response to the 
materiality of religious practices and objects, thereby allowing the 
reader to see how the binaries across and within the triad of contested 
domains of state–religion–village are continuously drawn, interrupted, 
and rearranged in everyday life experience (see Harms 2012). 
One of the ways in which state and religious semiotic ideologies 
respond to the materiality of religion is through purification. According 
to Mary Douglas’s analysis of purity and pollution situated within a 
Durkheimian dichotomy of sacred and profane, purification means 
‘separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing transgressions … to
impose system on an inherently untidy experience’ (2001: 4). In Chapter 




A Triad of Confrontation 
of the Buddhist bodhisattva Quan Âm in Sa Huỳnh appeared as ‘pollut-
ing’ to the policemen who carried out the task of vacating a local pagoda, 
this was because their state semiotic ideology rejected the Buddhist 
statue as ‘matter out of place’, to use Douglas’s (2001: 41) words. Almost 
thirty years later the new head monk of the local Buddhist pagoda saw 
the villagers’ placement of the same Buddhist statue in a non-Buddhist 
space as matter out of place because, in his religious semiotic ideology, 
‘Buddhist’ was to be kept strictly separate from ‘non-Buddhist’, just as 
religious practices and spaces had to remain separate from secular and 
superstitious ones. Thus, purification works through demarcation and 
the sharpening of distinctions among different categories and domains 
of social life, as Keane argues (2007: 83).7 Building further on Keane’s 
notion of purification, in this book I understand purification as cleans-
ing religious discourses and practices by rejecting those elements that 
do not conform to orthodoxy and orthopraxy in modernist political 
or religious semiotic ideologies. Such purification includes the institu-
tionalization and heritagization of religion – an exclusionary process 
in which religion assumes a highly organized form – as exemplified 
by UNESCO’s recent recognition of the Mother Goddess worship as 
an Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity (Salemink 2015, 2016a, 
2016b). Working through separation, demarcation, and cleansing of 
various categories, purification therefore sharpens binary oppositions 
within the triadic relationship of state–religion–village. 
While state and religious semiotic ideologies draw boundaries 
between binary categories, they are undermined by an indiscipline that 
blurs such binaries (Mbembe 1992). Rather than centre my analysis on 
Foucault’s (1975, 1991) approach, which privileges the apparatus of state 
power and the strategies through which state discipline is produced and 
internalized by the population, I track the exact procedures and means 
7. In his critique of modernity, Bruno Latour (1993) uses the term purification to
describe the process of ontologically separating the categories of human (culture) 
and non-human (nature), as is done in ‘modern’ science, in contradistinction to 
religion. In contrast, Keane argues that purification does not necessarily exclude 
the category of religion from the ‘modern’ (2007: 23–25), which is congruent 
with my own ethnographic material, as shown in my discussion of religious pu-
rification. Moreover, whereas Keane draws on Latour’s concept of purification as 
sharpening the boundaries between things and persons, he criticizes Latour for 
not explaining how purification really works. 
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used to obscure those binaries by focusing on the ways in which various 
actors in the triad of contested categories – state, religion, and village 
– rework semiotic ideologies. Assuming that agency is located within 
rather than outside structures of power (Giddens 1979; Keane 2003, 
2007; Ortner 2006), I show how state and non-state actors in Vietnam 
use indiscipline as a common tactic in response to forms of religious and 
state discipline (Certeau 1984; Mbembe 1992; Mahmood 2005; Harms 
2012). By ‘indiscipline’ I mean the use of strategic, improvised tactics 
by different actors, not necessarily to resist or reject selected political 
and religious repertoires, but to draw on them in order to pursue their 
own agendas. This has the effect, however, of subverting the dominant 
semiotic ideologies and rupturing, rearranging, and blurring binary 
oppositions. Denoting insubordination through continuous bargaining 
and re-invention, indiscipline stands in contrast to Foucault’s (1975) 
concept of discipline, and thus better captures the temporality and 
unpredictability of everyday interactions and practices through which 
subjectivities are formed and enacted (Mbembe 1992). However, the 
idea of indiscipline cannot be considered without the idea of discipline, 
as both are part of the same dialectical relationship. 
By bringing together these three analytical concepts – semiotic 
ideology, purification, and indiscipline – in my ethnographic material, 
I examine how different actors locate and redefine their positions in 
binaries that change and shift across and within the triadic relationship 
between state officials, villagers, and religious modernizers. Focusing on 
how state agents, fishers, and religious figures impose and subvert rules 
not by rejecting them but by invoking the dominant semiotic ideolo-
gies, I argue that binaries between state and villagers, between state and 
religious authorities, and between religious authorities and villagers are 
realigning all three categories. Yet, diverse religious practices, including 
their material articulations, exist simultaneously in the local community 
and indicate shifting allegiances in which state and non-state actors in 
central Vietnam sometimes align with the selected categories of the 
state or religious semiotic ideologies, and sometimes do not. 
Multi-sited research and methodology 
The material for this book was collected during a year-long period of 
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2007 in Quảng Ngãi Province, central Vietnam, and complemented
with follow-up visits totalling four months in 2011 and 2014. In
Vietnam, access to the field requires not only approval both of national
research institutions and government officials, but also cooperation
with local authorities. My Polish background and the lingering effects
in the present of the sense of fraternity among former Communist
bloc countries, together with my ability to speak and understand
Vietnamese, were crucial to my gaining permission to conduct
extended fieldwork in Sa Huỳnh and particularly on Lý Sơn Island,
which, due to its border status, was a politically sensitive zone closed
to most foreigners at that time. The Quảng Ngãi authorities had their
own understanding of my role in the province and also of the research
I was carrying out. In my PhD project the Provincial Office of Culture,
Sport, and Tourism saw a chance to raise the profile and visibility of
the province not only within the country, but also outside its borders.
Promoting Sa Huỳnh, which was associated with the colonial period’s
discoveries of a Bronze Age civilization of the same name (part of the
so-called Đông Sơn culture), and Lý Sơn Island as a not yet ‘discov-
ered’ place was part of that agenda.8 
My focus on religion determined the character of the ethnographic 
research that I carried out. People and their religious practices and 
worldviews turned out to be much more dynamic, mobile, and unpre-
dictable than I had assumed when I carefully designed my plan to stay 
in a small community. The idea of a ‘small fishing community’ itself 
turned out to be a fiction, as mobility and commercial networks across 
the South China Sea have been the hallmarks of this coastal society for
centuries (Li Tana 1998). The invitation of provincial authorities to in-
clude Lý Sơn Island encouraged me to change my initial plan and design 
a new project after I had already arrived in the field, one which took into 
account the fact that the two sites might provide me with the exciting 
possibility of exploring the relationship between the state and religion, 
and how religion might play out in a ‘peripheral’ border security zone. 
I did not conceive of it as a comparative research project, as fieldwork 
8. Đông Sơn culture is the name given to societies that lived in northern Vietnam 
from c. 600 BC to c. 200 AD. It is usually associated with bronze and early iron age 
civilizations and the discoveries of Đông Sơn bronze drums across the Southeast 
Asia, with the greatest concentration in northern Vietnam (Solheim 1988‒1989). 
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in different geographical places is often envisioned. To the contrary, 
following the paths and movements of people, objects, and narratives, I 
collected data that gave me a more complex and complete picture of the 
state, religion, and society in central Vietnam and forced me to rethink 
differences and connections found in the two settings (Malinowski 
1961[1922]; Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Marcus 1995, 1998). 
Because ‘religion’ in Vietnam plays out quite differently from the in-
stitutional monotheistic religions in the Western context, I had to figure 
out how to collect data regarding less formalized and institutionalized 
Vietnamese religious traditions. Villagers in Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn do
not form religious organizations in which members meet and pray regu-
larly to a particular spirit. Village temples were only open during com-
munal ceremonies. Although people felt obliged to contribute money, 
they were free to decide whether they wanted to attend these events or 
not. Their presence was not obligatory since there were elders in charge 
of the rituals. Often, villagers’ religiosity was transactional and ritualistic 
rather than exclusively devotional. During my ethnographic immersion, 
I gradually began to comprehend the ‘native’ point of view about what 
‘religion’ is and what it means ‘to be religious’ in Vietnam. I realized 
that although I was able to classify a particular spirit and determine 
general patterns, in everyday practice all gods and places merged with 
one another in a very flexible way that depended on the historical and 
political circumstances or individual preferences. This book sheds light 
on how such flexibility leads to a never-completed project and creates 
endless ‘hybrids’ across different social fields, geographical locations, 
and temporalities, mixing objects and categories (Latour 1993; Douglas 
2001; Keane 2008). 
An ethnographic approach that traces the recent past through the ac-
counts of people and records the present – shared between the ethnog-
rapher and the subject in real-time interaction in the field (Kumar 2016:
54) – proves useful for conceptualizing the way in which binary forms
of contestations emerge, dissolve, and re-emerge at different points in 
time among various groups of actors. Connecting the dots between 
temporally disparate events, practices, and people allows me to reveal
a triad of confrontation that is unstable over time. The value of this
ethnographic method lies in the possibility of analysing and theorizing
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oping an analytical model that goes beyond a simplistic demonstration 
of the top-down exercise of naked state power on villagers or a study of
straightforward bottom-up resistance of individuals and groups in the
village seeking to challenge the hegemony of the state. By ethnographi-
cally mapping different structural positions and goals in the triad of 
confrontation at various moments and locations in time, the structure of 
this book demonstrates the complexity and temporality of these interac-
tions in which the lines of dispute, of cross-cutting allegiances, and of 
tactical positions are constantly shifting. 
Structure of the book
The structure of the book traces the multifarious and boundary-
crossing religious and ritual practices from the perspective of fishers 
and farmers, men and women, and religious leaders and state officials. 
The ethnographic insights in the chapters highlight the role of the sea 
in people’s lives – not just in their livelihoods but in their cosmology as 
well. A view that takes the sea into account as part of the ecology and 
cosmology of coastal people is more common in the ethnography of 
Oceania and the island nations of Southeast Asia, but is still rather new 
for continental Asia and especially for Vietnam, which until recently 
was defined, and defined itself, primarily as a land-based, rice-growing, 
agricultural civilization. Thus, the distinctive focus on the sea as part 
of ritual practices highlights the fact that navigating state and religious 
authorities in Vietnam’s maritime periphery is a dynamic, flexible, 
changeable, and interconnected process. Making and doing religion 
is affected not only by larger socio-cultural forces, but also by the 
embodied actions of the relevant actors. The ethnographic examples 
in the chapters show that there are real confrontations between these 
groups, but also temporary and pragmatic coalitions and manipulations 
of state and religious discourses allowing various categories of actors to 
achieve often contradictory goals within the same semiotic ideology. By 
describing how these confrontations and contestations become visible 
in Vietnam’s maritime periphery, both in terms of discipline – as a state 
project – and of indiscipline – as a common tactic people use to navigate 
state and religious ideologies – I offer an in-depth analysis of the triadic 
relationship of state–religion–village in a relatively little-known part of 
Vietnam. 
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Chapter 1 starts by addressing the spatial dimensions of the sea 
with reference to religious practices. I briefly discuss the historical 
and vernacular geographies of the field settings and religious sites. I 
emphasize the overlapping histories of the Kinh (Viêt) and the Cham 
and the gradual absorption of the Cham seafaring legacy by the Kinh. 
Moving away from the tendency to segregate Cham and Vietnamese 
histories (Wheeler 2006), I also question the idea of ‘Vietnameseness’, 
which glosses over regional, historical, and cultural differences. Chapter
2 opens with a discussion of the category of religion in the context of
Vietnam against the broader backdrop of Asia. Like other parts of 
Southeast Asia, in Vietnam a separate term that could refer to ‘religion’ 
only emerged in the context of European colonialism and in connec-
tion with Western narratives of modernity. During the period of High 
Socialism in Vietnam, ‘religion’ was often conflated with the Sino-
Vietnamese term mê tín dị đoan (‘superstition’), according to which 
religion appeared as archaic, unscientific, and politically heterodox. In 
the early years of the Đổi Mới era (1986–1990s), the Vietnamese state 
gradually abandoned the interpretation of religion as ‘unscientific’ and
‘irrational’, but continued trying to draw a line between those informal, 
vernacular religious practices that were designated as having a ‘national
character’ (known as tín ngương) and therefore were worthy of recogni-
tion, and those considered ‘superstition’, which were to be suppressed 
and eradicated.9 This led the state to reformulate meanings connected 
with diverse religious traditions in line with the new, ‘purified’ cat-
egory of religion as ‘cultural heritage’ and to design new measures for 
controlling such practices. By zooming in on binary opposites such as 
institutionalized religion versus beliefs, religion versus politics, and science
versus religious superstition, I prepare the ground for the discussion not 
only of how these binaries inform people’s action, but also how they are 
subverted in everyday practice by people acting to promote their own 
personal or collective interests. 
Chapter 3 moves into the main empirical arguments of the book, pro-
viding an outline of the history of the two main forms of socio-economic
organization in the coastal society over the centuries, those of rice cultiva-
9. While the Đổi Mới reforms have never ‘ended’ and so are, theoretically, still in 
place, I refer to the Đổi Mới era as the initial period of active reforms, starting in 
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tion and fishing. In pre-colonial and colonial times, the latter was always
the more marginal; the activities of fishers were seen as less valuable and
prestigious and they were physically excluded from the village settle-
ments and ritual practices of the former and from the hierarchical appa-
ratus of the state. They formed instead their own, more egalitarian forms
of social organization. Nevertheless, the two organizational structures
most representative of this binary opposition – the agriculture-based
village (làng) and the guild-oriented fishing organization (van) – were
always interdependent and symbiotic, and their linkages are especially
evident in their shared cosmology. In postcolonial times, the histori-
cally subordinate fishers availed themselves of the Party-state’s efforts to
break down the hierarchical structure of the old society. In post-Đổi Mới
times, the fishers became richer and enhanced their social position vis-
à-vis the farmers through ritual investment in agriculture-based temples.
Throughout the chapter, I argue that by resisting exclusive ritual control
of the village temples by farmers, fishers have managed, in part, to turn
the tables and subvert the old hierarchy that had excluded them from the
ritual and political domain of the village.
Chapter 4 describes the confrontation between a Buddhist monk, 
fishers, and state agents for control over sacred places. I start by sketch-
ing the antireligious measures taken by the state shortly after Vietnam’s 
reunification in 1975. In Sa Huỳnh, the policemen who carried out the 
task of vacating the village pagoda had to quickly decide what to do with
a two-metre-tall image of the Buddhist bodhisattva Quan Âm that was
too heavy and unwieldy to take to the district office. Reluctant to destroy 
the Buddhist statue themselves, the policemen latched onto the fishers’ 
offer to take the statue away, which allowed the policemen to report that 
they had fulfilled their task. Both sides saw Quan Âm’s translocation to 
a nearby hill as an opportunity to act in accordance with state policies 
and their own personal preferences. However, twenty–eight years later,
the presence of Quan Âm on the hill created a problem for the new head 
monk of the village pagoda, who found it inappropriate that a sacred 
image of the Buddha was placed in a non-Buddhist space and demanded 
that fishers return the statue to its original location. The chapter illus-
trates that this encounter was an ideological struggle between competing 
purifying disciplines of, on the one hand, state agents who transformed 
local religious practices to align with present-day realities of postsocialist 
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Vietnam, and, on the other hand, monks who held that neither cultural 
interests nor local customs had a place in ‘pure’ Buddhism. 
Chapter 5 analyses one of the state’s commemorative projects de-
voted to glorifying the Paracel and Spratly seafarers on Lý Sơn Island 
and preserving all temples and relicts related to their activities. The 
state project can be seen as part of a strategy to claim sovereignty over 
the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos in the face of competition among 
several states, including China. However, the Vietnamese state is also 
challenged by alternative accounts from Lý Sơn islanders, particularly 
the efforts of one of the families to have their female ancestor officially 
inducted into the pantheon of Paracel heroes. Focusing on the dual 
process of appropriation and reworking of national narratives by the 
island community, I show that provincial authorities were more willing 
to accept male ancestors of Lý Sơn as potential heroes of the eighteenth-
century Paracel and Spratly flotilla than their female kin because they 
aligned not only with the interests of village lineages, but also with the 
broader interests of the nation-state. On the more theoretical level, the 
intersection of commemorative process with lineage competition and 
with the state authorities’ interests and preferences illuminates how the 
binary of state and society collapses in upon itself and how the maritime 
periphery becomes the centre in the performance of sovereignty played 
out along the lines of the state‒religion‒village triadic relationship. 
Chapter 6 provides an analysis of how women deal with men’s ex-
clusionary claims to religious authority and ritual practice. Women, like 
fishers, constitute a subaltern group that suffered from discrimination 
in the village religious space, but also found a way to take advantage of 
the state’s cultural policy. In one case a woman in Sa Huỳnh enhanced
her status as a religious specialist by cultivating her reputation as a spirit
medium, which had the unintended but welcome consequence of help-
ing her cope with financial insecurities brought about by the volatile 
market. This woman’s ultimate success in her quest for religious author-
ity, which had previously been the exclusive preserve of men in that 
part of Vietnam, was made possible through transgression of symbolic 
gender boundaries in ritual practices. Thus, by focusing on women and 
their religious activities I provide an account of the ongoing process of 
redefining gender roles in ritual contexts in coastal communities and of 
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In the concluding chapter, I address the implications of fishers’
 imbuing their religious practices with a political dimension as they
navigate their way through multiple-level contestations and confronta-
tions. I propose that Michel de Certeau’s (1988) understanding of 
dialectical relations beyond servility or resistance is crucial for scholarly 
work on state, religion, and society. It provides important insights into 
the dynamic creativity of everyday interactions and the dominant se-
miotic ideologies that are always related to and function in particular 
social situations and power relationships. Within a framework that 
foregrounds the centrality of the maritime periphery, state, community, 
and religious authorities are mutually drawn into doing and making 
religion through their improvised tactics – not simply to resist, reject, 
or acquiesce, but to pursue their own agendas by drawing on selected 
political and religious repertoires. While state and religious ideologies 
insist on drawing sharp boundaries between binary categories such as 
religion and politics or institutionalized religion and popular beliefs, the 
categories are undermined in everyday practice by an indiscipline that 
blurs and shifts the boundaries of such binaries. This approach allows
me to show that doing and making religion is neither exclusively a state
nor a community practice, but rather the always temporary and incom-
plete product of tactical manoeuvres and interactions of various actors 
who invoke, enact, and embody binary positions, often appropriating 
the same or similar semiotic ideologies in order to subvert them. 
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Sa Huỳnh, a coastal region of central Vietnam, and the island of Lý Sơn have long been socially and economically oriented around the South China Sea. Both places are associated with a distinct 
Bronze Age culture of Austronesian seafarers referred to as the Sa Huỳnh 
culture, which flourished in central and southern Vietnam between 
1000 BC and 200 AD.1 The Sa Huỳnh archaeological sites, named after 
the village where the discovery took place and where I conducted my 
fieldwork, provided evidence of intercultural links to maritime Malay 
cultures and extensive trade networks across the South China Sea as 
early as 600 BC (Wheeler 2006; Vickery 2009), predating the Cham 
period by a millennium or more. For centuries, then, the sea was a 
space that integrated and facilitated the circulation of wealth, power, 
and knowledge, while the seacoast was a point of cross-cultural contact 
rather than a borderline (Wheeler 2006). 
Charles Wheeler (2001: 6) notes that most of the seaports in the 
central and southern parts of Vietnam were established during the 
Nguyễn period (1802–1945) on the foundations of former Cham sea-
ports that had had extensive trade relations with seafaring merchants of 
predominantly Chinese origin (see also Đông Khánh Địa Dư Chí 2003 
[1885]; Ngô Đức Thọ and Nguyễn Văn Nguyên 2006).2 Historically,
1. In 1909, the French scholar M. Vinet identified jar burials, pottery, and other 
objects with characteristic ornaments in the coastal village of Sa Huỳnh. The first 
discovery of artefacts in Sa Huỳnh was followed by excavations by Vietnamese 
archaeologists in other settings, including the most recent one on Lý Sơn Island. 
2. In Quảng Ngãi Province alone there were six ports – Sa Huỳnh, Thới Cần, Sa Kỳ, 
Lý Sơn, Đ i Cổ Lũy, and Mỹ Ý – that are of Cham origin. 
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the Cham port network included Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn and stretched 
as far as Hainan Island and Guangzhou, where Cham merchant com-
munities existed for over a thousand years, interacting, and engaging 
in commerce with Chinese as well as Arab, Persian, Jewish, and Indian 
merchants. The coast served as a ‘nexus for sea, coastal, riverine, and 
land traffic that integrated Vietnamese regions and linked Vietnam with 
maritime Asia’ (Wheeler 2001: 6). 
The Cham were known throughout Southeast Asia not only as skilful 
seafarers and successful merchants, but also as ‘pirates’, due to their naval 
raids on coastal areas that employed ethnically diverse maritime peoples 
(Hall 2011: 80). Between the seventh and fifteenth centuries, the Cham 
established their rule over coastal plains and mountainous zones in what 
is now south-central Vietnam (Nam Trung Bộ), a region that stretches 
from Quảng Nam to Bình Thuận provinces. Although the Cham sover-
eign polities never formed a unified kingdom (Vickery 2009: 45), the 
Cham and Cambodian inscriptions as well as Chinese sources from 
the seventh century refer to them as ‘Champa’. In the fifteenth century, 
Champa was invaded by Đ i Việt – the name of the Việt polity at the 
time – which gradually took control of the entire Cham territory. It was 
not until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, that Nguyễn 
lords were able to establish their power in the south. The civil wars 
between the Nguyễn and the Trịnh lords (1627–1672 and 1774–1775), 
which divided Vietnam into northern and southern realms, created 
conditions that allowed Việt migrants living in the south to form their 
own distinct way of life. Central Vietnam was part of the southern realm 
and provided an option for northern Vietnamese migrants who, driven 
by a shortage of land, famine, internal conflict, and struggles for power, 
were seeking a better life elsewhere. 
Historian of Southeast Asia Li Tana (1998) points out that the Việt,
who arrived in the seventeenth century, had to settle into a new and dif-
ferent environment and engage with Cham communities. Their gradual 
extension into new areas in the south allowed migrants to escape domi-
nation by the northern court of Trịnh in the Red River Delta, and to 
adopt such local elements as Cham deities and spirit cults, which were 
free of Confucian restrictions (Li 1998: 101–116). Vietnamese migrants 
colonizing the old Cham territory worshipped tutelary spirits that they 
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of the sea, the encounter with the unfamiliar Cham civilization, and 
interethnic marriages produced patterns that were quite different from 
those that existed in northern Vietnam (Li 1998). Therefore, to gain an 
adequate appreciation of contemporary religious practices and the sites 
of spirit worship in Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn, one must take a closer look at 
the historical legacy of the Cham, at different ways of being Vietnamese, 
and at the complex history of this coastal society. 
Cham and Viê. t legacies 
In Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn there are numerous temples and shrines located 
where anthropomorphized deities and terrestrial and maritime spirits 
are venerated by the local community. Many of these temples bear traces 
of assimilation of Cham elements into Việt culture, while others show 
a strong Chinese influence. As we will see in Chapter 3, they cast an 
interesting light on the history of the two locations, but also reveal an 
interrelated series of binary oppositions involving mainland and island, 
inland and coast, and land and sea, and thus different relationships 
between people and space. While Sa Huỳnh villagers almost never 
expressed anxiety about the previous Cham inhabitants of the land, the 
Việt residents of Lý Sơn Island were acutely aware that they were only 
the latest residents in a long history of settlement. This was a source of
anxiety, as was the fact that the archeological record indicates that the
Cham civilization was present prior to the Việt arrival on Lý Sơn in the
seventeenth century. Islanders assuaged such unsettled feelings by seek-
ing to convey a sense of genealogical continuity with larger entities such 
as the mainland and the nation. During my conversations with islanders, 
many of them betrayed a sense of unease regarding the previous Cham 
presence. One of the Lý Sơn villagers told me: 
In the past Bình Thuận was the place of origin for the Cham people, but 
from there they spread to central parts, entering Đà Nẵng and Quảng 
Nam. In Lý Sơn there were not so many of them, so [the land] out 
here was intact. There was no one to have an exchange with at all. For 
that reason in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Việt people 
occupied Champa and stayed there. Well, back then, people from all 
provinces were moving in and out … to other provinces. There were 
also people here [on the island] and the Cham also came here, but 
then [Việt] occupied the islands. After that [Cham] did not come here 
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anymore, they were not able to (laughing). … The Việt caught crabs, 
fish, and snails, which they ate through the day to survive. When more 
Việt occupied the island and stayed here, civil harmony with Champa 
people began. 
When I asked the villager what he meant by ‘civil harmony with Champa’, 
he replied: 
There were still a few Cham people here – they lived on this land. After 
those regarded as Cham died, they did not enter the island anymore; 
they were gone so the Việt people flocked together here. 
The passage quoted above is not an isolated example of the sense of 
discomfort associated with the prior Cham presence on the island. It 
reveals an immediate defensive reaction of the islanders, who felt the 
need to convince me of the absence of Cham people at the time when 
their ancestors arrived on the island. Despite the historical evidence that 
Champa consisted of several states that occupied the south-central coast 
of Vietnam from the end of the first millennium BC (Southworth 2004; 
Vickery 2009; Hardy 2009), many islanders maintained that the Cham 
were originally concentrated only in the southern part of Vietnam, in 
present-day Bình Thuận Province. Many villagers claimed that those 
Cham who stayed on the island gradually vanished and, generally, the 
Việt people outnumbered them. In this way Lý Sơn people wanted to 
clear up any doubts about their identity and their rights to the land, and 
to forestall any accusations of violence during the process of settling on
the island. Nevertheless, surnames such as Mai, Đinh, Tiêu, and so forth
suggest that the Vietnamese migrants on Lý Sơn Island intermixed with
the Cham natives (very few of whom still lived in the area). In the pro-
cess, the descendants of these interethnic marriages masked their Cham 
origins by absorbing and retaining most of the beliefs of the agrarian 
villages from which their Việt forefathers had come. 
While Việt people took possession of various islands in the South 
China Sea as Việt territory by means of a Việt-centric settlement his-
tory, they did not establish themselves on empty soil. Lý Sơn villagers 
had to assimilate and interact with the Cham who were already there, 
even though they might claim that those Cham who stayed gradually 
vanished and that the Việt people simply came to outnumber them. 
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use of the land, but also about cultural attempts to produce locality and
create the type of localized sociality that Appadurai calls ‘neighbour-
hood’ (Appadurai 1996). Such production of locality might require 
newcomers to perform ritual procedures that would pacify local spirits 
of the defeated and dispossessed indigenous inhabitants and incorporate 
them into the pantheon of the newly dominant community (Kammerer 
and Tannenbaum 2003). For example, Việt villagers ritually inscribed 
themselves in Lý Sơn and Sa Huỳnh history by cultivating relations with 
the Cham spirits that are to this day worshipped in many temples on 
the island and mainland. The ritual relationship with these spirits was 
predicated on the existence of a more powerful spiritual domain and 
was maintained through the ritual of ‘buying or renting land’ (lê ta thô) 
(Li 1998: 131; T  Chí Đài Trường 2005: 264). Right into the twentieth 
century the inhabitants of both Lý Sơn and Sa Huỳnh would engage a 
local ‘sorcerer’ to perform a ‘ritualized bargain’ with a Cham ancestral 
couple, Chúa Ngu Ma Nương, and make lavish sacrifices in order to keep 
the land fertile (see Li 1998: 131; T  Chí Đài Trường 2005). One of the 
oldest inhabitants of Lý Sơn Island described the ceremony concerning 
land ownership: 
In the past, the northern part of Lý Sơn belonged to the Chiêm Thành
(Cham Kingdom). Our Kinh forefathers fought with the Chiêm Thành, 
who were defeated and had to leave their land. The land remained and 
it was sacred (linh thiêng); if our ancestors who wanted to inhabit it 
refused to worship them [the Cham deities], they would bring serious 
illnesses upon the village. That is why the forefathers installed an altar 
[on the old Cham territory] for a wife and a husband, Chúa Ngu Man 
Nương. The couple managed the land and every five years the village 
organized the ‘request for land’ ritual, during which many oxen and 
buffaloes had to be offered to keep peace. The ceremony was great and 
lasted several days and nights. The phù thuy (sorcerer) was invited too. 
He called the couple and asked them if they were satisfied with the 
offerings. If they said ‘yes’, the villagers could stop, but if the couple 
said ‘no’, they had to continue to make sacrifices of animals. The land 
belonged to the couple, and without the offerings the village would be 
punished. If the husband required five pigs, they would give him exactly 
five pigs. If asked, they complied; the husband was easygoing, but it was 
very difficult to satisfy his wife! 
33 







By performing the large ceremony for such Cham spirits as the 
goddess Uma and Chúa Ngu Ma Nương, the newcomers not only 
established themselves as the rightful patrons of the new land, but also 
tacitly apologized for taking the land away from the Cham natives.3 As 
the new owners of the territory, they ritually paid tribute to the fact that 
other inhabitants once ruled over the land and its fertility. But this is just
one dimension of the ritualized bargain and the newcomers’ way of in-
scribing themselves into the new territory. Another symbolic dimension 
appears when we look at the ritual of ‘buying or renting land’ as a recon-
ciliation of binary Cham and Việt ethnicities. By adopting cosmologies 
and spirits and engaging ritually with land and sea, the Việt newcom-
ers downplayed and even masked their foreignness. In that sense, the 
ritualized propitiation by the Việt became the symbolic surrender by 
the previous owners of the land and thus provided the newcomers with 
protection against sanctions from the Cham spirits (see Arno 1976). 
The close interaction with the sea and the encounter with Cham 
prompted the Việt in Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn Island not only to adopt 
foreign spirits and beliefs into their own religious practices, but also to 
willingly experiment with the material culture of their predecessors. Việt
migrants learned seafaring techniques from the Cham, and even the con-
struction of their ships followed Cham principles (Li 1998: 112; Pham, 
Blue, and Palmer 2010; Pham 2013). Lý Sơn’s family annals (gia pha) 
indicate that from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, many of 
the islanders, due to their excellent seafaring abilities, were recruited by 
the feudal state to collect precious sea products and goods from wrecked 
ships in the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos. The eighteenth-century 
Vietnamese historian Lê Quý Đôn (1972 [1776]: 210) reported on 
Vietnamese from mainland villages near Sa Kỳ who were allowed to 
move to Lý Sơn and were granted a royal concession to explore the sea. 
Such practices were not unique to Vietnam, but also took place in other 
regions of Southeast Asia. In his interesting account of the eighteenth- 
and the early nineteenth-century migration and trade practices of ‘sea 
people’ in south-west Kalimantan, Atsushi Ota (2010: 69) observes that 
during this period many migrants, referred to as ‘pirates’ by Europeans, 
set up their communities in the coastal areas and ‘were engaged in
3. Uma is the name for the great Hindu goddess Paravati, usually associated with 
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various profitable activities such as trade, fishing, and cultivation, sup-
plemented by occasional raids on traders, fishermen, and the villagers’. 
By calling these maritime migrant communities ‘sea people’, Ota (2010: 
69) makes the interesting point that those communities were ‘within 
the political reach of states and settled under state rulers’ approval, but 
they were not completely politically integrated, maintaining privileges 
in certain activities, such as settlement in certain places and plundering’. 
This is analogous to Lý Sơn’s loose connection to the mainland’s politi-
cal apparatus, which came to be formalized as the Paracel and Spratly 
navy, consisting of villagers recruited from Lý Sơn who operated in the 
vicinity of the Paracels and Spratlys, which until recently constituted the 
fishing grounds of Lý Sơn fishers (Lê Quý Đôn 1972 [1776]: 203, 210). 
Local mobilities vis-a-vis highlands–lowlands–islands 
Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn villagers proudly talked about their ancestors’ 
engagement with other societies and their extraordinary mobility over
land and sea. Lý Sơn people in particular underlined their past explora-
tions in an effort to contest and change their present status as a remote, 
‘sea-locked’, and ‘outlandish’ fishing community. Indeed, mobility and 
commercial networks between Cham, Chinese and Việt across the 
Central Highlands and the South China Sea were of long standing.4 
Up until the nineteenth century, mountain and forest areas of Quảng 
Ngãi Province were famous for the production and trade of cassia and 
eaglewood (Hardy 2009). At that time, cinnamon trees were farmed by 
highlanders, and the bark was purchased by Vietnamese and Chinese 
traders for resale to merchants based in Hội An. The mountain areas 
were home to important markets for trade in highland products – es-
pecially cassia, buffaloes, and rice – that attracted people from lowland 
population centres such as Sa Huỳnh. 
Out in the middle of the South China Sea, the Paracel and Spratly 
archipelagos sustained mobility and cultural and economic exchanges
among small island communities around the South China Sea. Throughout
the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Lý Sơn sailors 
capitalized on various cosmopolitan and commercial links in the South 
China Sea by gathering gold, silver, swords, ivory, porcelain, cloth, wax, 
and other goods from the wrecked ships in the Paracels and Spratlys 
4. For the region of the Mekong Delta, see Taylor (2007). 
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and supplementing them with large quantities of mother of pearl, snails, 
tortoises, and sea cucumbers, all of which were handed over to the royal 
court in Huế. The sailors were allowed to keep a significant portion of 
the harvested marine produce for their own profit (Lê Quý Đôn 2006 
[1776]: 155). The beautiful and well-preserved ancestor house built 
during the reign of Emperor Minh M ng (1820–1841) by the family 
of Mr Tứ (born in 1930)5 – the uncle of my host on Lý Sơn – bears 
testimony to the extraordinary profits coming from that trade and 
the extensive maritime networks that connected Lý Sơn villagers and 
Chinese merchants. During their voyages to the Paracels, the Paracel and 
Spratly sailors occasionally met Chinese fishermen on the high seas and 
exchanged information (see, for example, Lê Quý Đôn 1776: 82b-85a, 
in Nguyễn Q. Thắng 2008). In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
some Fujianese and Hainanese who ventured into the Nanyang region 
(present-day Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia) to procure their 
catches of sea cucumber (hai sâm, bêche-de-mer) would stop off in Lý 
Sơn to get fresh water and peanut oil for cooking. Mr Tư told me that 
the generations of his family built their wealth on the lucrative trade 
that involved the sea cucumber – a highly appreciated delicacy among 
Chinese. Unlike the Chinese, however, for a long time Lý Sơn villagers 
did not develop a taste for sea cucumbers, but they knew how to process 
the animal in order to sell the product in Hội An – a former Cham port 
that from the seventeenth century onwards attracted many Chinese as 
well as Japanese, Muslim, and European merchants. 
Under French colonial rule, the Paracel and Spratly flotillas ceased to 
exist, but the seafaring and trading skills of the islanders enabled their 
voyages to the south, where they continued to explore new markets 
and expand their networks through translocal and transregional trade. 
Islanders traded with the mainland and sold whatever they caught and 
farmed, which included beans and peanuts, although they were most 
famous for their production of fish sauce, peanut oil, and fishing nets 
made of a special fibre from a tree (cây gay) that grows on Lý Sơn. At 
this time fish preservation in Sa Huỳnh was inextricably linked with 
the production of salt, which entailed directing sea water into the fields 
and allowing the sun to evaporate the water, leaving just the salt. The 
salt-making technique remains the same to this day in Sa Huỳnh. It was 




The Coastal Society: Historical and Vernacular Geographies 
learned from Cham, who specialized in a mixed economy based on ir-
rigated agriculture, salt production, and fishing. In the colonial period 
the French controlled salt production, and the finished product from 
Sa Huỳnh was sold to Tonkin in northern Vietnam and Cochinchina in 
southern Vietnam. Although the French salt monopoly aimed to control 
the highlands and ethnic groups for whom the salt was essential to their 
livelihood, an illicit and clandestine trade in salt and fish sauce with Hrê 
and Cơr ethnic groups living in the highlands flourished. Elderly fish-
ers from Sa Huỳnh reported that in the past they used to travel into the 
mountains to Ba Tơ, a trip that lasted about five days, to trade the salt, 
usually for rice. 
While Sa Huỳnh fishers exploited overland connections to the 
mountain and forest regions, Lý Sơn people relied on their seafaring 
skills and maritime trade connections. One of my Lý Sơn informants 
said that in the 1930s his late father worked as a ‘trader assistant’ (lái
phu) for one of the boat owners (chu tuyên) on the island and used to 
travel south on the winter monsoon and return north with the summer 
monsoon. In November the northerly winds would begin blowing and 
over the next few months, Lý Sơn people would sail in their vessels 
(ghe bu m) down to Saigon, where they would spend the lunar new 
year. Because rice could not be cultivated on the island due to the poor 
soil and the shortage of water, the trip to the south was undertaken in 
order to buy rice, which was an essential component of the diet of the 
people of Lý Sơn. The father of my informant did not take these trips 
alone; he would be accompanied by a group of other sailing boats. On 
the way down to the south he would usually buy sugar (đương phên) in 
Quảng Ngãi and salt in Sa Huỳnh but his trade networks also allowed 
him to go to Quy Nhơn, Nha Trang, and Hà Tiên in search of bargains. 
Disembarking in Saigon or Cà Mau, he and the rest of his crew would 
hire themselves out as labour to the French or Chinese, which gave them 
additional income for the purchase of rice. At some point in March the 
wind would shift northwards, and the trip back could be commenced. In 
early summer with a full load of rice, he would sail along the coast and up 
to the north, passing different ports on the way. Sometimes he took on 
board Cham traders of medicinal plants (thuốc nam), which were highly 
sought after and needed by islanders. The Cham traders would board at 
the port of Bình Thuận and sail with him all the way to the island. The 
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father of my informant would stop again in Sa Huỳnh to buy salt, which 
then would be sold back in Lý Sơn. However, reaching home did not 
mean that his voyage was completed. Taking advantage of the southerly 
wind he would resume his journey up north through the ports of Hội 
An and Huế, where he would typically buy blocks of ironwood (gỗ lim), 
used for building ancestral houses, as well as Chinese porcelain, which 
was in high demand on Lý Sơn Island. 
While Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn villagers cognitively differentiated 
the mainland from the island and the highlands from the lowlands, their
mobility stretched far beyond these binaries. These territorial categories
were not self-contained; they were, rather, subverted by people’s move-
ments, continuously transgressed and interlinked (see Salemink 2018a). 
Brought into contact through trade and mobility, the qualitatively dif-
ferent worlds of highlands, lowlands, and islands became a translocal, 
even domestic, space that Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn villagers traversed as 
they temporarily settled in distant places. Their diasporic networks and 
engagements with distant markets and ports promised a good profit 
(see Ho 2006). Venturing out into the Central Highlands or navigating 
through the South China Sea was not just a matter of contacting new
people but, as Eric Tagliacozzo (2009: 114) points out, more often a 
matter of renewing already existing ties and networks. These connec-
tions and relations were sufficiently intimate and prolonged to allow 
people to go back and forth between various modes of life as they navi-
gated through different geographical spaces. 
Post-revolutionary realities and economic liberalization 
The outbreak of the First and the Second Indochina Wars brought new 
political and economic pressures to the people of Sa Huỳnh and Lý 
Sơn, who found themselves trapped between two forces – the National 
Liberation Front and the U.S. troops. In 1954, after the First Indochina 
War, the United States supported the establishment of an anti-commu-
nist government south of the demilitarized zone between Quảng Trị 
and Quảng Bình provinces. Consequently, Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn – like 
the whole Quảng Ngãi Province – were assigned to the Republic of 
Vietnam, commonly known as South Vietnam, and disconnected from 
the liberation movement that they strongly supported. Due to a solid 







The Coastal Society: Historical and Vernacular Geographies 
tinued to support the Hồ Chí Minh regime even when the first regular 
American troops entered Quảng Ngãi. While Sa Huỳnh served as a base 
for the U.S. Army, the strategic location of Lý Sơn Island was used both 
by the Naval Forces of the Republic of Vietnam to control passing ships 
and trawlers in the South China Sea and by the communist guerrillas to, 
for example, hide stolen weapons. Lý Sơn fishermen were occasionally 
used by the Vietnam Naval Forces as guides in military missions to the 
Paracels.
However, in contrast to Sa Huỳnh, Lý Sơn’s geographical position 
enabled it to some extent to avoid the turmoil of war. In 1975, after the 
Second Indochina War had ended and the country was unified again,
the revolutionary state tried to impose a socialist vision of society on the
South and unsuccessfully attempted to pursue a policy of collectiviza-
tion (see Taylor 2001; Kerkvliet 2005). As a provincial official in Quảng 
Ngãi stated in an interview with me in 2007, relations between more 
and less prosperous peasants were never as harsh in the South as they 
were in northern villages. According to the official, many of the farm-
ers in Central Vietnam were knowledgeable persons who treated their 
labourers well and provided help if necessary. While this commonly 
held view of the situation is most likely highly idealized, it nevertheless 
demonstrates my interlocutors’ desire to point out that the state’s policy 
ended in a complete fiasco. They claimed that when the poor farmers 
joined cooperatives, their situation often became worse than it had been 
when they worked for hire. In Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn, fishing coopera-
tives established in 1979 and 1980 only survived a few years, as they met 
with resentment from the people. In the 1980s the fishing cooperatives 
stopped operating, although they have never been officially dissolved.6
 Calling this period the ‘catastrophe’ (ham họa), Sa Huỳnh and Lý
Sơn villagers reported that when cooperatives were introduced, the 
village temples were stripped of their property and, in some cases, 
were severely damaged. Sacred statues were removed from temples and 
placed in the local offices of the People’s Committee, and the temples 
6. There was also a fundamental disparity between fisheries in the northern and 
southern regions. By the 1980s, only 10–15 per cent of the boat owners in Central 
Vietnam had joined cooperatives, and most of them were in the provinces known 
today as Quảng Bình, Quảng Trị, Thừa Thiên, Ninh Thuận, and Bình Thuận 
(Nguyễn Duy Thiệu 2002). 
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were closed. In Lý Sơn, people who had ancestral wooden panels embel-
lished with Chinese characters or lacquered boards at home were forced 
to bring them to the communal house, which had been turned into a 
warehouse. However, some of the local cadres were aware of the great 
religious value of these objects and allowed people to take them back 
home piece by piece. 
Consequently, continuous bargaining, bricolage and navigation of
state discipline were part of people’s daily survival repertoire. In the 
period of the subsidized collectivist economy (1977–1986), the mobil-
ity and trading networks of Sa Huỳnh’s and Lý Sơn’s residents were also 
severely restricted. Lý Sơn villagers reported that there were shortages 
of the most basic products, such as rice, sugar, and salt, which had to 
be brought from the mainland. To sail to Quảng Ngãi they needed to 
obtain special permission from the local authorities. Such permission 
specified clearly how many days they were allowed to stay away. On the 
day of the trip their names would be shouted out by the authorities, and 
only after presenting a valid document would they be allowed to embark 
on a small motorboat. The islanders recall that the boats were filled with 
more people than they could actually accommodate, and many of them 
had to stand or squat in uncomfortable position for eight or more hours 
before they reached Sa Kỳ. Villagers would still manage to smuggle out 
some of their local products, such as garlic and onions, to sell in Saigon 
on the black market in order to be able to buy rice. Hidden in baskets full 
of vegetables, the rice was then illicitly transported on the boat back to 
the island. Villagers recalled that they had so little rice that they had to 
cook it with sweet potatoes in order to fill their stomachs. For the people 
of Lý Sơn, the time had come to capitalize on their seafaring skills. 
In 1982 Mr Nha (born in 1948) was the first fisherman on the island 
who, using a simple administration map stolen from the local People’s 
Committee Office, made the daring journey to the Paracels to fish there. 
Later that same year he guided another seven fishing boats. Navigation 
technologies or nautical charts were not available at that time because 
the local government feared that fishers might try to escape the country 
by sea. Initially, in the Paracels, the fishers caught mainly flying fish (cá
chu n), which were suitable for preservation in salt. A year later, when 
ice-making technology became more accessible, they expanded their 
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and Spratlys was transported to Đà Nẵng, from where they obtained the 
ice. Again, this changed along with the new market opportunities that 
appeared in the late 1980s. Most of the Lý Sơn fishers chose to sell their 
catches to local women traders in Đông Ba market in Huế and later in 
Sa Kỳ port – the closest mainland harbour to Lý Sơn. In 1989, Sa Kỳ
port began to operate under the Border Guard Command (Công an Biên 
phòng), which provided the logistical facilities for the development of 
the local fish market. 
In Sa Huỳnh, fishing has been an intensive activity in the coastal 
waters for a long time. Fishers employed mainly traditional fishing 
techniques such as trawling, hooks and lines (lươi gia cào), lift nets (lươi 
rút vay), and seine nets (nghê câu) to catch fish far off shore. All these 
methods required hard manual labour. Fishing close to the shore and in 
the lagoon demanded profound practical knowledge. The most popular 
methods of using nets were lươi ben and chài lươi for catching fish and 
shrimp. The fishers also relied on their ability to locate various species 
and to gather and drive them together into the net (đuôi cá). 
After 1989, due to increasing demand for marine products in domes-
tic and international markets, Sa Huỳnh, like Lý Sơn, was incorporated 
into a regional market economy. As a result, Sa Huỳnh entered into a
modernization phase in which fishers increased their harvesting capaci-
ties. Larger boats enabled them to reach new fishing grounds, the expan-
sion of the lagoon and intensification of shrimp cultivation increased 
harvests, the development of ice-making techniques enabled the 
preservation of fish from a few hours to a few days, and better transport 
and roads allowed the local fish trade to reach distant markets. Around 
this time, the Sa Huỳnh fishers got involved in intensive fishing in Bà
Rịa, Vũng Tàu, Hải Phòng, Đà Nẵng, and Bình Ty, where they sold their 
catches. Women tried to do their best to take care of their families in their 
husbands’ absence. At the beginning of the 2000s, women who did not 
have small children and could afford to do so would go once a month to 
mediate the transfer of money from Sa Huỳnh fishers working in distant 
ports to their wives staying at home. One of them, a 35-year-old woman 
named Phương, was appointed by the women as ‘a note keeper’ (chu ghi).
Three days a month the fishing fleet of Phương’s husband went ashore 
in Vũng Tàu to repair nets and fishing gear and sell the catch. Thus, 
every month she undertook the trip by bus to Vũng Tàu Port, rented 
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a small room in a cheap hotel, and spent a few days working in the fish 
trade alongside her husband. She collected her husband’s earnings and 
those of the other men and took them back to Sa Huỳnh.
Around the same time, with regular fishing expeditions to the 
Paracels and Spratlys and using a hazardous diving technology that re-
lies on compressed air, Lý Sơn fishers were able to collect sea cucumbers 
in deeper waters and thus revive the old trade in the Chinese delicacy.7 
With the booming fishing market, some of the Lý Sơn people who in 
the late 1960s and 1970s had emigrated to Quảng Ngãi, Nha Trang, or 
Saigon anticipated the upcoming opportunities for profitable business. 
They connected with exporters, often of Sino-Vietnamese origin, who 
provided them with credit to buy the marine products directly from Lý
Sơn fishers. Initially, the cargo of sea cucumbers, shark fins and, occa-
sionally, turtles and sea urchins was sent to urban markets in central and 
southern Vietnam for export to China and Cambodia, but more recent 
destinations also included ports in northern Vietnam. In the north, out 
of sight of customs patrols, fish and various marine products from Lý
Sơn are traded across the border at fishing villages in Móng Cái and 
transferred to Chinese fishing vessels at sea or transported directly by 
Sino-Vietnamese traders to Guangxi, Guangdong Province, and Hainan 
Island. 
However, this thriving trade in marine goods has been caught be-
tween two opposing forces – the liberalization of cross-border trade 
between China and Vietnam and the simultaneous enforcement of bor-
ders at sea. The Qing dynasty (1636‒1912) of China first began to show 
interest in the uninhabited islands of the Paracels in 1909. The Republic 
of China and the French colonial authorities in Indochina made rival 
claims to them in the 1920s and 1930s. France made a separate claim to 
the Spratlys in 1933 and China followed suit in 1946 (Hayton 2019).
But it was not until decades later that China denied Lý Sơn fishers rights 
to use fishing grounds that for generations they had considered their 
own. In 1982 – the year in which Lý Sơn people recommenced their 
trips to the Paracels and deep-sea fishing began – a new United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was formally adopted, 
which came into force in 1994 when Guyana became the sixtieth coun-
7. Fishermen usually dive down to 50 m or more and breathe through a thin plastic 
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try to ratify the agreement. This created a new international legal regime 
governing maritime resources, in particular the idea of an ‘exclusive eco-
nomic zone’ (EEZ). However, most of the boundaries of the rival EEZs 
in the South China Sea have never been agreed upon, leaving plenty of 
room for confrontation at sea. Fishers from Lý Sơn and Sa Huỳnh have 
found themselves accused by Chinese authorities of illegally entering 
restricted zones, while the new unilaterally enacted Chinese laws have 
turned them into ‘poachers’. With its far greater economic, political, and 
military power, China has been able to enforce a seasonal fishing ban 
in parts of the South China Sea, seize and detain Vietnamese fishers, 
and even destroy their vessels (MacLean 2014). China’s increasingly 
assertive actions in the South China Sea during the 2000s have further 
exacerbated tensions and incidents in the region. The region’s common 
history of commerce, exchange, and interest in protecting marine life 
has been superseded by tensions over rival territorial and maritime 
claims. On occasion, anger has erupted into anti-Chinese protests across 
Vietnam (MacLean 2016). The crisis became a turning point for Lý
Sơn, which found itself at the centre of attention because of the fishers’ 
presence in the disputed waters, interpreted by many in the country as 
a brave defence of Vietnam’s maritime borders and national sovereignty 
(see Chapter 5). As a result, Lý Sơn villagers have had to maintain a low 
profile regarding their trading activities with China. 
Shifting administrative boundaries 
Both borders and names of places have changed frequently in Vietnam 
throughout the course of history. Two identical temples located next
to each other, known as miêu Đôi (the Twin Shrines), recall the story
of the former border between the provinces of Quảng Ngãi and Bình 
Định, which in colonial times was located much further east than it is
today. It also tells the story of the former border between the two vil-
lages of Đồng Vân and Tân An. According to legend, in this place local 
people found the head of a white horse that had belonged to a Chinese 
general. They decided to erect a temple in order to worship the spirit of 
the White Horse (Bach Mã). However, the discussion about which side 
of the border would be the right place to worship turned into a heated 
argument between the two villages over who had the right to claim the 
spirit and to erect the temple. Consequently, the authorities of Phủ, a 
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province in colonial times, gave both villages the right to build separate 
temples and worship the spirit, but on the condition that the temples be 
identical in all features, including height and external ornamentation. At 
the time of my fieldwork, the Đôi temples still stood on either side of the 
former border, serving as a reminder of the old argument between locals 
about who owned the right to worship the local spirit. The dynamic 
that emerged between the two communities also reminds us that any 
present-day ‘village’ unit is a product of historical contingency. 
Sa Huynh – the coast 
Initially, ‘Sa Huỳnh’ – both a historical and common name used by local 
people – did not refer to the cluster of villages but was in fact the name 
of one of the six seaports located in Quảng Ngãi Province.8 Today, Sa 
Huỳnh is officially known as Phổ Th nh Commune (xã), situated in 
the vicinity of the present-day border between Quảng Ngãi and Bình 
Định provinces. The term xã, often translated as ‘commune’, refers to an 
administrative unit denoting a municipality consisting of various làng – 
residential units or ‘villages’ or ‘communities’. Depending on the region 
in Vietnam, sometimes the term thôn is used instead of làng to refer to 
‘community’; in other places the two terms are used interchangeably. In 
some cases, làng can refer to a unit of the thôn. The làng or thôn might 
be broken up into smaller units such as xóm or ấp (‘hamlets’) and lân
(‘sub-hamlets’). In Sa Huỳnh the term thôn is used by local authorities 
to denote the smallest type of settlement; however, people referring to
their ‘community’ might also talk about làng or van chày (‘fishing com-
munity’). Since the terms are used in a flexible way and the rules vary 
from region to region, it would be incorrect to consider the case of one 
particular setting as representative for all of Vietnam (Kleinen 1999a, 
1999b). 
8. The name ‘Sa Huỳnh’ dates back to the reign of the Nguyễn lords in the southern 
realm (Đàng Trong or ‘Inner Region’, 1558–1777). Lê Quý Đôn explains: ‘This 
is the land of Hoàng Sa [Sa Huỳnh], a drainage basin that lies east of the Trường 
Sơn mountains with seawater continuously washing over the shore’ (quoted 
also in Đảng Bộ Phổ Th nh 1985: 3). The name ‘Sa Huỳnh’ is derived from the 
Sino-Vietnamese term Sa Hoàng (literally ‘sand [and] golden’) meaning ‘golden 
sand’ (cát vàng in modern Vietnamese). Interestingly, the term is also the name of 
the Paracel Islands (Hoàng Sa), but with the noun placed after the adjective and 
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Today, Phổ Th nh Commune, with an area of more than 24 square 
kilometres and a population in excess of 20,000, comprises six thôns: 
Th ch By, Th nh Đức, La Vân, Đồng Vân, Tân Diêm and Long Th nh. 
Figures published in 2006 indicated that Th ch By comprised 1,852 
households with a total population of 10,000 people. At the time of my 
fieldwork, more than half of them were still of working age, which in 
Vietnam is from 15 to 60 years of age for men and 15 to 55 for women. 
La Vân, relatively small in comparison to Th ch By, consisted of 466 
households with a population of 2,307. Tân Diêm had 310 households 
and 1,514 inhabitants. The majority of the population in those villages 
made a living from fishing, fish breeding and selling, salt and fish sauce 
production, boat construction, animal husbandry, and small restaurants 
and shops. 
According to data obtained from a local government office of the
People’s Committee, 80 per cent of Th ch By – the most densely popu-
lated community – lived off fishing. However, the official authorities 
emphasized the increase in unemployment among fishers in the last few
years. The official statistics to which I was referred to presumably did 
not take the informal sector into account,9 but instead concentrated on
the fact that most of the fishers in Th ch By were landless and during the
off-season could not switch to farming. Another possible explanation for
the high unemployment statistic is that the fishermen’s wives, who usu-
ally stayed at home and took full responsibility for the household during 
their husbands’ absence, were most likely regarded as unemployed. 
In recent times, Sa Huỳnh has also experienced fluctuations of 
incoming and outgoing migration. Many young people moved to Đà
Nẵng, Quy Nhơn, and Ho Chi Minh City in search of better-paying jobs.
The temporary stay of young persons in the city often became perma-
nent when they found work and started a family. Hy Van Luong (2009: 
92–93) reports that an overwhelming number of migrants from Quảng 
Ngãi were young people between the ages of 15 and 35. In Sa Huỳnh, 
those who could afford to do so would make their way to Ho Chi Minh 
or Quảng Ngãi City and pay for a basic Japanese or Korean language 
course that would allow them to apply for a work permit abroad. They 
9. Most of the villagers were still involved in small-scale artisanal production, includ-
ing activities such as cultivating ornamental plants, weaving bamboo baskets and 
fishing nets, processing dried sea products for sale, and tailoring. 
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hired themselves out as labourers in Japan or South Korea, where they 
would stay for several years. Young women who did not see chances for 
marriage in their native villages would go to Ho Chi Minh City or Hanoi 
in the hope of finding a job and a husband (see Luong 2009: 91). Those 
who were already married but wanted to escape poverty or were just 
looking for adventure also moved to the big city. In turn, girls under the 
legal working age from neighbouring Bình Định Province waited tables 
at roadside restaurants and bars for ‘a bowl of rice’ or a small salary in Sa 
Huỳnh. Some of them voluntarily dropped out of school, but the vast 
majority were forced to do so because their parents were unable to pay 
for their education. These girls grew up in poverty, and by moving to 
Sa Huỳnh they hoped for changes that would enable them to help their 
parents and start a better life. 
My fieldwork focused mainly on Phổ Th nh Commune and the twin 
fishing villages of Th ch By (divided into Th ch By 1 and Th ch By 2), 
the agricultural village of La Vân, and the salt-producing village of Tân 
Diêm. In the past Tân Diêm had been a sub-hamlet (ấp) of La Vân, but 
today it constitutes a separate village (thôn). Although I tried to confine 
the area of my research, it was impossible to focus exclusively within 
the boundaries of these communities because their ritual landscapes are 
continuously expanding. People organize and participate in religious 
ceremonies and festivals not only in their own communities, but also in 
neighbouring villages, including Phổ Châu Commune, which was part of 
their ritual landscape. Therefore, regardless of administrative divisions, 
the whole township, including Phổ Th nh and Phổ Châu Communes, 
was known among locals by the name Sa Huỳnh. Following the local 
perception of space, I therefore use Sa Huỳnh to refer in general to this 
coastal settlement area, and the names of individual villages when I wish 
to single out a particular process or phenomenon. 
As I began to explore religious life in Sa Huỳnh, I realized that I had 
missed part of the story by focusing exclusively on Sa Huỳnh and as-
suming that it was self-contained. In particular, I saw ritual and religious 
links with Lý Sơn Island, located only about 30 km off the Quảng Ngãi 
coast. According to local narratives, at the beginning of the twentieth 
century Sa Huỳnh fishers found the body of a woman that had been 
thrown by the sea onto rocks below the temple of the goddess Thiên Y 
A Na at the foot of Cấm Núi (the Forbidden Hill), which forms a part of
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the Sa Huỳnh peninsula. They took her body away and buried it in the 
vicinity of the temple. Many fishers believe that she was a trader from Lý
Sơn Island. In Sa Huỳnh she is known as Bà Lao, although some people 
argue that her name was Ngô Thị Khinh, while others say that her real 
surname was Tô, which indicates a Chinese origin. In the 1980s, vil-
lagers inducted Bà Lao into their pantheon of three goddesses – Thiên 
Y A Na, Thủy Long, and Quan Âm – worshipped on the Forbidden 
Hill. Consequently, this place became known among villagers as ‘the 
place of four ladies’ (chỗ bốn bà). Nowadays, people perceive Bà Lao 
as a particularly sacred spirit because she was young, unmarried, and 
died prematurely. For example, Tư, a middle-age fisherman whom I 
met making offerings at her grave, said that a few years ago his ship got 
bogged down in shallow waters close to the place where Bà Lao’s grave 
lies. He was convinced that she raised the water level so his ship could 
safely enter the port. 
Phận, the old caretaker of Thiên Y A Na’s temple, stated in an in-
terview that a few years earlier relatives of Bà Lao from Lý Sơn Island 
came to him and enquired about her grave. They said that they heard 
about the location of her grave through a spirit medium. The family, 
wanting to fulfil their ritual and ceremonial obligations towards their 
newly revealed divine ancestor, asked Phận to take care of the grave 
and gave him some money to renovate it. I was not able to find Bà Lao’s 
family during my visit to Lý Sơn, but islanders told me another story 
which led me back again to Sa Huỳnh. I learned from fishers that in one 
of the temples devoted to the worship of the Whale Spirit in Lý Sơn, 
they keep the head of the most powerful whale. When I asked islanders 
what happened to the rest of the whale’s body, they replied that it had 
drifted in to Sa Huỳnh and is now kept in a similar temple near Th ch 
By village in Sa Huỳnh. Although neither side could confirm the other’s 
story, their narratives continue to reveal symbolic connections between 
the two places. 
I took these stories as metaphors of the interconnections of coastal 
society. Just as the head must be joined with its other remains to form 
a complete body, Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn are joined by the sea and 
constitute an interconnected space in which beliefs and narratives 
constitute elements of cohesion. Therefore, when in February 2007 I 
got the chance to expand my research, I started to work at a second site, 
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Lý Sơn Island, parallel to my mainland fieldwork in Sa Huỳnh. Each 
setting shed light on the other and significantly enriched my knowledge 
about important changes that happened along the maritime periphery 
of Central Vietnam. By looking at the two I was able to form a more 
complex picture of how people navigate state and religious authorities 
in the border zones. 
Lý Sơn – the island 
Lý Sơn Island is a small atoll, formerly named Cù Lao Ré. While ‘cu lao’ 
is a Vietnamese pronunciation of the Cham word pulao, denoting island, 
the meaning of the term ‘re’ is unclear. Local people us the word re to
refer to the special fibre made from a tree that grew on the island and 
was used to make fishing nets. However, according to historian Andrew 
Hardy, the toponym re and the current term lý bear an etymological 
relationship to the names given by highland people for Quảng Ngãi’s 
main rivers.10 While one cannot be sure about true meaning of these 
terms, the Cham-Việt name and the Sino-Vietnamese record of the 
name Lý Sơn index different territorial and ethnic affinities, which Việt 
settlers attempted to blur and reconcile through ritual propitiation of 
the previous owner of the land. The Sino-Vietnamese name Lý Sơn (sơn
literally means mountain) draws our attention to the three long-extinct 
volcanoes on the island that played an important economic and defence 
role during the Nguyễn dynasty. Still today, the Lý Sơn mountains, like 
those in Sa Huỳnh, are used by the Border Guard Command (Công an 
Biên phòng) as military observation posts and play an important role in 
exercising sovereignty and in monitoring Vietnam’s territorial waters, 
especially now, with both China and Vietnam claiming the Paracel and 
Spratly archipelagos as their own. 
As in the case of Sa Huỳnh, what today constitutes the district 
(huyên) of Lý Sơn is a product of historical contingency. Lý Sơn Island 
changed its name and administrative status several times. In 1808 the 
king Gia Long changed the name Cù Lao Ré into Lý Sơn and made the 
island a canton (or sub-district – tông) of Bình Sơn District (Quảng Ngãi 
Province). After the August Revolution of 1945, the island, consisting 
of two communes, maintained the status of canton but changed its name
10. Hardy and Nguyễn Tiến Đông (2019) argue that the population of Champa’s port 
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to Trần Thành. In 1946 the canton was renamed and became the com-
mune of Lý Sơn. In 1951, the French colonial authorities placed Lý Sơn 
Commune under the administrative supervision of Đà Nẵng Township 
(thị xã) in Quảng Nam Province. In 1954, the South Vietnamese au-
thorities again made Lý Sơn a commune of Bình Sơn District. In 1993, 
Lý Sơn was separated from Bình Sơn and became an independent 
district. Today, Lý Sơn is one of the fourteen districts of Quảng Ngãi 
Province. 
In Vietnam local government officials are appointed at the level of 
the province (tỉnh), district (huyên) and municipality (or commune, 
xã). Local state power in Lý Sơn and Sa Huỳnh was exercised by of-
ficials recruited from the region and represented in the state institution 
of the People’s Committee (Ủy Ban Nhân Dân – UBND), which is tied
to the district and provincial offices. The People’s Committee Office,
represented by the chairman (chu tịch) at the apex, oversees several 
administrative departments responsible for economic and administra-
tive management of the area, guiding and organizing cultural events 
such as religious festivals, and managing such practical affairs as police 
work, updating fishers about new regulations, issuing sailing licenses, 
and investigating complaints and grievances, just to name a few of their 
many duties. 
At present, Lý Sơn District has an area of 10 square kilometres 
with 20,000 citizens living in three communes: An Hải and An Vĩnh 
on the island of Lý Sơn, and the third commune, An Bình, located on 
the neighbouring Bé Island (formerly called Cù Lao Bờ Bãi), which 
has only recently been inhabited and was included in Lý Sơn District. 
Lý Sơn Island, which remained unscathed during the First and Second 
Indochina Wars, was considered among provincial authorities as a store-
house of data on the settlement and development of the Việt people 
in Central Vietnam, and in 2014 gradually developed into a ‘patriotic’ 
tourist destination. 
The two làngs on Lý Sơn proper today constitute xã of An Vĩnh and 
An Hải. An Vĩnh consists of two thôn: West (Tây) and East (Đông).
An Hải comprises three thôn: West (Tây), East (Đông), and Central 
(Trung Hòa). Before the advent of tourism on the island, An Vĩnh had 
2,500 households with a population of 11,422 people, while An Hải had 
1,814 households with 8,214 people. An Bình Commune, located on
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the neighbouring Bé Island, consisted of 106 households and its popula-
tion reached 476 people. Local state power in Lý Sơn was represented by 
the district People’s Committee office and two commune-level People’s 
Committees. The three offices on the island were governed by a single 
chairman who supervised the administrative work, managed local af-
fairs, and organized protection against typhoons, among other duties. 
Since rice could not be grown on the island, Lý Sơn people always
had to be more strategic than Sa Huỳnh villagers for their economic sur-
vival – as their past maritime ventures showed. They also experimented 
on an individual basis. Due to a shortage of fresh water for agricultural 
and domestic use, Lý Sơn people tried alternative crops in an effort to 
make a living off the sandy soil. In the 1950s they tested red rice plants 
taken from Central Highlanders, but the cultivation turned out to be 
too demanding and farmers were forced to look for more suitable crops 
like sweet potatoes. However, a major success story in Lý Sơn’s agrar-
ian history has been the islanders’ ability to grow garlic and shallots 
in the sand. This started in the 1940s, when a farmer covered the clay 
beds near the seashore with a layer of sand, allowing water to percolate 
through and thereby making garlic and shallot cultivation possible. 
In the early 1960s, the method was improved and adapted by others, 
who started to use sand from the seashore and even seawater for garlic 
crops.11 In the period of the subsidized collectivist economy, the success 
of this experiment allowed them to sell garlic and shallots to Ho Chi 
Minh City. However, between 1988 and 1989, overexploitation of sand 
on the island caused the beaches to disappear almost entirely. Although 
islanders developed a method to recycle the sand, the shortage of sand 
was too severe, leading to a crisis in the garlic industry. In 2008 the 
situation became so serious that farmers were forced to buy sand from 
people who dug it from the seabed. Today, garlic and shallots are, next to 
fishing, one of Lý Sơn’s most important tourist attractions and a symbol 
of the sacrifices the islanders were willing to make in order to develop 
a barren land in the sea. Most tourists from northern and southern 
Vietnam perceive Lý Sơn to be a geographical and cultural backwater 
and their inhabitants as undeveloped fishers overcoming the odds to 
11. For a similar case of successful experimentation with the cultivation of shallots in 
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survive and thrive between Vietnam’s land mass and the Paracels and 
Spratlys, stoically standing at the forefront of national sovereignty. 

According to the universally accepted myth of origin, the Vietnamese 
descend from the union between the elements of water and land. L c 
Long Quân (Dragon Lord of L c), who came from the realm of the
water, married the beautiful, fiery Âu Cơ, who came from the moun-
tains. After the wedding, Âu Cơ gave birth to an egg sac, from which 
one hundred human children hatched and grew. However, the couple 
decided to split because L c Long Quân always found his heart longing 
for the coast, while Âu Cơ constantly yearned for the highlands. They 
split up their children, of whom fifty followed the dragon father L c 
Long Quân to live by the water and the other fifty followed their fiery 
mother Âu Cơ to dwell in the highlands. The L c children of Âu Cơ 
and L c Long Quân are considered the progenitors of the Vietnamese 
people who settled in the Red River Delta (Vo 2012: 100). While the 
legend of the creation of the Vietnamese nation begins with the union of 
the realm of water and mountains, and hence with the connection of the 
mountains to the rivers and the sea, the sea aspect has been neglected 
in most Vietnamese historical analyses. As Wheeler (2006: 125) puts 
it, ‘Ironically, Vietnam’s territory is the product of the very maritime 
engagements its Vietnamese nationalistic perspective ignores.’ 
Until recently, the region of the Red River Delta in Vietnam was seen
as the undisputed cradle of civilization and the exemplar of ‘authentic’ 
Vietnam and its wet rice culture. However, the increasingly strident 
international contestations over the South China Sea have led to a sig-
nificant change in rhetoric, recasting Vietnam from the village-based, 
rice-growing nation depicted during its various wars against foreign 
occupiers to a maritime nation (nươc biên) oriented towards the ‘East 
Sea’. This discursive shift from land to sea is marked by stories about the 
most recent ‘turn towards the ancestral sea islands’ (hương vê biên đao
quê hương) and the idea of Vietnam as a nươc biên, which is a contem-
porary invention of tradition that discursively places Vietnam in Tony 
Reid’s (1999) ‘Malay World’. The most recent propaganda posters that 
draw the maritime margins into the centre and blur boundaries between 
mainland and island are part of that effort. They proclaim that ‘Vietnam 
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is a maritime country’ (Viêt Nam là một quốc gia biên), ‘The island is 
a home and the sea is a homeland’ (Đao là nhà biên là quê hương) and 
‘Every Vietnamese is a citizen of the sea’ (Mỗi ngươi Viêt Nam là một 
công dân biên). Until this shift, fishers and the fishing industry were 
portrayed mainly in terms of socialist production – alongside agriculture 
and forestry – but the most recent move in Vietnam’s state rhetoric turns 
Vietnamese fishers into the heroic vanguard of national sovereignty in 
the ‘East Sea’. Complementarily, novel expressions of national identity 
and citizenship can be seen in T-shirt slogans such as ‘The Vietnamese 
nation is determined to preserve each plot of the Vietnamese land and 
sea islands’ (Dân Tộc Viêt Nam Quyêt Tâm Gìn Giữ Tưng Tấc Đất và Biên 
Đao Cua Viêt Nam) and ‘Vietnam turns towards the East Sea’ (Viêt Nam 
hương vê Biên Đông). These T-shirts became increasingly popular among 
many young Vietnamese tourists in Lý Sơn who wanted to publicly 
express their identification with fishers and the sea. 
This aesthetic shift is accompanied not by militarization but by a 
changing geography of affect (Navaro-Yashin 2007), by which people 
who have never been on the Paracels or Spratlys claim a deep emotional 
bond with these ‘ancestral’ places and the desire to defend their ‘sover-
eignty’. This affect is performed in a wide variety of ways: national com-
memoration of the Paracel and Spratly sailors; building a wall around Lý
Sơn Island to protect against Chinese invasion; emotional demonstra-
tions in the streets of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City against the Chinese 
occupation of ‘ancestral’ seas; and mainlanders performing solidarity 
with islanders – supposedly victimized by Chinese vessels – through 
patriotic tourism, donations, and cultural campaigns. Furthermore, the
changing geography of affect creates new spaces for interaction between 
state and society, but which also bring religion into the mix. The ‘an-
cestral’ deep sea territory, fishing practices, new maps of the national 
geo-body, new development plans, and a new style of patriotic tourism 
in Vietnam’s coastal areas illustrate the multitude of ways in which af-
fect is provoked and people respond to local and global economic and 
political discourses. As stated in the Introduction, the global competi-
tion for marine resources, the geopolitical conflict over the disputed 
archipelagos in the South China Sea, and tourism development in Sa 
Huỳnh and Lý Sơn – these are not the main foci of this book. However, 
it was my hope in this chapter that attending to such local histories of 
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maritime periphery will destabilize the powerful and hegemonic idea 
of ‘Vietnameseness’ that dismisses regional, historical, and cultural dif-
ferences and sidelines places – such as Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn – that do 
not represent the imagined culture of northern Vietnam. Sa Huỳnh and 
Lý Sơn themselves should also not be homogenized, but rather pursued 
through their spatial and temporal connections and discontinuities. By 
telling the story of how the people of Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn navigate 
state, religion, and the South China Sea, my wider goal in this book is to 
show religious practices in their continuity with earlier legacies and with 
different ways of acting and being Vietnamese. 
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C H A P T E R  2  
Doing and Making Religion
in Vietnam 
Hưng (born 1948), a former guerilla fighter, a member of the village team responsible for rituals, and a fisherman, often shifted between joking about the Party – warning me that 
the Communist Party allowed me to carry out my research and for that 
reason my intentions must be pure – and relating critical stories of the 
preceding years of severe restrictions. Before taking me to meet the lo-
cal healer and exorcist (thày đuôi tà ma) – known for his defence of a 
Buddhist statue during the antisuperstition campaign – he had asked 
me, ‘Why is the Communist Party only one, not two?’ Then, pointing 
to the sky and laughing, he answered his own question: ‘Because it does 
not tolerate competition and for that very reason there is no religion
(tôn giáo).’ Then he continued, ‘But because of a new policy up there,
the Communist Party has to spread propaganda about a return of free-
dom, freedom of religious beliefs (tự do tín ngương), which was limited 
in the time of state collectivization. Now there has been a real change, 
but [the Party] watches closely. I tell you young lady … understanding 
Communism is not simple!’ Hưng’s remark about the complexity of 
Communism raised much laughter among the men gathered around, 
but his underlying desire to share the bitter events of the antisupersti-
tion campaign in Sa Huỳnh was palpable. However, in his game of 
beating state discipline with his own indiscipline, he publicly warned 
me that my reasons for learning about local history must be ‘cultural,’ 
not ‘political’, and thus I needed to recognize a clear boundary between 
those two realms. 
Binary oppositions such as institutionalized religion versus beliefs, 
religion versus politics, high modernism versus (backwards) religion, 
science versus religious superstition, and cultural versus political ap-
peared in almost every conversation I had with Vietnamese people with
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regard to their religious practices. As Erik Harms (2011a: 226) per-
suasively argues, ‘To dismiss these binaries as false would be to ignore 
a fundamental element of the social landscape’, regardless of whether 
these binaries are seen as accurate or not. While such ideal oppositions 
help people make a sense of their world in everyday life, they are often 
blurred and merged to serve personal interests. In order to understand 
the ways in which such binaries are produced and invoked by state 
agents and by villagers like Hưng, it is necessary to take some time 
to discuss the regulatory character of the Vietnamese state regarding 
religious practices. By zooming in on the important transformations in 
state policy towards religion, this chapter thus prepares the ground for 
a discussion about the various categorical binaries informing people’s 
actions, as well as how these binaries are undermined in practice by dif-
ferent actors. 
The chapter opens with a brief discussion of the category of religion 
in Vietnam as it emerged through modern state formation. Drawing on 
Scott’s (1998) argument on state simplification, I discuss in the second 
section how the Vietnamese state appropriates and purifies religion 
through administrative procedures in order to standardize the complex 
and diverse vernacular classifications and hence make people and their 
religious practices ‘legible’ to the state gaze. The subsequent section 
takes a critical look at the Official Gazette (Công Báo) as it articulates 
Vietnam’s official state discourse on religion. Finally, I show that in the 
Đổi Mới period, the state approach to religion shifted from hostility to 
a more pragmatic approach.1 Whereas the Party-state withdrew from its 
pursuit of socialist modernity and appropriated religion by converting 
some influential religious forms into ‘cultural heritage’ and/or ‘national 
heritage’, it continues to see religion as a competing source of power that 
needs to be controlled and managed. 
Institutionalized religion versus beliefs
During my ethnographic immersion in Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn, I never 
heard villagers using the term tôn giáo (institutionalized religion) to 
describe their belief in spirits, but I often heard them using the term 
tín ngương (religious beliefs) to describe their personal and intimate re-
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lationship with specific spirits. Following the state, Vietnamese people 
make a distinction between ‘religion’ and ‘religious beliefs’ based on the 
presence or absence of doctrine (see Dror 2002a). As in other parts of 
Southeast Asia, in Vietnam a separate term that could refer to religion 
(tôn giáo) per se only emerged in the context of European colonialism 
(Van der Veer and Lehmann 1999; Turner and Salemink 2015). The 
newer term’s entry into common usage has resulted in religious practices 
being not only labelled and controlled, but also understood as separate 
from the ‘secular’ and counterposed to ‘science’ (for China, see Sutton 
and Kang 2009). In the imperial encounter, both colonized countries 
and those that had successfully resisted Western hegemony coined a 
new concept of religion based on terms understood within Western 
narratives of modernity (DuBois 2009). 
Such a process involved a kind of purification that reconfigured 
the concept of ‘religion’ both for those groups of people that identify 
themselves with religion and those that do not (Keane 2007: 83). For 
example, during the period of High Socialism in Vietnam, ‘religion’ was
often combined with the Sino-Vietnamese term mê tín dị đoan (‘super-
stition’), making religion appear archaic, unscientific and heterodox 
(Salemink 2013; see also Sutton and Kang 2009: 193–194). In the Đổi 
Mới period initiated in 1986, the Vietnamese state gradually abandoned 
the interpretation of religion as ‘unscientific’ and ‘irrational’, while still 
attempting to draw a line between those informal, vernacular religious 
practices that were recognized as having a ‘national character’ (known 
as tín ngương) and those considered superstition (mê tín dị đoan) and 
therefore contrary to the modern project of building a ‘progressive na-
tion’ (Salemink 2013; Taylor 2007). This led the state to reformulate 
meanings connected with diverse religious traditions in line with the 
new, ‘purified’ category of religion and to design new measures for con-
trolling such practices (Keane 2007: 84–88; Sutton and Kang 2009). 
In his analysis of religion in China, Andrew Kipnis (2001: 33) asks, 
‘[W]hat is this flourishing thing called religion, what is the significance 
of calling it religion, and why is it flourishing?’ According to one of the 
most accomplished and well-known anthropological definitions of reli-
gion – that of Clifford Geertz (1973: 90) – religion is a ‘system of sym-
bols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods 
and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order
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of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factual-
ity that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic’. However, 
implying that religion is a coherent system of beliefs, such a definition 
appears to have little relevance in the case of China or Vietnam, where 
religion is not only a ‘constructed category … arising through modern 
state formation’ (Ashiwa and Wank, 2009: 5), but it also lacks fixed 
norms and is polytheistic in its nature (Chau 2006; Endres 2011; Soucy 
2012; Turner and Salemink 2015; Hoang 2017). 
In trying to answer his own question, Kipnis accepts Talal Asad’s 
(1993: 29) argument that Geertz neglects the role of social forces such as 
authoritative institutions, which can impose consistent interpretations 
of religious symbols, authorize religious practices and knowledge, and 
discipline religious subjects. Bringing to the table historical conditions, 
Asad shows that it is not possible to formulate an essential definition
of religion because its contents change over time and because religion 
itself is a creation of a particular historical moment and a particular
place. However, Kipnis still finds inspiration in Geertz’s emphasis on 
symbols and models, especially in reference to China, where the state 
defines what belongs to the domain of religion and science. Instead of
reading symbols as a set of ‘shared beliefs’, as Geertz’s (2001: 34) defini-
tion implies, he points out existing contestations over religious symbols 
that produce an array of different interpretations and motivations rather 
than a unified form of thought. 
Asad’s sensitivity to historical context is helpful in our understand-
ing of religion as a process, but his analysis focuses mainly on exploring
religions through authoritative institutions, and thus it is reduced to
monotheistic modes of religiosity authorizing practices and doctrines
from in principle a central vantage point. Not all religious beliefs in
Vietnam involve a standardization of religious knowledge and practice as
in the Abrahamic monotheistic traditions (Turner and Salemink 2015).
Often lacking orthodoxy and orthopraxy, religion in Vietnam is mostly
polytheistic in nature and described in terms of the ‘interconnection
and mutual influence between major religious traditions …, through a
wide variety of rituals and in overlapping cosmologies and pantheons
associated with Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism …, built on a
substratum of ancestor worship … and spirit worship’ (Salemink 2008b:
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‘[i]n Vietnamese Buddhism, there is no systematized, formally imposed,
orthodox practice that is required of all devotees’ and, consequently,
many people who engage in Buddhist and non-Buddhist practices do not
necessarily experience them as being in conflict (Soucy 2012: 3–4; see
also Taylor 2004). This is no less true for Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn, where
the existing beliefs and practices such as ancestor worship, the cult of the
anonymous dead, worship of the goddess Thiên Y A Na and the Whale
Spirit, as well as geomancy and fortune telling, interact on various levels
and are tied, albeit rather loosely, to institutions such as fishing organi-
zations.2 This relative absence of orthodoxy and orthopraxy constitutes
a persistent challenge to state officials and doctrine-minded clergy, who
wish to purify religion by eradicating those practices that they do not
deem to be in line with their doctrinal interpretations. If we read the
antisuperstition campaigns of the late 1970s as an attempt to do away
with religion in the local village domain, it allows us to capture various
local responses that sometimes required that objects – such as temples
and statues – be destroyed, smashed or moved across different symbolic
and political spaces and subjected to different disciplinary practices and
state and religious semiotic ideologies (Keane 2008; see also Anagnost
1985, 1994; Duara 1991; Malarney 2002; Yang 1967; Young 1997).
In the case of Vietnam, it makes more sense to think about religion 
as ‘practice’ not only located, mediated and interpreted through perfor-
mances, ritualization, and the creation and use of text (Asad 2001; Chau
2006, Nye 2000), but also one that builds on authoritative state semiotic 
ideology. A focus on religion as an act that is rationalized across different 
social fields emphasizes an ongoing process of accommodation, appro-
priation, manipulation, indigenization and mutual influence between 
different secular and religious traditions and practices. Moreover, such 
an approach acknowledges the existence of many forms of religious ideas 
and interpretations, of competing beliefs and their diverse expressions, 
which do not have to be consistent or represent everlasting authority, but 
nevertheless have to be reproduced afresh (Fabian 1985: 147; see also 
Kirsch 2004; Hoang 2017). The interplay between state and religious 
semiotic ideologies becomes important when we try to understand the 
2. In Lý Sơn, Catholic, Protestant and Cao Đài religions all have their own churches. 
While monotheistic Christian religions were not present in Sa Huỳnh, a Cao Đài 
temple served a very small number of followers. 
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ability of people in Vietnam’s maritime frontier to navigate and subvert 
these ideologies beyond domination or resistance. 
High modernism versus religion
James Scott, in his book Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to 
Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1998), argued that the state 
always attempts to make a society ‘legible’ and arrange the population 
in a way that increases the state’s capacity to control its citizens. This 
drive for the administrative ordering of society includes organizing the 
natural geography, settling mobile peoples, establishing population and 
cadastral registers, standardizing language, designing cities, and build-
ing transportation infrastructure, to recount just the most basic efforts 
that states make to attach their ‘subjects to [their] environment’ (Scott 
1998: 2). This is often interwoven with the state’s blind confidence in 
scientific and technical progress, which Scott calls ‘high modernism’ – 
‘uncritical, unskeptical, and thus unscientifically optimistic about the 
possibilities for the comprehensive planning of human settlement and 
production’ (1998: 4). Such a utopian vision of a ‘progressive future’ 
requires massive changes in people’s work habits, living patterns, and 
moral convictions and perceptions of the world and, above all, a state 
that is able to use its power to put the high-modernist project into effect. 
Scott argues that war, revolution, economic depression, and struggle 
for national liberation create fertile ground for the emergence of a new 
power – the authoritarian state that rejects the past in favour of a new 
revolutionary vision for its society (Scott 1998: 5). 
Indeed, ‘progress’ and detachment from ‘primordial’ forms of clas-
sification took place in Vietnam against the backdrop of French colonial 
rule, the national political movement for independence, and the shock 
and trauma of the Second Indochina War. At the same time endorse-
ment of a socialist modernity was accompanied by a strong critique of 
the past (see Marr 1981; Endres 2002; Ninh 2002; Pelley 2002; Taylor 
2003). According to Scott’s (1998: 93) argument, the simplified and 
thus purified ‘prescription for a new society’ implies a radical break with 
its history and traditions because, in the view of the authoritarian state, 
they provide fuel for backwards institutions and customs, superstition, 
and religious bigotry, all of which hamper the achievement of high mod-
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has become a subject of constant scrutiny by politicians and intellectuals. 
They put the blame for colonial hegemony and economic backwardness 
on certain aspects of the culture, such as hierarchy, wastefulness, and 
irrationality, which they believed were not appropriate in a modern state 
and should be eradicated (Endres 2002).3 
In line with this revolutionary semiotic ideology, one of the main 
goals of the new socialist modernizing agenda was to strip traditional 
social arrangements of their sacred power and transform the Vietnamese 
people into a new and advanced society, with its progress based on 
education and rationality rather than on a religious pantheon (Keyes, 
Kendall and Hardacre 1994b). According to the Marxist–Leninist 
theory of the Party, religion will naturally disappear when humankind 
enters the period of communism and high modernism. In its effort to 
make Vietnam a secular society, Party ideologists blamed religion for 
the hardship and backwardness of the life of the masses, saying that 
people wasted time and money that could be better spent on education 
or national agricultural production. The Party-state was convinced that 
a systematic purification by selecting ‘proper’ aspects of Vietnamese 
tradition would put an end to ‘depraved customs’ originating from the 
‘era of feudalism’ (Endres 2002: 1). 
It is not without significance that one of the early tasks of the state’s 
purifying discipline concerned a total restructuring of the local village 
religious domain in which politics and religion were merged (Malarney 
2002).4 Village festivals, life-cycle rituals, and places of worship – the 
spaces that sustained old power and prestige – became targets of the 
state’s campaign against superstitions (Endres 2002). Following a 
Marxist analysis, religious buildings such as village temples, pagodas, 
and shrines were defined in terms of class struggle and considered hot-
beds of feudalism, ignorance, and exploitation, not to mention a waste 
of village resources. Concerned with introducing a ‘new way of life’, the 
3. Scott speaks of any state, not just authoritarian or socialist ones, and his argument 
thus remains highly relevant to an analysis of Vietnam in the Đổi Mới era, where 
socialist modernity has been replaced with a new vision of alternative modernity 
and the state’s efforts to construct a society that will fulfill global standards of 
‘progress’ and ‘civility’. 
4. For a very similar case of redefining the relationship between the sacred and pro-
fane in a Chinese village, see Duara (1988, 1991). 
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state undertook the task of turning religious buildings into spaces of 
secular rather than religious utility (Endres 2002: 3). 
In northern Vietnam, during the land reform (1953–1955), the 
period of war mobilization (1960–1975), and the time of collectiviza-
tion and dependence on state subsidy (1975–1986), sacred spaces had 
already been converted into granaries, storehouses and schools, while 
priest, monks and nuns were forced to adopt secular lives (Endres 2002; 
Hoang 2017). After 1975 this process was imposed on the South – al-
beit in a milder form – and lasted until 1986, when the state relaxed its 
enforcement of antisuperstition laws. The integration of the North and 
the South posed a serious challenge to the Communist state, which was 
confronted with a large body of religious sects and practices that had 
been eradicated or seriously restricted in the North but still flourished 
in the South despite selective control in resistance zones (Taylor 2004). 
In fact many of these religious sects, such as Cao Đài, Hòa Hảo, and the 
Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam, had never existed in the North. 
The period of High Socialism (1976–79), during which the Vietnamese 
Communist Party unsuccessfully attempted to pursue a policy of col-
lectivization in the South, signalled the most severe suppression of re-
ligion.5 For example, Sa Huỳnh villagers clearly remembered 1978, the 
year the Communists forbade the performance of rituals and worship. 
M nh (born in 1943), who, at the time of my fieldwork, was responsible 
for donations and organizing religious ceremonies in local temples, 
depicted the strict implementation of the antisuperstition campaign: 
We lived in peace at last but oppression (sự áp bưc) remained. Overt 
worship (thơ phương cúng) was not allowed. Some folks adhered to [re-
ligion] so they were politically suspect (bị chính trị); they were arrested, 
imprisoned in the province or the district, hence no one dared. … All 
temples were tightly boarded up, superstitions were not allowed, no 
permission was given to lead a religious life, to enter a monastic order 
(không tu hành, Phât đao hêt). … Only at home did we have the right 
5. In 1979 the Vietnamese Communist Party retreated from its collectivization policy
and from enforcement of its centrally planned economic system by setting out new
measures that were intended to enhance production. However, this shift became
the Communist Party’s new policy only in 1986, when the Đổi Mới programme
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to believe (quyên tín ngương); no one dared to burn incense during the 
full moon or pray while outside; if they did, they risked going to prison. 
M nh’s narrative underlines the confrontational relationship between 
the competing ideologies of state and religion that drew a sharp binary 
between public and domestic and, thus, between secular and religious 
realms. Consequently, those who dared to display religious devotion 
outside of their homes – in the secular space belonging to the state –
were disciplined, while those who limited their religious expression to
the privacy of their families were left alone. But one has to be careful
about taking M nh’s statement to denote an absolute antagonism be-
tween state and religion or state authorities and villagers. The desire to
practise their religion required of people more sophisticated improvisa-
tion and legitimation tactics that complicated these different structural 
positions and enabled them to move flexibly and smoothly within and 
across religious and state semiotic ideologies (see Chapter 4). At the
time of collectivization and dependence on the state’s handouts, villag-
ers in Lý Sơn remembered that the shortened and simplified versions 
of rituals were carried out with the utmost haste and in secret. Local 
authorities were aware of these illicit practices and deliberately left the 
temple keys in the hands of village elders after clearing the temples of 
sacred effigies. When in the 1990s the state’s antisuperstition campaign 
loosened its hold, Lý Sơn villagers, with the tacit agreement of the local 
authorities, resumed their religious practices. Villagers also remember 
that in 1991, while there was still no official permit to hold rituals, there
was also no strict prohibition. Between 1993 and 1994 the local offices 
of the People’s Committee allowed the temples to be reopened, and 
local authorities pretended they did not see the ceremonies that villag-
ers organized there. In the majority of cases the temples’ interiors had 
survived intact. Two years later the nationwide relaxation of religious 
oversight reached Quảng Ngãi, and villagers began openly to hold com-
munal ceremonies and to worship their spirits in the temples. At that 
time in the territory of the former North this process was in full swing, 
while in central Vietnam it had just started. 
The economic reforms of Đổi Mới had brought economic liberaliza-
tion, privatization and commercialization to everyday life. Ever since the 
Communist-led Vietnamese state integrated the country into the global 
economy and abandoned collectivist policies, the threat of contagion by 
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foreign cultures had become a greater challenge to the state’s legitimacy. 
To fill the void created after withdrawing from socialist modernity, the 
Party-state attempted to create its own version of modernity in which 
national identity played a dominant role and, as a result, took a more 
favourable attitude towards not only formal religions (tôn giáo), but also 
‘folk beliefs’ (tín ngương dân gian) (Endres 2002; Luong 2003; Taylor 
2001, 2007; Salemink 2013). This allowed for the reinterpretation of 
flourishing religious practices throughout Vietnam as an expression of 
Vietnamese ‘culture’ and, above all, ‘national heritage’. 
Religious versus secular 
As in China, in Vietnam the ongoing process of the state taking control 
over religious affairs in local communities was an attempt to divest local 
temples of their mystical aura and to show that local gods were powerless 
effigies. Paradoxically, at the same time, in Vietnamese official discourse 
there was a tradition of preservation of communal houses, temples, and 
shrines going back to 1945, when Hồ Chí Minh issued a decree on the 
protection of cultural heritage (di san văn hóa) in the context of land 
reform (Endres 2000). Historian Patricia Pelley (2002) demonstrates 
clearly that the Vietnamese postcolonial socialist state, unrelenting in 
its defence of the country against foreign aggressors, was extremely 
concerned about national history and its interpretation. As early as 
1943, as the ‘guiding concepts for the project of building a “new culture” 
and a “new life”’, the Vietnamese Communist Party, in its ‘Theses on 
Vietnamese Culture’, introduced three principles: nationalization, 
popularization, and scientism (dân tộc hóa, đai chúng hóa, and khoa học
hóa) (Endres 2002: 2; see also Ninh 2002: 26–46). ‘Nationalization’ in 
particular was understood as a defence against hostile forces – France 
and Japan – in terms of a ‘long-standing tradition of resistance to foreign 
aggression’ and, therefore, occupied a particular place in the ideologi-
cal and academic discourse (Endres 2002: 2). In the 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s, scholars debated extensively about turning points in Vietnam’s 
history as well as about the historical figures concerned that were often 
‘repackaged’ and represented as national heroes (Pelley 2002). This 
repackaging not only referred to historic figures, but also to religious 
structures that, in the official view, stood for a ‘national tradition’. Close 
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gradual change in the official policy towards the local religious domain, 
namely, the transformation of religious buildings into ‘secular spaces’ 
that bear ‘cultural heritage’ and those that bear ‘national heritage’. At the 
same time, however, it reveals that Hồ Chí Minh’s directives were largely 
ignored. 
In the North, during the land reform (1953–1955) and the time 
of collectivization and dependence on state subsidies (1975–1986), 
religious buildings suffered extensive neglect and damage as their 
facilities and properties were claimed by village agricultural coopera-
tives or simply cleared of clergy and left empty. The monks and nuns 
who depended largely on these properties were disconnected from the 
basis of their livelihoods. During the land reform, those pagodas that 
temporarily retained their plots of land were taxed, and their clergy were 
expected to work in their rice fields, shoulder to shoulder with villagers, 
no longer able to rely exclusively on the labour of religious followers for 
their upkeep (Công Báo 1955; Công Báo 1995a). 
A comparison of individual issues of Công Báo reveals that, while the
state had its own vision of how to make use of temples, it was not always 
clear and consistent in its policies towards religious spaces. As a result, 
the state’s inconsistency widened a gap between the official goals for 
repurposing sacred spaces and its actual implementation. Moreover, the
implementation of the new ideological agenda was not always as peace-
ful a process as the state intended. Ten years after Hồ Chí Minh issued 
his directives on protecting cultural heritage, Prime Minister Phan Mỹ in
the Công Báo of 1956 lamented the pitiful situation of demolished sites
of local cults, which in the official discourse had undergone a metamor-
phosis from religious sites into ‘historical monuments’ (di tích lịch sử),
‘heritage of feudalism’ (di san cua phong kiên), or ‘monuments of resist-
ance to foreign aggression’ (di tích kháng chiên) (Công Báo 1956: 189). 
Thus his lament referred to the dilapidation of these buildings because, 
according to state semiotic ideology, they were officially of national, not 
religious, significance. However, as the next issues of Công Báo show, in 
the process of appropriation of religious buildings for secular purposes, 
national aspects were often ignored by local cadres as well as villagers. 
Religious structures were demolished not only by the communist
guerrillas, who had used time-tested scorched-earth tactics to deny
the enemy any space to quarter their troops, but also by villagers who
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tore down the buildings or simply used the materials to construct their
own houses. Consequently, the state showed its concern over popular
reactions and feelings about the ‘dilapidated situation of temples fall-
ing into ruins with pieces lying scattered around’, which might have
resulted in a ‘negative political impression among local visitors and
foreign guests,’ and recommended to provincial offices of culture and
the People’s Committees to remove all signs of vandalism from monu-
ments and to beautify the local landscape by planting trees (Công Báo
1960: 338). 
In its rhetoric, the government proclaimed that although the ‘commu-
nal houses, Buddhist pagodas, shrines, temples, and imperial tombs have
for centuries been exploited by feudal tyrants, who used them as sources
of prestige in order to get close to all classes of people and to sow supersti-
tions among them’, they should now be utilized in accordance with a new
cultural project of building a modern nation (Công Báo 1960: 338). The
state’s concern was dictated by a practical interest in developing the sites
as places of historical interest, cultural value, or scenic beauty that the
masses could visit as tourists rather than as places of religious activity.
More importantly, this development aimed at replacing ‘superstitious’
beliefs with a new socialist creed. Thus, the fate of these places was not
a trivial and unimportant matter: their new role was to serve the state
machinery in building a new society. The Ministry of Culture, aware that
it was losing control over the temples and fearful of the potentially disas-
trous consequences of antisuperstitious zeal, blamed its own employees
for ‘lack of proper view’ (ibid.). In a self-critical mood, the Công Báo
(1960: 338) describes the temples’ destruction:
As a result of the need for material for new building projects, a number 
of objects of our age-old architectural heritage (di san kiên trúc cô truyên) 
have been demolished; some of them have been used to support the art 
of cooperatives (văn nghê hơp tác xã) or the production of oil lamps for 
meetings, others have been turned into retail outlets, storehouses and 
markets, while some of them remain in the hands of superstitious old 
ritual masters, but no one is taking care of the majority of them. Some 
people with little awareness have destroyed these places or used them 
as private houses. … 
It is prohibited to defile architectural monuments (công trình kiên 
trúc) or to use them in illegitimate ways such as: making improper draw-
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and ducks [in them]; storing hay; storing manure in communal houses,
pagodas, shrines, temples, or imperial tombs (lăng tẩm); taking memo-
rial plaques, tiles, wood, wooden panels with Chinese characters, or 
lacquered boards belonging to communal houses in order to demolish 
them, to make piers, plank-beds, or chairs, or to bake lime. 
To rectify all ‘mistakes and shortcomings’, local authorities were
strongly encouraged to protect and preserve ‘all old architectural sites
and other locales of scenic beauty and use them in an appropriate way
without wastage’ (ibid.). The ‘appropriate way’ was understood as ‘turn-
ing all places of worship into schools, exhibition halls, gathering places,
and cultural houses’, which in the official discourse were presented as
places of education and thus better alternative uses for once sacred loca-
tions (ibid.). However, before the implementation of the state policy, the
same issue advised local governments to consult with villagers, owners of
religious buildings and provincial cultural offices about the most suitable
way to utilize the religious structures. According to the government order,
all Buddhist pagodas and temples – classified as sites of historical interest
or scenic beauty – were to be managed by local People’s Committees (uy
ban nhân dân) and cultural offices (sơ văn hóa) (Công Báo 1962). In prac-
tice this meant that any renovation and construction work in places of
worship and of historical and cultural value had to be officially approved
by these bodies. This rule is still obeyed all over Vietnam, including in Sa
Huỳnh and Lý Sơn. 
The six years following this public admission of shortcomings in 
the management of religious structures did not, however, significantly 
improve the situation, and the Party had to sharpen its tone. Reacting 
to the continuing destruction of pagodas and temples, Prime Minister 
Ph m Văn Đồng excoriated administrative committees (uy ban hành 
chính) for failing to ‘preserve all places of historical interest, teach people 
about their value, and transform them into museums’ (Công Báo 1966: 
270). He stressed that these places had been destroyed due to the lack 
of interest in preserving them and even a lack of awareness of the official 
duty to do so, which was a reflection of the low level of training of local 
cadres (ibid.). 
In 1973, two years before the end of the Second Indochina War, the 
state, specifying its policy towards Buddhist pagodas and the clergy, 
had to again remind local authorities of their responsibility to protect 
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all places of historical and cultural interest. The government directive 
called for ‘preserving thoughtfulness (chu đáo) and cleanliness (sach 
sẽ)’ vis-à-vis Buddhist pagodas and forbade ‘hurting the feelings and 
beliefs (tín ngương) of the people’ by destroying Buddhist sculptures 
and instruments or using them in inappropriate ways (Công Báo 1973: 
253). Vice Prime Minister Lê Thanh Nghị reminded authorities in all 
communes (xã) and urban neighbourhoods (khu phố) that they had a 
duty to coordinate mass organizations (tô chưc nhân dân) responsible
for protecting and ‘bringing into play the notion of historical monu-
ments’ (ibid.). He pointed out that these committees must invite and 
help monks and nuns to take direct responsibility for the protection and 
preservation of ‘historical spaces’ but, at the same time, they should not 
interfere with religious activities. Therefore, the state was concerned not 
about religious but, above all, about national spaces.
Theoretically, the Buddhist clergy could count on official guarantees 
to continue their religious activities if they voluntarily handed their land 
over to the village cooperatives and joined common production. The 
cooperatives were expected to assign the monks and nuns to brigades 
based on practical abilities and their religious tasks in order to ensure 
their livelihoods (Công Báo 1973). In reality, however, the clergy had 
little choice: the state recommended training the most suitable local 
clergy as tour guides. It was presumed that monks and nuns could help 
local cadres with instructing visitors on the history of pagodas and sce-
nic sites (Công Báo 1973: 253). 
One year later, in an attempt to complement the policy of ‘preserva-
tion’ and ‘protection’, the state introduced a procedure of ‘classification’ 
(xêp hang) of pagodas and temples as ‘historical and cultural monu-
ments’ (di tích lịch sử và văn hóa) (Công Báo 1974: 51). This was the 
first time that the Ministry of Culture added the adjective ‘cultural’ (văn
hóa) to the term ‘historical monument’ (ibid.), thereby broadening
the definition of ‘heritage’. The subsequent issue of Công Báo (1975) 
listed twelve pagodas and temples that qualified according to this new
criterion. However, between 1975 and 1979 – the time of the most zeal-
ous antisuperstition campaigns – the Công Báo remained conspicuously 
silent regarding the protection and preservation of temples. 
At the beginning of the 1980s the state returned to its policy of 
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the practice of classifying temples according to their historic, cultural, 
and artistic importance (Công Báo 1980, 1982). In 1984, when the 
instructions concerning cultural preservation received the higher legal 
status of ‘state law’ (pháp lênh), provincial authorities were encouraged 
to apply for official recognition of all cultural and historical sites (Công 
Báo 1984; see also Endres 2002: 5). Judging from the growing number 
of official declarations of recognition published in the Công Báo after
1984, the state’s initiative met with an enthusiastic response from local 
officials and villagers.6 All these events took place on the eve of the Đổi 
Mới reforms. 
Starting with the introduction of the Đổi Mới reforms in 1986, 
Vietnam gradually withdrew from its project of socialist modernity and 
opened its borders to the international community. Integration with 
global capitalism, however, came with the enormous threat of inunda-
tion by foreign cultures. This prompted the state to attempt to devise 
an alternative Vietnamese vision, one in which national identification 
was the main indicator of modernity (Salemink 2008b; Hoang 2017). 
One milestone in the state’s policy of preservation of those local cultural 
practices that would simultaneously symbolize ‘traditional’ and ‘mod-
ern’ was Resolution No. 5 of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party on Building a Progressive Culture Imbued with National Identity,7 
which was adopted in 1998. Although this resolution does not refer 
explicitly to religion, it nevertheless allowed for the interpretation of 
religious revival in terms of ‘culture’ and, above all, ‘national heritage’. 
Salemink (2013: 161) interprets Resolution No. 5 as, on the one hand, 
an ‘umbrella for all sorts of local, bottom-up efforts to reinvent tradi-
tions and invest these with new forms and meanings’ and, on the other 
hand, a useful tool for the state to ‘claim a greater role in the organiza-
tion of rituals and festivals … in an attempt to channel the discourse 
over Vietnam’s identity in new directions after the withdrawal from a 
Socialist modernity’. 
Due to its particular emphasis on the national aspect of Vietnamese 
modernity, it seems that Party Resolution No. 5 is much more binding 
6. According to the Ministry of Culture, by 1996 a total of 1,860 ‘historical and 
cultural monuments’ had been officially recognized (Endres 2002: 6). 
7. Nghị quyêt Hôi nghị lân thư năm Ban chấp hành Trung ương Đang vê xây dựng và phát 
triên nên văn hóa Viêt Nam tiên tiên, đam đà ban sắc dân tộc. 
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for official authorities and even academics than the 2001 State Law 
on Cultural Heritage, published in the Công Báo (2001: 2232). While 
the 2001 law describes ‘cultural heritage’ in general terms as a ‘spiritual 
product which has historical, cultural, and scientific values preserved
in memory and writings and handed down orally, through arts and
crafts, science, oral philology, folk performances, a way of life, a tradi-
tional lifestyle, festivals, handicraft techniques, knowledge of traditional 
medicine, food culture, traditional national costumes, and different 
terms of folk knowledge’, Resolution No. 5 helps to reconcile tensions 
that inevitably arise between inherently contradictory concepts such as 
‘socialism’ and ‘market’, and ‘cultural chauvinism’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ 
(Salemink 2013: 174). 
In 2002, specifying the 2001 Law on Cultural Heritage, the gov-
ernment pointed out that historical and cultural sites had to meet the 
criterion of significance on at least one of three levels: (1) ‘provincial’ 
(tỉnh), (2) ‘national’ (quốc gia), or (3) ‘special national’ (quốc gia đặc
biêt). While the first referred mainly to archaeological, historical, 
and cultural sites important for local regions, the latter two explicitly 
stressed the national aspects of such places. More precisely, the law of 
2001 indicates that all places designated as ‘national’ (di tích quốc gia) 
and ‘special national monuments’ (di tích quốc gia đặc biêt) must refer 
to important events in national history or to ‘national heroes’ (anh hùng
dân tộc) or ‘famous symbolic persons having influence on the course of 
national history’ (Công Báo 2002: 4051). Later in the Công Báo of 2002, 
Prime Minister Phan Văn Khải gave a detailed list of all documents 
necessary to apply for the official recognition, known as ‘Certificate of 
Designation of a Historical and Cultural Relic’ (công nhân di tích lịch sử 
văn hóa). In most cases, it was required that the application, certified by 
local authorities, must include a ‘life story’ (lý lịch) of the famous person 
or hero (usually worshipped by the local community as a divine spirit or 
god), a written statement from the applicants, and a map with the exact 
location of the site (ibid.). 
At the time, the lý lịch functioned as a political biography that had to be
periodically submitted to local authorities. In this way, the state assessed
individual class background, behaviour according to socialist standards,
social relations, and contributions to society (Leshkowich 2014: 143).
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tool of economic and political class categorization and revolutionary
commitment. After 1975, it was crucial for classification of southern
Vietnamese ‘in political terms as supporters or opponents of the revolu-
tion and in economic terms by documenting their peasant, worker, or
bourgeois capitalist origin’ (Leshkowich 2014: 150). However, the use
of the term lý lịch, which is by definition political, to assess the gods’ and
spirits’ contributions to national history provides an interesting example
of state discipline ‘moving productively between ideal categories’ of poli-
tics and religion (Harms 2011a: 26). By demanding from the religious
constituency a political biography of the spirit, the state institutionalizes
religious practice and cleanses it of any connotations that are not congru-
ent with the official semiotic ideology. At the same time, cleansing those
aspects from the spirit record provides people with room for manipula-
tion of different categories – religious and political – and for the use of
indiscipline as a local tactic when acting on behalf of their gods. As I will
show through my ethnography in Chapters 4 and 5, different groups of
actors often draw on state semiotic ideologies and employ a common
political language, but rarely agree on its meaning. 
Paradoxically, the modern practice of the socialist state to grant
certificates to heroes, divinities, and temples of historical and national
significance has a long tradition in Vietnam, dating back to imperial times
(see Wolters 1988; Boudarel 1991; Do 2003; DiGregorio and Salemink
2007). By the sixteenth century the imperial court was already attempt-
ing to gain control of the spirit cults in the villages through the establish-
ment of a hierarchy for the spirit world that conformed to the Confucian
model. Spirits were certified with a royal charter (sắc phong) and, at the
same time, their ‘spirit record’ (thân tích) was standardized and cleansed
of elements that were not congruent with the dominant, official ideology.
The central authorities required that the new spirits had to be those of
deceased individuals who had been moral exemplars or good officials.
The central state acted as patron of these spirits and, through their
standardization, tried to integrate the country and enforce a sort of unity
on the regional and local levels. A closer reading of the Công Báo shows
that the postcolonial socialist Vietnamese state continued this precolo-
nial practice. Like the imperial court, the modern state seeks to increase
its legitimacy through the careful selection and canonization of those
historic figures who demonstrated moral and patriotic values and heroic
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resistance against foreign invaders (see Pelley 2002: 177–189; Malarney
2007: 529; Salemink 2007; Pham Quynh Phuong 2009). 
In line with the imperative to ‘build a progressive culture, imbued 
with national identity’ – a famous slogan from Resolution No. 5 – local
state agents are encouraged to apply for official recognition of com-
memorative sites that they can prove have the potential to be included 
in the category of ‘cultural heritage’ (Endres 2001, 2002: 6). At the same 
time, villagers who want to reclaim the sacred spaces of certain spirits 
and deities and reaffirm their institutional significance try to obtain 
such a certificate, which not only provides state recognition for the 
temple but also, as in the imperial past, enables people to worship their 
divinities in any way they wish. As such, it is also a source of personal 
consolation and communal pride. 
However, as Salemink (2013: 173) points out, the state recognition 
goes beyond the cultural and historical assessment of the site as herit-
age, as the state ‘reifies and instrumentalizes local processes under the 
umbrella of the nation’. By giving local practices and sites the label of 
‘cultural’ and ‘national heritage’, the state rids them of their religious 
content and appropriates them for its own purposes. This involves 
not only selecting, appropriating, and modifying meanings, but also 
controlling and disciplining the people who are emotionally engaged in 
rescuing their sacred sites (Salemink 2013). 
Science, beliefs, and religious superstition
In 2005, on a hot summer afternoon in Hanoi, I met with my Vietnamese 
language teacher. I asked her to help me interpret an article entitled ‘Is 
it right that religion is at variance with socialism?’ (Phai chăng tôn giáo 
mâu thuẫn vơi Chu Nghĩa Xã Hội?). It was authored by Đõ Quang Hưng 
(2004), the director of the Institute for Religious Studies, where I was 
affiliated from 2002–2005. She took a look at the title and then said: 
Religion still exists and this is a fact the socialist country has to accept. 
Marx said that religion was the opium of the masses. But now, the Party 
has a new interpretation, namely, that religion could have a positive ef-
fect, similar to a drug that gives people relief when they suffer a great deal 
of pain. In a modern society there are many different problems people 
have to deal with on their own, and sometimes they feel hopeless. They 










Doing and Making Religion in Vietnam 
As Charles Keyes, Laurel Kendall, and Helen Hardacre (1994a) 
demonstrate in their seminal volume Asian Visions of Authority, the the-
sis that modernization and restructuring of Asian societies in the name
of ‘progress’ would lead to their secularization, as predicted by Marx, 
Durkheim, Weber, and their followers, failed to materialize. The mar-
ginalization of the religious sphere did not lead to a break with religious
traditions. In fact, quite the opposite occurred: in the face of moderniza-
tion, religious traditions became even more significant (Keyes, Kendall, 
and Hardacre 1994b: 3). The authors aptly point out that state agendas 
to control and standardize religion have been informed not only by 
theories of modernization that sought to free people from superstitious 
and time-consuming practices, but also by the need of modern Asian 
states to legitimize their rule and organize the ‘masses’. This necessity, 
expressed in the nation-building process, entailed a different attitude to 
the past and to religion from that of socialist modernizing agendas. 
Indeed, in 1990, the Vietnamese Communist Party debated how ‘to 
strengthen the task of religion in the new situation’ and, as a result, ap-
proved the resolution: 
Religion is a legitimate requirement of a part of society. The pending 
question of religion existed in the socialist system for a long time. 
Religious virtues and morals are, for many reasons, suitable to the new 
and great undertaking of national construction.8 
However, as Salemink (2008b: 276) argues, only when the Party 
Central Committee adopted Resolution No. 5 in 1998 did the religious 
intensification begin ‘to be translated into the official imaginary of the 
nation’. In light of this document, ancestor worship, communal houses, 
and the rituals associated with them appeared to be legible to the state in
the sense that they were recognized as fitting material for reshaping the
representation of the past and for narratives about national and revolu-
tionary martyrs in modern Vietnam (Taylor 2007; Salemink 2008b). As 
in other Asian countries where the dead were ‘employed’ in the service 
of national unity (see Evans 1998; Keyes 2002), in Vietnam the belief in 
life after death and especially in the ‘exceptional dead’ became a potent 
symbol of national integration linking society with its heroic history 
8. Government Regulation 24-NQ/TW 16/10/1990, quoted from the Vietnam’s 
Communist Party: On Religious Issues Resolutions of the 7th Plenum [9th tenure] (The 
Gioi Publishers 2004). 
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(Malarney 2007; see also Ho Tai 2001; Endres 2008; Kwon 2009). Van 
der Veer and Lehmann (1999: 11) argue that ‘death and afterlife form 
the stuff of which both religion and nationalism are made’. Consequently, 
in Vietnam ancestor worship has recurred as a ‘hero-centered political 
culture’ in which the centre of gravity is the exemplary service of the 
ancestors rather than their peaceful afterlife (Kwon 2006: 104). 
The gradual change of state attitudes towards culture and religion 
was accompanied by scholarly debates reacting to the revival of religious 
traditions. Special attention was given to the ‘cultural identity’ (ban sắc 
văn hóa) of Vietnam, which was seen as the ‘essence’ of the nation. Along 
these lines, scholars produced articles describing at length how ‘national 
cultural identity’ contributed to the ‘skills and spirit’, ‘vital power’, and 
‘experience’ of the Vietnamese nation, which, in turn, made it possible 
for Vietnam to emerge triumphantly from the trials of history. In the 
state semiotic ideology, ‘patriotism’ (chu nghĩa yêu nươc) and the sense 
of being a ‘patriot’ (yêu nươc) were acknowledged as the most important 
characteristics of national cultural identity. 
For example, Ngô Đức Thịnh (2001), one of the most devoted 
scholars of folklore studies, found in the realms of the supernatural (linh
thiêng) and spiritual (tâm linh) symbolic elements of patriotism that 
were developed into ‘religious beliefs’ (tín ngương) encompassing all 
these meanings. Vietnamese academics saw a ‘will to build and preserve 
the country’ in traditional society, especially in the popular culture of 
the peasants, who appeared as the guardians of the ‘pure’ and ‘authentic’ 
Vietnamese tradition (Pelley 1993: 114).9 This subordination of the 
sacred dimensions of religion to the state’s secular objectives is found in 
many Asian countries, where religion is seen as the essence of national 
culture (Kendall 1996a, 2009; Hann 2006; Kehl-Bedrogi 2006; Mandair 
2009; Van der Veer and Feuchtwang 2009). Laurel Kendall (1996b, 
2009: 17–19) reports that in the 1980s a new Korean middle class of
intellectuals believed that the real essence of a people was in their ‘folk
traditions’. It should come as no surprise, then, that in Vietnam tutelary 
9. In the post-colonial period, Vietnamese culture was divided into ‘popular’ 
and ‘official’, reflecting the class divide between the peasant and ruling classes. 
Accordingly, folklore studies focus on the ‘little people’ – the idealized peasants 
without local and historical specifity (Pelley 1993: 199). For a critique of defining 
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spirits and craft ancestors, who had been erased from local landscapes 
during the campaign against superstitions, have returned in their full
glory as historical characters. So-called folk culture and village commu-
nity have become arenas in which all these notions can be articulated 
according to the official slogans ‘family–village–nation’ and ‘preserva-
tion, wealth, and development of national cultural character’ (Ngô Đức 
Thịnh 2001). 
Although during the Đổi Mới era some popular practices previously 
labelled as superstitions became recognized as ‘folk beliefs’ (tín ngương 
dân gian) and ‘national heritage’ (Endres 2002; Taylor, 2003; Salemink 
2008c), the pejorative category of superstition has not disappeared 
entirely. In opening up public space for religion, the socialist state has 
neither admitted limitations to its political power nor given up control 
over religious practices. Although the state no longer plays the strong 
ideological role in people’s lives that it did before Đổi Mới, it still tries to 
standardize religious practices. One such effort is the validation of those 
popular religious practices that remain in line with the state’s semiotic 
ideology and the stigmatization of those that bear a ‘superstitious’ char-
acter. While identifying the first category seems to be relatively easy, the 
latter is more ambiguous and therefore creates a problem for the state. 
The Sino-Vietnamese term mê tín (in Chinese: mixin), commonly 
translated as ‘superstition’, is associated with certain aspects of religious 
expression within the boundaries of the so-called great traditions
of Islam, Buddhism, and Christianity and popular religious practice 
(Anagnost 1987).10 In the case of China, Sutton and Kang (2009:
193–4) show that when the term ‘religion’ was paired with ‘supersti-
tion’, ‘religion’ ‘under the shadow of superstition’ appeared archaic and
unscientific. Asad (1993, 2003) points out a similar phenomenon when
he draws our attention to the concept of the ‘secular’, which emerged 
historically in conjunction with the notion of the religious. Like ‘super-
stition’, the concept of ‘secular’ cannot do without the idea of ‘religion’. 
In 1999 the Ministry of Culture published a volume titled Religious 
Beliefs –Superstitions (Tín ngương – mê tín) (Hà Văn Tăng and Trương 
10. According to the Dictionnaire Vietnamien-Chinois-Français by Eugene Gouin 
(Missions Étrangeres de Paris 2002), mê could be translated as ‘to adore’, ‘to 
devote’, ‘to be mad about’, ‘to love’, ‘to be blind’, or ‘to be unconscious’, while tín
means ‘trust’, ‘to believe’, ‘faith’, and ‘faithful’. 
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Thìn 1999), which poses the problem of depicting ‘superstition’ with 
reference to the new socio-economic situation Vietnam faces. Trương 
Thìn, a vice director in the Ministry of Culture and Information in Hanoi 
and one of the volume’s editors, argued that every faith and religion has 
a ‘superstitious’ (mê tín) character, which does not automatically mean 
that its nature is heterodox (dị đoan). Only in cases when the mê tín, 
understood here as a feeling of confidence and unwavering belief, is 
‘used unfairly’ does it become something deformed, strange, odd, and 
nonsensical and, as a result, turns out to be mê tín dị đoan, or heterodox 
superstition (1999: 112–115). 
As argued above, in the Đổi Mới era the Vietnamese state gradually 
departed from an interpretation of all religious practices as ‘unscientific’ 
and ‘irrational’, while still attempting to draw a line between those reli-
gious practices that were recognized as having a ‘national character’ and 
those that went against the modern project of building a ‘progressive 
nation’ and were therefore labelled as ‘superstition’. To this end, the 
socialist state prepared a precise list of the religious practices consid-
ered ‘outdated’ and ‘superstitious’. Life-cycle rituals and village festivals 
should be in tune with a ‘civilized way of life’ (nêp sống văn minh), and 
were therefore a particular focus of its concern. With reference to such 
rituals, one government regulation states: 
The state respects religious freedom (tự do tín ngương) or the freedom
not to have any religion (tôn giáo). Practices of ancestor worship, cer-
emonies in churches, temples, and pagodas … are beliefs (tín ngương) 
that the state respects. Astrology, fortune telling, soul-calling, geomancy,
prophecy, amulets and incantations, spirit exorcism, and healing by spells
and magic … are superstitions that the state strictly forbids. Burning of
votive paper (mannequins, many-storied houses, vehicles, dollars, and
cheques…)11 inside cultural and historical monuments or during festive
occasions is prohibited. Installing incense bowls inside public service
11. By burning paper money and other paper items, Vietnamese people send these 
offerings to dead relatives in the afterlife in the belief that such offerings will help 
their spirits live more comfortably in the other world, and the spirits will help the 
living in return. In 2018 Vietnamese Buddhist Sangha issued an official document 
categorizing the burning of votive paper as superstition (available at https:// 
english.vov.vn/society/buddhist-sangha-proposes-eliminating-votive-paper-
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buildings, production facilities, state enterprises, socio-political organi-
zations, or military installations is forbidden.12 
Note that the government regulation prefers to use the term ‘reli-
gious beliefs’ instead of ‘religion’ when referring to ‘religious freedom’. 
According to Western usage, ‘religious beliefs’ here are relegated to the 
private realm and mainly considered a personal matter (for China, see 
Ashiwa and Wank 2009; Sutton and Kang 2009: 194). Nonetheless, 
the lack of a clear differentiation between ‘religious beliefs’ and ‘super-
stitions’ still posed a challenge for the state’s officials, and the lack of 
institutionalized organizations and the fluid and charismatic character 
of the authorities supporting them makes the practice of ‘superstitions’ 
highly resistant to state control (Anagnost 1987: 44). 
Trương Thìn (1999) argues that superstitions are related to inad-
equate public education, and an atheist education is one of the most 
important aspects of a socialist upbringing when it comes to abolishing 
superstition. He points out that not enough attention is paid to ‘scientific 
atheism’, which should be universally taught in schools, as well as among 
Party members and other organizations in society (1999: 122–23). 
Because of their spiritual character, ‘religious beliefs’ and ‘religion’ are
conducive to developing ‘social evils’, ‘outdated practices’, and ‘supersti-
tions’. All levels of government are therefore required to plan, guide, and 
manage religion in order to build a cultured, civilized, clean, and safe 
environment. 
Trương Thìn furthermore argues that the ‘ideology of fatalism and
predestination’ and the ‘psychology’ of praying for luck are often con-
nected with illicit businesses, embezzlement, bribery, and damage to 
public health (1999: 125). Hence, in the late 1990s, even as temples 
and shrines were popping up like mushrooms all over the place, many 
popular religious specialists and their clients still remained shrouded in 
an aura of suspicion of malpractice and misappropriation of funds. In 
its struggle against superstition, the state created stricter laws in order 
12. Government Regulation 04/1998/TT-BVHTT, quoted in Trương Thìn (1999: 
121). See also Ordinance of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly 
No.21/2004/Pl-UBTVQH11 of June 2004 Regarding Religious Beliefs and Religious 
Organizations (available at http://www.thuvienphapluat.vn/archive/Phap-lenh/ 
Ordinance-No-21-2004-PL-UBTVQH11-of-June-29-2004-on-beliefs-and-
religions-vb76132t14.aspx, last accessed 4 June 2018). 
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to more easily ban fortune tellers, physiognomists, and astrologists, and 
to eradicate suspect places of worship such as temples and shrines in the
recesses of rocky caves or on street corners. The vignette at the begin-
ning of the book describing the fishers’ effort to get permission from 
the authorities to erect a shrine for the statue recovered from the sea is a 
case in point. Consequently, article 199 of the Vietnamese Penal Code 
treats the practice of superstition as a crime that is liable to punishment: 
Those who use fortune telling, spirit possession, or other superstitious 
forms to trigger serious consequences are liable to re-education for one 
year or to imprisonment for a period of three months to three years. In 
cases where the crime of superstition has led to death or other extremely 
serious consequences, the time of imprisonment will be from two to ten 
years. (Trương Thìn 1999: 124). 
The socialist efforts to abolish superstition were not limited to popu-
lar religious specialists. Since the early years of the Communist Party,
the family also came under socialist scrutiny as a source of ‘backwards
customs and habits’ that were part of everyday life. Since the 1990s,
however, family and lineage rituals have been presented as the cement of
village communal spirit, as having an educational role in the lives of the
people, and as teaching basic concepts of morality. Trương Thìn (1999:
125–126) claims that the most effective method for combatting supersti-
tion was to expand the campaign for building ‘cultural families’ (gia đình
văn hóa), ‘cultural villages’ (làng văn hóa), ‘cultural quarters’ (khu phố văn
hóa), and ‘civilized housing estates’ (khu tâp thê văn minh).13 The cul-
13. The ‘Civilized Way of Life’ campaign, of which the main focus was the ‘Cultural 
Family’, had already started by the early 1960s and experienced a number of dif-
ferent phases; for more information see Drummond (2004). This campaign bears 
a striking similarity to the Chinese discourse on civilization. However, in the case 
of China, the concept of wenhua (Vietnamese: văn hóa) or ‘culture’ was used in 
the Cultural Revolution and had a class character. Consequently, since the 1980s 
it has been replaced by wenming (Vietnamese: văn minh) or ‘civilized’, which refers 
to the idea of modernization. In Vietnam, the association of the terms ‘cultural’ 
and ‘civilized’ with ‘class’ is much weaker than in China, although it is present. 
For example, the term ‘cultural villages’ (làng văn hóa) refers to the ‘peasant class’, 
while the term ‘civilized housing estates’ (khu tâp thê văn minh) denotes educated 
urban elite living in residential blocks in a city. Nevertheless, in Vietnam, the terms 
‘cultural’ and ‘civilized’ are used interchangeably and are associated with both the 
whole development of society and with nation building. At the same time, the 
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tural campaigns were adapted to the new conditions of a market-oriented
society and constituted a crucial component of the new nation-building
process; they were designed to help ‘prevent and drive back negative
practices, social evils, and harmful cultural products’ (ibid: 125).14 The
state arrogated to itself the role of educator and patron of Vietnamese
society and granted certificates to those who reached the standards of
‘modern behaviour’, which includes well-being, progressiveness, hygiene
and good health, preservation of traditional order, good customs, and
civilized ways of life during weddings, funerals, and religious festivals
(Drummond 2004; for China see Anagnost 1994, 1997).

What had begun with drawing a strict boundary between religion and 
politics in an effort to purify religion under the project of socialist 
modernity gradually shifted over time to a more pragmatic approach in 
which certain religious forms were transformed into the more secular 
concepts of ‘cultural’ and ‘national heritage’, while other practices were 
classified as ‘superstition’ and were, therefore, forbidden. In that sense, 
the Party-state continues to see religion as a competing source of power 
that needs to be controlled and managed. However, the presumed binary 
oppositions of institutionalized religion versus beliefs, religion versus 
politics, and science versus superstition are not in practice so clear-cut 
or static, and the fuzziness of the distinctions leads to the development 
of novel forms of religiosity that cut across not only religious, but also 
political, linguistic, and ethnic boundaries. The following chapters relate
the events through which Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn villagers, state authori-
ties, and religious figures pragmatically reconfigured these binaries and 
reinvented themselves vis-à-vis larger entities such as mainland, island, 
and nation to best serve their specific localities and interests. 
education and literacy. For an excellent discussion of wenming campaigns in the 
context of China, see Anagnost (1997). 
14. For more detail on the governmental decision regarding promulgation regulations 
on granting the honorable titles of ‘cultural family’, ‘cultural village’, and ‘cultural 
quarter’, see also Công Báo (2002a: 4045–4066). 
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C H A P T E R  3  
Between Land and
Sea: Spatial and Social
Boundaries among Fishers
and Farmers 
There is a legend among fishers in central Vietnam that the ship of King Gia Long was rescued from sinking by the goddess Quan Âm, who tore a scrap off of her dress and threw it into the sea, 
creating the whale that carried the royal ship safely to shore on his back. 
According to local Buddhist beliefs, Quan Âm – the Goddess of Mercy 
– is a Buddhist bodhisattva who resigned from his search for ‘nirvana’ 
and instead assumed a female form in order to help people. Her cult is 
particularly popular among fishers of the south-central coast region of 
Vietnam, who believe that she helps them during storms. 
Moved by and grateful for the whale’s deed, King Gia Long brought 
the whale into his family and gave him the royal title ‘Great General of 
the Southern Sea’ (Nam Hai Đai tương quân). Since this time, fishers 
in central Vietnam have considered the whale their tutelary spirit and 
father’ (cha) who protects them during their voyages at sea. Therefore, 
whenever they find a beached whale on the shore, they organize a 
funeral ceremony and erect a temple, which serves as a kind of tomb 
or mausoleum (lăng) for the marine mammal. Every year those fishers 
celebrate the anniversary of the whale’s death and make offerings at the 
altar in its temple. 
According to local narratives, at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century Lý Sơn farmers found a whale beached on the shore just op-
posite the temple of the Goddess of the Five Elements (Bà Chúa Ngũ 
Hanh), which belonged to the village An Vĩnh. The five statues of this 
goddess represent Fire, Earth, Metal, Water, and Wood, and maintain 
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the balance between yin (âm) and yang (dương) – the principles of order 
and disorder, internal and external, and of male and female domains. 
The farmers decided that the seafaring deity representing the male 
domain would complement the Goddess of the Five Elements. The 
fishers’ organization, Vĩnh Th nh, protested and claimed the property 
rights to the beached whale. However, the farmers did not want to yield 
and remained steadfast in their decision. They strongly believed that the 
Whale Spirit had chosen their village to send rain in time of drought and 
to improve crops. Subsequently, the land-oriented village (làng) and the
fishing organization (van) reached a compromise by building two sepa-
rate temples: the Inner Dune Palace (dinh C n Trong), representing the
farmers, and the OuterDune Tomb (lăng C n Ngoài), representing fish-
ers. The two temples were designated for the veneration of the Whale 
Spirit, which was revered by both farmers and fishers alike under his full 
name, Great and Cruel General of the Southern Sea (Nam Hai Da Sa 
Đai tương quân tôn thân). The farming village decided that the fishers’ 
anniversary celebration in the Outer Dune Tomb could precede the 
one organized by the farmers, but as a sign of the fishing organization’s 
respect for the agriculturally oriented village, the celebration could not 
be held without the presence of the village senior – the ritual master of 
high sacrifice and representative of the founding lineage and, hence, a 
farmer. 

In traditional, predominantly agrarian Islamic, Hindu, and Buddhist 
societies, fishers were considered ‘out of culture’ and of lower social status
(Serjant 1995; Chou 2003, 2010; Hoeppe 2007; Subramanian 2009). 
In Ming China (1368–1644), those who lived along the coast formed
a separate social category within a settled agrarian society and did not 
have rights to permanent settlement (Xi and Faure 2016). Historian
Trần Quốc Vượng (1992: 29) noted that in precolonial and colonial 
Vietnam, fishing was a despised occupation and fishers constituted one
of the most marginalized groups in society. Landless, without roots in
the village, and living in areas close to the sea and rivers, fishers were 
discriminated against and deprived of the spiritual and material ameni-
ties offered by the village. Even though much has changed in postcolo-
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systems, large-capacity fishing vessels, and the recent extension of eco-
nomic initiatives to fishers – especially in the context of Vietnam’s and 
China’s competing claims to the South China Sea – the hierarchical 
divide between the worlds of the land and the sea still structures the 
coastal society of central Vietnam. 
In his classic monograph on Malay fishermen, Raymond Firth 
(1964) demonstrated that in coastal areas, fishers often live side by side 
with people of other occupations, including farmers, with whom they 
maintain economic and frequently intimate relations. Michael Pearson 
(1985: 3), a historian of the Indian Ocean, goes a step further, stating
that ‘land and the sea intertwine in complex and various ways’ and argu-
ing that we have to be careful not to see the people living on the shore 
as totally land- or sea-oriented. Indeed, coastal people’s cosmology is 
infused with ambivalence as they look both to the inland/mainland and 
to the sea as a means of livelihood and as a cosmological and sovereign 
centre. Yet the examples of Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn show that people 
themselves hold to a cognitive dichotomy in which the two modes of 
life – farming and fishing – are thought of as completely separate, even 
though in everyday life the two activities might mix. In Sa Huỳnh and Lý
Sơn Island, the hierarchy between fishers and farmers is reproduced in 
the two vernacular terms làng and van, which appeared in almost every 
conversation I had with villagers. 
In precolonial and colonial Vietnam, làng (village) constituted the 
territorial unit of Vietnamese society and represented an agriculture-
based lifestyle, with the political and ritual system based in the đình
(communal house). In the đình, villagers spiritually ensured a good har-
vest for the upcoming year through the worship of those who first broke
the land under the plough (tiên hiên) and of the founders of the village 
(tiên hâu).1 In central Vietnam, van referred both to a self-ruling fishing 
organization and to a territorial unit with its own religious system that 
was based in the lăng, a temple for the cult of a seafaring guardian spirit, 
1. In central and southern Vietnam communal houses were characteristically erected 
in honour of the tiên hiên and the tiên hâu: those who first broke the land under the 
plough and the founders of the village, respectively. If the communal house was 
a northern đình, it would be a shrine for the village guardian spirit, who could be 
either a historical or a mythical person. 
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the Whale, who was usually referred to as Mr Nam Hải.2 In the lăng – lit-
erally ‘tomb’ or ‘mausoleum’ – fishers kept bones of the beached whale. 
The fact that whales are considered seafaring guardian spirits speaks 
volumes about fishermen’s concerns. Exposed to cold wind, rough seas,
unpredictable threats, and equipment failure, fishers frequently endure 
great psychological stress and constant economic pressure in their eve-
ryday lives. Through propitiating the Whale Spirit they seek to ensure 
their own protection rather than the fertility of the land and the bounty 
of the harvest and, hence, the welfare of the village. 
Pearson (2006: 366) writes that ‘[f]olk religion on the littoral … re-
flects the need of its practitioners. The concerns of coastal people were 
usually quite different from those of peasants and pastoralists inland. 
On the coast religion had to do with customs to ensure safe voyages or a 
large catch, or a favorable monsoon so that fishing could recommence. 
Particular gods were propitiated for these purposes.’ The vignette above
is a good illustration of Pearson’s point about different concerns of ag-
riculturalists, whose main worry in this context was rain for their crops, 
and of fishers, who were more concerned with guaranteeing safe passage 
at sea. Here we touch on the heart of the problem – different perceptions 
of what constitutes valuable work. 
In many Asian societies farmers have historically looked down 
upon fishers because fishing was considered the easier way of life. In 
contrast to the hard labour of a farmer, who had to invest a great deal 
of labour cultivating the soil and looking after the fields in order to 
enjoy his yields, a fisher, it was believed, just invested in his gear, went 
to sea, and extracted its produce, giving nothing in return. In precolonial 
and colonial Vietnam, rice was considered the essential staple, in part 
2. In northern Vietnam and the northern coast of central Vietnam, the van was 
known in the form of floating communities that lived on boats along the banks 
of rivers or in the lagoons (Nguyễn Duy Thiệu 2002; Hoang Ba Tinh 2006). 
Called Đản in Vietnam and Dan-jia in southern China (Xi and Faure 2016), these 
boat dwellers formed small hamlets whose populations were unstable as fishers 
often move in search of new fishing areas (Nguyễn Duy Thiệu 2002: 91–92). 
In northern Vietnam there were also so-called fishing villages (làng đánh cá), 
whose inhabitants engaged in both fishing and farming. These villages resembled 
the fairly common ‘craft villages’ (làng nghê) whose inhabitants were experts in 
goldsmithery, the production of conical hats, the manufacture of furniture, silk, 
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because it could be stored for long periods and used in times of famine. 
In this sense farm labour was highly valued. Unlike rice, fish had to be 
consumed shortly after catching and, hence, just added variety to a 
farmer’s diet, which predominantly consisted of boiled rice, sometimes 
with a drop of fish sauce and some vegetables ( Jamieson 1985). The old 
Vietnamese folk proverb – ‘In the village, the scholars come first, the 
farmers come second; but when the rice runs out and one wanders [in 
search of a bowl of rice], scholars come after farmers’ – gives us a sense 
of how highly valued farming was and how a good rice harvest was seen 
as a guarantee that villagers would not starve (Nguyễn Duy Thiệu 2002: 
118). 
The introductory vignette tells us something else as well. The two 
religious arenas – the Inner Dune Palace representing farmers and the 
Outer Dune Tomb representing fishers – epitomized competing spatial 
imaginaries that territorialized the coast and its inhabitants as the space 
outside the hierarchical agrarian world of the inland. Thus, the struggle 
for the right to the Whale Spirit took place not only within the existing 
binary relationship of farmers and fishers, but also within the spatial, 
cognitive, and social divide between land and sea, between inland and 
coast, and between mainland and island. This is where the question 
arises: what does it mean for people living on the coast of the South 
China Sea to have two main livelihoods – farming and fishing – within 
their communities? This chapter places the discussion on fishers and 
farmers in historical perspective in order to explore how the distinction 
between these two modes of life – which often complemented each 
other – became the basis not only for constructing and maintaining, 
but also for deconstructing a social and ritual dichotomy of land and sea 
in Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn. As I will show, this idealized land–sea binary 
was never absolute, and it shifted in postcolonial times when the state’s 
antisupertition measures provided the historically subordinated fishers 
with room to challenge the old hierarchy. The fishers took advantage of 
the Party-state’s attack on all forms of social differentiation in terms of 
class, gender, seating order, and ritual function that the đình, the village’s 
political and ritual centre, reproduced. Uplifted by a recent reversal in
economic fortunes due to the availability of trawling, refrigeration tech-
nologies, and domestic and global demand for marine produce, fishers 
have attained a relatively stronger economic position than farmers and, 
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by investing heavily in agricultural temples and rituals, have turned the 
tables and upended the old hierarchical divide. 
The recent conflict over the South China Sea has opened up a new 
maritime frontier in Vietnam that overemphasizes the sea as part of the 
rebranded ‘maritime nation’ (nươc biên; literally ‘water [and] sea’) and, 
paradoxically, sharpens the spatial and social binaries between farmers 
and fishers. While the centrality of water has always been present in 
Vietnamese cosmology and Vietnamese vocabulary – as is particularly 
well illustrated in the Vietnamese words for ‘country’ (đất nươc; literally 
‘land [and] water’) and ‘government’ (nhà nươc; literally ‘house [and] 
water’) (Avieli 2012: 28) – the term nươc biên places a new emphasis
on the sea and the coast. The state’s domestication and instrumentaliza-
tion of fishers draws the entire population into performance of national 
sovereignty and, somewhat ironically, draws the periphery – such as Lý 
Sơn – into the centre. Even though fishers are often seen by the domi-
nant urban population as ignorant, backwards, and in urgent need of 
national development, they could be confident, even if only for a fleet-
ing moment, that their fishing profession is seen as a sacrifice – willing 
or unwilling – to the nation, as they stand bravely on the frontlines in the 
struggle for national sovereignty. 
The land–sea dichotomy
Inland versus coast 
If we look at the geography of Vietnam, we see that in central Vietnam 
a narrow strip of lowlands linking the Red River Delta region in the 
north and the Mekong River Delta region in the south is sandwiched 
between the South China Sea to the east and the Trường Sơn range to 
the west. These lowlands consist of alluvial plains and sandy strips of 
coastal dunes. In the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, newcomers 
to Quảng Ngãi Province deforested vast areas of the region to create 
arable land for rice cultivation and to establish villages grounded on the 
patrilineages of their places of origin. These groups assumed prominent 
positions on the basis of their prestige as first settlers in the frontier area 
even though, in their place of origin, they may have been outcasts. They 
invested their labour in the land, thereby making it their property. Soon 
after a new village received its name it was included in the province 
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which, as mentioned earlier, was the political and ritual centre of the 
village (Nguyễn Văn M nh 1999).3 The memory of their arrival and of 
their right to the new land was preserved in the local đình through the 
cult of the founders. The exclusive character of the founders’ cult had 
a disadvantageous effect on later newcomers, who were refused village 
membership and hence the right to own land. Making the best of the 
natural conditions in the new environs, they formed van on sandy strips 
of coastal dunes and depended on fishing and trade for their livelihoods. 
Toàn Ánh (2005 [1968]) observed that new ‘hamlets’ in central 
Vietnam were established not only by those who arrived later than the 
founding group and were denied land rights in the existing villages, but 
also when there was not enough land for the original settlers, if the land 
was barren, or if some of the founding families decided to resettle in the
vicinity of a river, the sea, or the forest to earn their living fishing, produc-
ing salt, or clearing the forest. They would request permission from the 
village to establish a new hamlet to be run by a separate chief, although it
would remain administratively subordinate to the village. In the course 
of time the newly created hamlet could become an autonomous village 
(Toàn Ánh 2005 [1968]: 23, 31, 121). This was the case for the villages
of Đồng Vân and Tân Diêm in Sa Huỳnh. Situated on the most favour-
able land, La Vân was regarded as the head village, while adjacent Đồng 
Vân and Tân Diêm formed small dependent hamlets. Inhabitants of Tân
Diêm – located closer to the sea – are to this day engaged in producing 
salt, while Đồng Vân, situated in the hills, combines forestry and agri-
culture. Long Th nh, Th ch By, and Th nh Đức, located on the sandy 
dunes, represent a different process. They developed into salt-making 
and fishing communities (van) that constituted settlements outside of 
the làng system and hence outside of the state administration. 
In Sa Huỳnh, according to local narratives, the most fertile plains 
were occupied by the first Việt migrants coming from the north. The vil-
lage ‘convention’ (hương ươc) of Sa Huỳnh indicates that the agricultural 
village of La Vân had already been established by 1740.4 The fishing 
3. In many cases, villages founded by northern migrants in central Vietnam were 
named after their places of origin; An Vĩnh and An Hải villages on Lý Sơn were 
named after villages in Bình Sơn district, Quảng Ngãi Province. 
4. See Hương ưóc, Đưc Phô (Village convention of Đức Phổ District). (1937). Hanoi: 
École Francaise D’Extrême – Orient. Unpublished manuscript, Library of Social 
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settlement Th ch By was established much later than La Vân, namely in 
1816. This rather later establishment of the fishing settlement suggests 
that, at that time, the Cham population was still present in the area. The 
Việt who settled in the most remote parts of the coastal area intermixed 
with the Cham population, gradually taking over salt fields and salt pro-
duction. Outnumbered by Việt, the Cham were forced to adopt some of
their customs, including dress and language (see Wong Tze Ken 2016),
leading to a blurring of the distinction between Việt and Cham settle-
ments in this area. It also helps explain the conflation of professional 
and ethnic categories in the minds of the farming-oriented population, 
as all fishers, whether of Việt, Cham, or other ethnic background, were 
contemptuously called ha, meaning ‘lower rank, inferior people’ living 
along the coast, or mọi, meaning ‘barbarous’ or ‘savage’ – terms that 
had in the past been used exclusively to refer to Cham or other ethnic 
minorities in the Central Highlands (see Nguyễn Duy Thiệu 2002: 88). 
Due to their seafaring and foraging way of life, the coastal and island 
people in Central Vietnam were also known as ‘lowland barbarians’ 
(mọi ha) or ‘sea barbarians’ (mọi nươc) (Ner 1940: 475‒7). 
Island versus mainland 
While Sa Huỳnh’s composition of fishing and farming hamlets illus-
trates well the division between the coast and inland and between land
and sea activities, Lý Sơn provides an interesting case of an attempt to 
emulate the mainland pattern even though on the island there was no
arable land for wet rice cultivation. The lack of arable land and, hence, 
the inability to grow rice is an important detail that sheds new light on 
the formation of categories such as làng and van. In the face of serious 
physical constraints to growing rice, islanders tried to control access 
to limited resources by reproducing the hierarchical division between 
farmers and fishers that they knew from the mainland. Coming from
the northern coastal provinces of Thanh Hóa, Nghệ An, and Hà Tĩnh, 
some of the ‘founders’ and ‘great lineages’ may well have had the lower 
Science, Hanoi. Under the Lê and Nguyễn dynasties a clash of the dual system – 
official and unofficial – of village administration brought about the ‘convention’ 
(hương uơc), which was a ‘mixture of administrative rules, customary laws and re-
ligious guidelines. The purpose of the convention was to regulate the interactions 
and relationships of each village’s society’ (Tonan 2008: 748; see also Grossheim 
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status of fishers, but in the new setting, by taking advantage of being 
first, they established themselves as superior làng.5 The recognized 
descendants of the ‘founders’ formed dominant lineages and an unof-
ficial channel of grassroots administration as chiefs of hamlets (xóm) 
and sub-hamlets (lân) operating within the context of the ‘patrilineages’ 
of the village. Other lineages whose precursors came shortly after the 
founders were ranked alongside the ‘founders’ but were not accorded 
the same power; these lineages were called tộc lơn or ‘great lineages’. 
This hierarchical stratification survives on the island to this day and 
is displayed in religious and ritual practices. All these groups recorded 
their genealogies (gia pha) in ancestral halls of the individual lineages 
(nhà thơ họ). Others, who could have been either fishers or peasants, 
were not admitted to the đình order and did not share equal rights as 
village members because they arrived much later than the ‘founders’ and 
‘great lineages’ and therefore did not have access to free land. They had 
to obtain permission from the ‘founders’ or ‘great lineages’ to buy plots 
of land and build houses within the territory of the village, but even in 
such cases they were not considered legitimate village members. Having 
been denied village membership, they joined forces and formed a van
with its own civil code, although it was still subordinate to the village. 
In contrast to mainland central Vietnam, where fishing communities 
occupied sandy dunes and, thus, could be easily distinguished from 
agricultural villages with their surrounding rice fields, on Lý Sơn Island 
fishing and farming settlements merged with each other precisely be-
cause of the lack of arable land for rice cultivation. More specifically, 
the two xã of An Vĩnh and An Hải were established in the seventeenth 
century as two làng, but shared their territory with two van: Vĩnh Th nh 
and An Phú. Van Vĩnh Th nh was positioned within the territory of An 
Vĩnh village, while van An Phú overlapped with An Hải village. This ar-
rangement survives today. But those who formed a làng could not claim 
superior status on the basis of investment in rice cultivation nor could 
they produce the crop that would rescue the village from starvation in 
times of famine. Unable to maintain strict physical boundaries between 
the làng and the van, làng members of the two villages nurtured these 
separate categories through rituals and ceremonies and through claims 
5. See local family records (gia pha), Lý Sơn Island. 
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that their ancestors were the first settlers on the island who tamed the 
new ‘wild’ land and founded the villages. 
Fisher as a relational category 
Thanks to the annals and local narratives preserved in Lý Sơn, as well as
to historical records by Lê Quý Đôn ([1776] 2006), we know that the
Paracel and Spratly navies collected and traded goods from wrecked ships.
These navies consisted of both those who were members of the founding
lineages and those who belonged to the organization called van. The latter
group in particular most likely consisted of assimilated Cham, as it was
a common practice for the imperial court in Huế to enlist experienced
Cham ‘fishers’, who often were skilful sailors, shipbuilders, and traders, in
the navy (Bộ Ngo i Giao 2013: 10–11). Moreover, according to records
from An Vĩnh’s temple, the van in Lý Sơn was more than just a fishing
organization; in fact it was, above all, a trading organization (van giao
thương), as is confirmed by their various maritime ventures to the Paracels
and Spratlys as well as to Cochinchina, as described in Chapter 1.6 
For the small island societies with a limited resource base such as Lý 
Sơn, salvaging cargo from wrecked European merchant ships was one of 
their sea-borne occupations. The recovery of gold, silver, swords, ivory, 
porcelain, cloth, wax, and many other goods from the Dutch, Spanish, 
Portuguese, and British wrecks was so profitable that Lý Sơn sailors 
were granted a royal concession to salvage the cargos. The spoils – often 
supplemented with catches of mother-of-pearl, snails, tortoises, and 
sea cucumber – were handed over to the royal court in Huế (Lê Quý
Đôn [1776] 2006: 155) Besides being exempted from taxes, the sailors 
received some monetary reward and were allowed to keep a large part of 
the harvested marine goods for their own profit (Lê Quý Đôn [1776] 
2006: 155). In an interview, a forty-nine-year-old fisher describes these 
activities, using the phrase ‘collecting things’ to refer to salvaging cargo 
that could be traded for profit: 
Previously Lý Sơn people used to go on sailing boats and, I think, 
because of that, having only sailing boats, they were still able to go to 
the Paracels. They kept sailing to the Paracels not because of the royal 
order, which at that time was just a small part of their activities, but 
because the Paracels were located on the Silk Road, the trade route of, 
for example, Chinese, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese. All kinds of people 
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passed through there, so they [Lý Sơn people] followed that route and 
its trade up to the Paracels. There the Hoàng Sa [Paracel] flotilla was 
responsible for collecting things such as guns, steel, and porcelain. … 
I tell you, some families in Lý Sơn, if they traded, they would get very 
rich. Lý Sơn was very rich, so the guiding principle of Lý Sơn [people] 
at that time was: ‘To get rich one must do trade’ (muốn làm giàu phai đi
buôn) or, as they put it, ‘Without trade there will be no prosperity’ (Phi 
thương là bất phú), meaning that in order to get rich, you must engage in 
trading. So those in Lý Sơn who did trade were economically better off. 
Historians provide well-documented studies showing that season-
ally organized piracy, plundering, and smuggling in the South China Sea 
were sometimes turned into formalized trade (Antony 2014; Wang 2014; 
Wheeler 2015). Historically, these activities constituted an important 
part of local life and economy and supplemented fishing. There was a 
popular saying that fishers ‘soak up wealth like a sponge’ (giàu bọt nươc), 
hinting at the perception that their profit from trade was not morally 
justified, especially when compared to the hard work of preparing the 
soil for cultivation (Nguyễn Duy Thiệu 2002: 118). Moreover, coastal 
settlements and, especially, islands were seen as a frontier of pirates and 
smugglers who could always find a good hideaway somewhere along 
the South China Sea coasts (see Watson 1985; Murray 1987; Kleinen 
and Osseweijer 2010). Known in British logbooks as Guangdong or 
Pulo Canton, Lý Sơn Island was a dangerous and inaccessible place for 
ships to anchor due to the coral reef and rocks surrounding its coast 
(White 1824: 75), and it was thus a perfect location for those people 
the Europeans called ‘pirates’. A hilly, narrow tip of Sa Huỳnh peninsula 
that encloses a big sandbar also used to serve as a good hiding place for 
various smugglers and their junks. Away from prying eyes, they could 
secretly haul their illicit cargo from the open sea back to the sandbar or 
sail it further down the coast if the need arose. 
Va.n as ‘guild’ and ‘territorial unit’ 
In their study of two working-class neighbourhoods in a small English
town, Elias and Scotson (1994: xviii) show that exclusion and stigmatiza-
tion of outsiders through social control are the most powerful weapons 
employed by the established group ‘to maintain their identity, to assert 
their superiority, keeping others in their place’. In the case of Vietnam, 
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a fisherman without landed property and unregistered in the village 
was not allowed to marry into a farmer’s family. Moreover, fishers were
forbidden to settle in farming-oriented villages. Tho i, a retired fisher-
man in Sa Huỳnh born in 1940, described fishers as ‘stateless’ people by 
pointing out the divide between coast and inland: 
In the past, the coastline was only for those involved in marine profes-
sions, while the inland was controlled by the government, the state. 
… When you do fishing you do not have any land, not even a plot of 
ground to bury yourself; when you die your family has to ask the village 
(làng) to bury you. This is the custom of the forefathers of the poverty-
stricken northern people who came here to work. 
In Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn, the làng maintains its superior status 
through memories about the common origin of its members, collective 
feasts, and rituals organized in the đình. The làng despised the fishing 
hamlet and excluded its residents from local affairs taking place in 
the đình. In Sa Huỳnh the position of fishers was particularly inferior 
because they were permitted to occupy only the narrow strip of sandy 
dunes. Being spatially separated from the agrarian village, fishers did not 
have agricultural land and, thus, could not produce rice. 
Nguyễn Duy Thiệu (2002: 334) points out that in precolonial and 
colonial times, the van in the southern part of central Vietnam did not 
have a formal administrative apparatus and was, above all, a religious 
organization. However, Thọai’s statement suggests that the van in Sa 
Huỳnh was also a settlement. Indeed, Sa Huỳnh van has its genesis 
in a professional and religious organization, but it was also a ‘territorial 
unit’ which functioned according to its own rules, similar to a village in 
which residents formed patrilineal groups and had the same occupation. 
Unlike the northern van, which consisted exclusively of those who lived 
on the water in boats, the van in central Vietnam was established by 
those living on the sandy dunes; it was modelled on the social structure 
of the land-oriented village, but was a looser and more open entity. 
While the làng had its đình, the van also had its own communal tem-
ple (lăng). There fishers venerated their guardian spirit and discussed 
public matters. According to Nguyễn Duy Thiệu (2002: 334–335), the 
charters (sắc phong) granted to the fishermen’s temples by the Nguyễn 
dynasty (1802–1945) indicate that the van was a religious organization. 
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royal title conferred upon whales by King Gia Long: ‘High-ranking Spirit 
of the Southern Sea’ (Nam Hai Cự Tộc Ngọc Lân Thương Đẳng Thân) or 
‘Great General of the Southern Sea’ (Nam Hai Đai tương quân) (see the 
vignette at the beginning of the chapter). However, Nguyễn Duy Thiệu’s 
argument about the van as a religious organization could also be applied 
to the làng, which acquired the legitimate rank of village in a similar way, 
through a royal charter recognizing the cult of the guardian spirit in the 
local đình. 
Another important aspect of the van in Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn was 
the non-hereditary position of the head of the van (chu van), a kind 
of professional leader and ritual master elected every three years from 
among the most experienced and prosperous fishermen. This institu-
tion has survived in Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn almost unchanged through 
the present day. Xướng (born in 1933), a head of Vĩnh Th nh van (Lý
Sơn), stressed that for as long as anyone could remember, the election of 
the head fisherman had always been conducted according to egalitarian 
principles: 
This position cannot be kept for long. The fishermen’s chief has to 
resign from the post, and the next chief arises to continue the plans, 
projects, and much work; thanks to them, all matters are discussed 
again, materials are purchased, everything for the people. 
The chief ’s wealth or lineage status had never been a determining 
criterion; more important was his moral conduct and authority among 
fishermen. His unblemished reputation and nomination was ‘spiritually’ 
approved by the Whale Spirit through the spirit medium seance held in a
local temple. For Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn fishers, the function of the head 
of the van had far-reaching significance because he could facilitate or 
constrain their relationship with the sea. A chief ’s breach of good man-
ners or corrupt behaviour might prevent the entire van from enjoying 
good catches or could even cause accidents. As Xướng described it: 
The head of the van is responsible and takes care of the profession and
the people working at sea. For example, at the beginning of a year he
prays for a good season at sea and for the fishermen who go to sea. If
they do not have any accidents, it is because of him. If the head of the
van acts contrary to the regulation of the divine (thân linh giao), then the
working people run into difficulties – something terrible might happen,
for example bad weather, and people would die. The head of the van has
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to take responsibility before the divine and the people. … He is elected
by fellow villagers, but it is the Whale Spirit who decides whether he
has enough merit. Most important are his authority and reputation; to
be selected to be the head, he has to have a sincere heart (có tâm) and
he has to serve the Whale Spirit. He would be elected for the first, the
second, and the third year if he had a sincere heart and was virtuous in
his service to the people making a living. Second, he has to have merit
(công) with the local community, like me when I am doing social works.
A good service allows one to be promoted to the head of the van posi-
tion, to supervise the ‘private office’ [i.e., the Whale Spirit temple] of the
divinity (coi sơ tự cho thân linh), to be responsible, to contribute ideas
and opinions, and to resolve problems when something goes wrong. 
The proper conduct of the head of the van assured the generosity of
the sea and the well-being of the entire fishing community. The fisher-
men and their families respected him and benefited from his knowledge,
experience, advice, and his ‘spiritual’ relationship with the Whale Spirit.
Xướng’s interpretation captured certain aspects of the genesis of the van in
central Vietnam as a religious, professional, and more egalitarian organiza-
tion than the làng, and to some extent confirms Nguyễn Duy Thiệu’s view.
The fishing settlements of Th ch By and Th nh Đức are called in
vernacular Vietnamese van chày or simply van, which literally means ‘float-
ing fishing community’. In the context of Sa Huỳnh, the term denotes
the fishers who are clustered along the beach in separate hamlets. In Sa
Huỳnh, the van of Th ch By and Th nh Đức traditionally employed
diverse fishing techniques. In Th ch By there are two territorially distinct
sub-hamlets with different methods of catching fish. Each of these two
settlements owns an individual Spirit Whale Temple, forms a distinct van, 
and has its own chief. Using a different fishing technique, the third hamlet
of Th nh Đức represents a separate van and has its own temple. These
three vans are divided and referred to on the basis of their traditional fish-
ing tools and techniques – the net van, the hook van, and the lift net van – 
but, at the same time, they are bound together through ritual and seafaring
ceremonies. However, on Lý Sơn Island the two vans – Vĩnh Th nh and
An Phú – formed neither clusters nor occupied a territory separate from
that of An Vĩnh and An Hải villages in a manner similar to that found in
Sa Huỳnh. Their members never made distinctions among themselves on
the basis of fishing techniques; rather, they differentiated themselves on
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When compared with the làng, the van appears to be a more egalitar-
ian organization due to the nature of the fishing profession, which often 
involves considerable hazard. Work at sea requires cooperation, mutual 
trust, and equal investment of labour from the whole crew on board, re-
gardless of whether one is a captain or a ‘common’ fisherman. However, 
it does not mean that within the van there were no hierarchical relations; 
indeed, even there the land–sea dichotomy was firmly established and at
times contested. The vans of Th ch By and Th nh Đức provide a good 
example of such shifting spatial imaginaries. Up to the present day, the 
‘net van’ (van lươi), Th ch By, claims to be the leading organization and 
the leading territorial unit because of its direct access to Sa Huỳnh port, 
which was located directly off its shore. The superior status of the ‘net 
van’ is contested from time to time by the inhabitants of the big sandbar 
adjacent to Th ch By, who claimed to be more experienced and skilful in 
the art of fishing. Territorially, this big sandbar, a sort of island enclosed 
by Sa Huỳnh Peninsula, was part of Th ch By, but it formed a separate 
small fishing ‘guild’ called the ‘hook van’ (van câu bua), which operated 
in the open sea, in contrast to the ‘net van’, which preferred to fish close 
to the shore. Th nh Đức constituted the ‘lift net van’ (van lươi gia cào) 
– representing the third type of fishing device that was also used close to
the shore. Although Th nh Đức considered itself an independent van, it
had a duty to show up at the ceremony devoted to the Whale Spirit’s an-
niversary in Th ch By. Moreover, during the Lunar New Year it was the 
chief of Th ch By van who represented the entire community of fishers 
in Sa Huỳnh and opened the new sea season. U, who was forty-five years 
old at the time I interviewed him and who spent most of his life at sea, 
compared the structure of the three van of Th ch By and Th nh Đức to 
an office: 
The van is ruled by the chiefs. Each craft village [làng nghê – here refer-
ring to the ‘hook’, the ‘net’, and the ‘lift net van’] has a different spe-
cialization. The head of the ‘net van’ of Th ch By is like a director; the 
individual chiefs of the two others are like vice-directors – something 
like the personnel in an office. On the third day of a new year, the head 
of the van is the first to go to sea in the new season. 
U also used the phrase ‘craft village’, the term usually applied to
villages that specialize in a particular profession in addition to agricul-
ture. In U’s speech the two categories of ‘occupational’ and ‘territorial’ 
95 























overlapped. This suggests that for U the van was both a ‘hamlet’ and a 
‘professional organization’. 
In this sense, a loose analogy could be made between the van and a
‘guild’ – such as those of medieval Europe, which were established as
professional associations and sanctioned by secular and religious au-
thority. The European guilds were also religious fraternities and, under 
the patronage of specific saints, carried out feasts and ceremonies. As
I noted earlier, the van was certified by the royal charter, which recog-
nized the religious character of the fishing organization. In some cases, 
the king granted selected fishing communities the right to salvage goods 
from wrecked ships, as was the case for Lý Sơn. Similarly, the medieval 
guild, comprised of experts trained in a given craft, was established by 
a city charter or a ruler and held a monopoly on trade in its craft within 
the city where it operated (Grafe and Gelderblom 2010). 
Another loose comparison could also be drawn concerning certain
rules that the medieval guild in Europe imposed on its members. First
of all, the guilds in Europe had their own statutes. According to these
statutes, the members were under oath to use the craft techniques
that were standardized and controlled by their guild. Additionally,
the statutes regulated feasting, religious ceremonies dedicated to the
guild’s patron saint, funerals, and contributions to a common fund for
mutual assistance in times of distress. In the case of Vietnam, the self-
ruled van remained outside of the (agricultural) village and regulated
its matters through its own ‘convention’. Administered by a chief of
the van, this convention allowed outsiders to join the van and become
members after contributing a small amount of money. The main issues
regulated by the convention concerned the duty of mutual assistance
in the profession, especially in case of storms and typhoons at sea;
indicating where boats of the individual van had a right to anchor and
to catch fish; specifying the fishing season; and prohibiting the catch-
ing of certain species of poisonous fish. Furthermore, the convention
regulated religious festivals, life-cycle rituals such as births, weddings,
and funerals, and work for the restoration of temples (Nguyễn Duy
Thiệu 2002: 135–137).
From what has been said thus far, it should be clear that the van – 
whether professional or religious organization or territorial unit – was 
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a flexible strategy of controlling marine resources and providing mutual 
support to its members. Far from being absolute and independent, vans 
were often situated within the control of and in relation to a larger land-
oriented village system. The following section says a few words about 
the hierarchical làng, which has ceased to exist, in contrast to the van, 
which have survived to the present day. 
Lang system
 ‘Our village lost its sanctity!’ This was the bitter sentiment of seventy-
year-old Hập (born 1937) of Lý Sơn when I asked him about changes in 
the structure of the land-oriented village. He was a descendant of one of 
the founding lineages and he kept the memory of his great-grandfather, 
who had held the position of village senior and ritual master in the local 
đình of An Hải village and was proficient in demotic Hán-Nôm (Sino-
Vietnamese) script. When Hập explained in more detail the dramatic 
changes that were occurring in the village politics, I could sense a note 
of nostalgia for an old moral world and tradition that had faded and 
then vanished in the tumultuous history of Vietnam. Hập himself was 
a respected architect and a consultant for the state in reconstructing the 
communal house in An Vĩnh village, which had been neglected during 
the antisuperstition campaigns and finally collapsed. Hập’s statement 
captures the changes in the nature of village ritual practice in Lý Sơn, a
practice that was embodied in an array of hierarchical and political rela-
tions and expressed in terms of both material and spiritual resources: 
Before [1975] our đình had the Council of Notables. The village senior 
of the council managed the đình and conducted ceremonies. Some years 
after the liberation, the state restored beliefs (tín ngương), but there is 
nothing left of the previous forces (lực lương) of the đình. The chief of 
the hamlet (xóm) of the temple [of the goddess ThiênY A Na] had to 
move up to run the đình… 
Our village has lost its soul (mắt tâm linh) because in these days the 
representation in rituals does not come from the apex as it did in the 
past, but from below. … The chairman of the commune (chu tịch xã) 
took over the position of the village head (lý trương), and nowadays it 
has nothing to do with religion. 
Hập underscored the present-day separation of politics and religion
and how village space, in which the village headman (lý trương) and the
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Five Notables used to represent the apex of the politico-administrative
hierarchy, has been restructured. Nghị (born 1922), another descend-
ent of a founding lineage on Lý Sơn, clearly remembered that before
1975, performing rites as a ritual master of high sacrifice was the most
important ceremonial function of the village senior, who spiritually rep-
resented the làng before the divinity in the đình. He was required to be a
descendent of one of the village’s founding lineages. Although nominally
this position was not included in the official administrative apparatus,
the village senior was held in high regard by both village and van, even
though the latter was outside of the đình system. Below the village senior
was the village headman, whose power was authorized and legitimated in
the local đình. Nghị described who, at that time, ran the village: 
Before the village headman occupied a position in the administrative 
apparatus, the village senior held the highest position in the village. He 
was bound to the divine (thân linh) and he could contact the sacred
(linh thiêng). As regards the system of power, the administrative appa-
ratus included the village headman, who managed village affairs; at that 
time he was like [today’s] chairman of the commune (chu tịch xã). At 
the top of the village stood the village senior; below him was the village 
headman, who managed staff including the village officials: the keeper 
of hygiene (hương dịch), the guardian of public works (hương muc), the 
head night-watchman [policeman – hương kiêm], the treasurer (hương 
bôn), the registrar (hương bộ), and the group running various works 
(ban chấp sự). … The guardian of public works managed procurement 
[buying offerings for ceremonies], the registrar kept the records, and 
the ban chấp sự was responsible for invitations and supplies. 
Like Hập, Nghị emphasized that the position of village senior had 
lost a lot of its former political power in the spiritual sense, but for him 
and many representatives of the older generations, the village senior still 
remains superior to the secular post of chairman. As Nghị put it, 
Today there is no treasurer or village headman – the village dignitar-
ies – anymore. … The positions were abolished in the time of the ‘state 
distribution economy’ (thơi bao cấp);7 the old system was eliminated by 
7. Vietnamese people often use euphemisms that cannot be translated into English 
directly. In this case the expression thơi bao cấp – literally ‘subsidy era’ – in a 
loose translation means ‘the state distribution economy’ and denotes the time of 
collectivization and dependence on the state’s handouts. ‘The state distribution 
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the state administration. … After the liberation [in 1975], everything 
was gone; only the position of village senior remained. … [Nowadays], 
the village senior has two duties: to keep the financial contributions of 
the village and to record them. He stands higher than the chairman of 
the commune; he is the one who communicates with the divine [in the 
communal house]. 
Actually, in the South the break in the relationship between religion
and politics occurred long before the socialist procedures definitively
separated the two domains. Referring to Francophone scholar Lê Văn
Hảo, Thien Do (2003: 60) reported that the southern đình served a
solely religious purpose. The distinctive character of the southern đình
was the consequence of changes in the village’s social structure applied
by the French administration in 1904. The đình’s decision-making
model was split into ‘two unequal parts’: the ceremonial function and
secular administrative activities (ibid.). In their booklet Geography
of Quang Ngãi Province (Địa Dư tỉnh Quang Ngãi), Nguyễn Đóa and
Nguyễn Đ t Nhơn (1939) provide evidence of the colonial division of
administrative and religious spheres in the province in the form of two
separate formations: the Assistant District Chief (Quan Bang Tá) and
the Festive Committee (Ban Khánh Tiêt). According to this division,
the notables who were responsible for performing rites in the đình
were, in theory, not allowed to take part in any administrative affairs
of the village, which were subsequently reserved for a committee of
officials.
However, my further conversations with Lý Sơn villagers indicate 
that the religion–politics binary was not absolute, as village notables 
and elders who were theoretically left out of village politics due to the 
colonial regulation still had significant influence over the village officials 
to whom they ascribed ritual roles during the communal ceremonies. 
These officials often participated in such formal religious procedures 
in order to increase their authority. This old pattern of village power 
was still intact in Lý Sơn on the early 1960s even though the southern 
authorities abolished the institutions of village headmen and the Five 
Notables and introduced new forms of village administration. After 
1975, the Office of the People’s Committee and the Administrative 
Committee were established on the island, and the đình system was 
ultimately abolished. 
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Fishers’ retribution during the antisuperstition campaigns 
In contrast to Hập and Nghị (Lý Sơn), Tho i, a fisherman from Sa 
Huỳnh, did not lament the decline of the đình hierarchical order or 
the socialist restructuring of local village politics. He offered his own 
explanation for the separation of politics and religion: 
In the old days, the village senior, the village headman (lý trương), and 
the vice village chief (phó lý) all took part in religious ceremonies. At 
that time, there was little social work to do. … But now, there is a great 
need for public service in the society. In the old days, with the feudal
order, they were called lý trương and phó lý, but now their positions have 
changed and no one uses these titles anymore. … In the present society, 
there is much need for public service, so the authorities are busy with 
other matters, while the work concerning ‘spirituality’ is done by the 
elders, who serve the divinities these days. 
Tho i’s opinion is more interesting if we take into consideration the 
fact that he himself was assigned by the elders of the inland village of 
La Vân to lead the organization of annual rituals in the Thanh Minh 
Temple (Temple for the Dead), which replaced the hierarchical đình in 
Sa Huỳnh. Note that Tho i called the old system ‘feudal’, suggesting its 
non-egalitarian character and the fact that fishers depended on the làng
in many ways, for example, to obtain permission to bury their family 
members or to buy rice. In Tho i’s eyes, today’s authorities have much 
more important matters to deal with than supervising rituals in local 
temples. In his statement regarding fishers as ‘stateless’ people (quoted 
earlier in the chapter), he said that the hierarchical division between the 
village and the fishing community, as well as the subordinate position 
of the latter, were ‘the custom of the forefathers of the poverty-stricken 
northern people who came here [to Sa Huỳnh] to work’. 
In Sa Huỳnh the đình suffered extensive damage during the resist-
ance struggle against the French in 1945, but the final destruction did 
not take place until the period of post-unification and collectivization, 
providing an interesting example of the purification of religious spaces 
by both state officials and fishers. As in other parts of Vietnam, in Sa 
Huỳnh local officials were determined to wipe out all forms of social dif-
ferentiation in terms of class and gender restrictions, seating order, ritual 
functions, and food distribution that the đình reproduced (see Luong 
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đình system and its symbolic communal house, in which village found-
ers were worshipped and which represented and reinforced a hierarchy 
of social inequality derived from agriculture, some fishers felt justified in 
tearing down the đình and using the building materials to construct their 
own houses. While the đình of Sa Huỳnh was never rebuilt, the Whale 
Spirit Temple was enlarged, with the tacit agreement of local cadres, 
even during the time of the antisuperstition campaigns. The Sa Huỳnh 
authorities allowed the van to function because it was inherently more 
egalitarian due to the nature of the fishing profession, which, as noted 
before, often involves considerable hazard and requires cooperation, 
mutual trust, and equal investment of labour from the entire crew on 
board. Thus, in the view of those authorities, the occupational character 
of the van superseded its religious function, enabling both fishers and 
state agents to move beyond the religion–politics binary and upend the 
old hierarchical relationship between farmers and fishers. 
Growing status of the va.n 
Times had changed, old rules had lost their power, and the new admin-
istrative structure of rural units, thôn, to some extent erased the social 
differences between the làng and the van in Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn. 
Moreover, fish had become a lucrative commodity, especially in contrast 
to rice, which had become cheap and widely available. A conversation I 
had with a forty-three-year-old woman (born in 1964) from Sa Huỳnh,
a neighbour of my landlady, nicely illustrates this process. On one occa-
sion I heard her expressing regret that she and her husband had moved
away from the sandy dunes to the other side of Highway A-1. She ex-
plained that at the beginning of the 1990s her husband gave up fishing, 
sold their small plot of ‘land’ next to the highway, and bought an arable 
plot for rice cultivation. They had hoped to improve their material situa-
tion by switching to farming. Things did not work out as expected, how-
ever, and they found themselves unable to earn a living from growing 
rice. The wife was forced to open a small shop and supported her family 
selling basic foodstuffs and various commodities for home use. During 
our conversation, she pointed to the other side of the highway where a 
solid, three-storey building with a sea view stood. She wistfully noted 
that she and her family had lived on that land in the 1990s. The new 
owners apparently made a much better investment, buying the land on 
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the sea side of the highway and building a hotel where passing travellers 
can rent a room to stay overnight and treat themselves to freshly caught 
seafood. 
At present, the cultivation of rice no longer guarantees a good income,
and the negative attitude towards fishing has become less pronounced.
Fishers have ceased to be as dependent on farmers as they were in the
past. Furthermore, the national attention to the South China Sea and
new state cultural and socioeconomic initiatives have brought about
some positive changes in fishers’ social and material status. While their
economic prosperity and ‘civilizational’ (văn minh) progress are evident
in better houses, modern mobile phones, TV sets, new motorbikes, and
so on, the fishers’ financial ‘recovery’ becomes most apparent in their
lavish sacrifices and increasing financial contributions and to the ‘agri-
culture’ village temples and participation in their seasonal ceremonies.
Both Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn authorities have acknowledged that in recent
times the van has gained a stronger economic position within the village
than the làng. They base such statements on their observations of money
contributed to offerings and ceremonies in the temples. The villagers of
La Vân confirmed this, revealing that most of the money for the recon-
struction of the Thanh Minh Temple came from Th ch By’s two vans,
which, as the villagers put it, showed ‘sentiment’ (tình cam) towards and
‘solidarity’ (tình đoàn kêt) with the village. In 2007, for the New Year
ritual in one of the village temples in An Hải (Lý Sơn), several captains
of fishing crews contributed a total of 44 million VND (about €2,000).
The example of Thiên Y A Na – a Vietization of the Cham goddess 
Pô Nagar, who is believed to secure the livelihood of both farmers and 
fishers – well illustrates this phenomenon.8 In An Hải village (Lý Sơn), 
the elders were responsible for carrying out an important ritual in the 
temple of Thiên Y A Na to ensure the fertility of the land. When I at-
tended one such ceremony, I saw a large number of fishers who offered 
the goddess three fine pigs. Fishers stated that whenever the goddess 
blessed them with good catches or they managed to escape from a 
Chinese coastguard ship, they gave her back more than was expected. 
8. I use the term ‘Vietization’ to refer to the process in which Việt people adopted 
Pô Nagar’s cult and integrated her into the Việt spirit pantheon. The integration 
of Cham spirits and gods was simultaneously accompanied by the assimilation of 
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The ceremony took place in the late evening, lasted many hours, and 
ended with a feast before the sun broke the darkness. 
Historically, the right to make the more prestigious sacrifice of pigs 
was reserved for the farming villages, as fishing communities were kept 
outside đình system. During the ceremonies in the đình, the master of 
high sacrifice received ‘a first cup of sacrificial drink’ (ẩm phươc) as a 
blessing from the divinity, which was extended to the entire community 
in the form of the feast (Nguyễn Văn Huyên 1995 [1945]). This also 
included the kiêng – ‘presenting of sacrificial meat’ – which was a com-
mon practice following the royal model of offering the sacrificial cuts 
from the pig to the notables after the ceremony, in accordance with their 
rank. In Lý Sơn and Sa Huỳnh, both ẩm phươc and kiêng survive today, 
and the practices have been adopted by the van. I witnessed that the ẩm
phươc, in the form of a cup of alcohol, and the pig’s head and entrails
were offered to the chief of the fishing community, who held the posi-
tion of Master of the High Sacrifices in the ceremony in honour of the 
Whale Spirit. For the duration of the ritual he loudly chanted invitations 
to the tutelary spirits and all divinities from the neighbouring temples to 
taste the offerings. After the sacrifice, he and his assistant received half 
of the pig’s head. 
However, the làng was not always happy with the vans’ attempts to 
elevate themselves through ostentatious sacrifices, and in some cases it
tried to regulate this matter. The vignette at the beginning of this chapter
gives us a snapshot of the internal dispute between the làng and the van
in Lý Sơn about the rights to the Spirit Whale. I noted that this dispute 
was solved by building two separate temples marking the ritual, territo-
rial, and social boundary between farmers and fishers. The làng assigned 
two different dates for the Whale Spirit anniversary. In June 2007 I had 
the opportunity to take part in the ceremony organized by the van. I 
witnessed that in this particular case the van was not allowed to offer a 
pig, as this more prestigious sacrifice was reserved for the làng; members 
of the van were only permitted to present a chicken to the divinity, a sign 
of the van’s subordinate position vis-à-vis the làng. 
The foregoing discussion of van members’ aspirations to perform
đình-style ceremonies raises the question of the fishers’ motivations for
making lavish sacrifices of pigs in agricultural temples, a practice that for
a long time was reserved only for the làng. Referring to Edmund Leach’s
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(1954) study of the political systems and social structures of Highland
Burma, Thomas A. Kirsch (1973: 3) argued that it was impossible to
state what units such as ‘village’, ‘villagers’, or ‘a village cluster’ meant to
the Kachin society without referring to their religious ideas (1973: 9). He
emphasized that these various units were ordered on the basis of ‘shared
religious ritual and right to this ritual’ (Kirsch 1973: 9, emphasis added).
More precisely, Leach (1954) presented Kachin society as oscillating
between the extreme poles of two social organizations: the gumsa and the
gumlao. The basis of gumsa, or ‘autocratic’ political power, was a ‘chief ’s
ritual rights to sacrifice to the spirits controlling fertility of the domain’
(Kirsch 1973: 11). This right was acquired by establishing separate ‘sacred
groves’ for each of the village groups, a process that could be seen as analo-
gous to the làng erecting a đình. According to Kirsch, the formation of the
counterpart to gumsa, the gumlao – which, because of its more ‘rebellious’
and ‘egalitarian’ type, could be compared to the van – was a struggle for
greater ‘religious freedom’ and a ‘repudiation of exclusive ritual control
by a chief ’ (1973: 11). Furthermore, Kirsch (1973: 14) showed that in
the Kachin gumsa, the ‘chief ’ had exclusive rights to make sacrifices to the
spirits and to make the ‘land of the dead’ fertile. However, if his sacrifice
turned out to be ineffective, his position could be threatened by some-
body else who wished to overthrow him and usurp his prestige (1973:
16). Kirsch argued that in Kachin society the economic ability to give the
feast raised the ritual status of sponsors. Therefore, the ‘prestige’ was not
given, but had to be earned by giving feasts; through such feasts the giver
proved his ‘potency’ and ‘virtue’, which qualified him for prestige (ibid.). I
believe that a very similar dynamic underpins van members’ engagement
in đình-style ceremonies. 
Coastal people’s sense of territoriality and, closely associated with 
it, hierarchy is not enshrined in a permanent and immutable situation 
and structure (cf. Kirsch 1973: 35), but is undergoing a continuous 
process of change along with the ever-changing ecological, political, and 
social conditions. Just as rice is the main staple of Vietnamese cuisine 
but fish sauce (nươc mắm) its characteristic flavour (Avieli 2012: 31), 
so the land and the sea, and farmers and fishers, are inextricably bound 
up in a hierarchical relationship that is mutually constitutive rather than 
absolute. Fish sauce is both a cultural marker of Vietnamese cuisine and 
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it reconciles the salt with the starch and the sea with the land. Nir Avieli 
(2012: 32) explains that the mediating quality of fish sauce stems from 
its ‘liminal, “betwixt and between” position: two “solids’ (salt and fish) 
are processed into a liquid, which is an extract and essence of both’. If rice 
is the core, fish sauce is the ‘cementing agent’ of the different dishes that 
make up a Vietnamese meal and for the people, who dip ‘their morsels 
of food into a shared saucer of nươc mắm before putting them into their 
mouths’ (Avieli 2012: 32). 
The relationship between rice and fish sauce thus captures the core 
message of this chapter, namely that the social structures represented
by the làng and the van in Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn are far from perma-
nent, static, or absolute, and that the categorical opposites làng–van
are both ongoing, living, and changing hierarchies and relationships. 
With a growing global demand for marine products and the global 
consequences of the South China Sea dispute, fishers have started to 
play a more important role in the village ritual domain to which the van
had no previous access. As in the past, when the feast in the đình served
to highlight inequalities and status differences within the village, today 
the vans use the same means to earn ‘permanent prestige and status 
relations’, as well as social recognition (see Kirsch 1973: 17; Malarney 
2002). Renovating temples, appropriating the traditional right of the 
agricultural village to sacrifice pigs, and sponsoring village agricultural 
rituals became means of displaying fishers’ ritual ‘potency’ and thus their 
growing status in the community. Each lavish sacrifice made by fishers 
in agricultural temples served as evidence of their good catches, their 
material well-being and, hence, their spiritual ‘reward’. By challenging 
the exclusive ritual control of the làng, they turned the tables on the old 
hierarchy. This recent enhancement of the fishers’ economic position 
vis-à-vis the farmers and their ritual investment in agricultural temples 
show the complexity of local territorial imaginaries and the dichotomies 
of land and sea. Fishers are not merely a disadvantaged group; they 
manage to exploit the situation in a way that helps them to demonstrate 
and cultivate their prestige in response to the changing political and 
economic context. The next chapter takes this point further as it explores 
how fishers use their agency to reach compromises with state officials 
and religious modernizers over what constitutes ‘proper’ religion. 
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Modernizers, and Fishers 
On a hot summer day in 1978 the district police arrived at TừPhước pagoda in Sa Huỳnh and confiscated all statues and Buddhist objects – with the exception of a two-metre-tall im-
age of the Buddhist bodhisattva Quan Âm that stood outside and was 
too heavy and unwieldy to take to the district People’s Committee in 
Đức Phổ. The policemen who carried out the task of vacating the local 
pagoda had to decide on the spot what to do with the troublesome ob-
ject. Reluctant to destroy the statue themselves, they ordered villagers 
to smash the figure. Taking advantage of this situation, a group of Sa 
Huỳnh fishers intervened. The Buddhist bodhisattva Quan Âm is par-
ticularly worshipped there by fishers, who believe that she is the creator 
of the Whale Spirit and offers them protection during storms. Risking 
punishment by the police, the fishers transported the statue by boat to 
the Forbidden Hill (Cấm Núi) where the waters of the South China 
Sea push through a channel into a small bay known as the ‘sea gate’ of 
Sa Huỳnh. This dangerously rocky section of coastline, separating the 
community from the sea, was considered very treacherous for passing 
junks and other boats and for a long time was symbolically made safer 
by the configuration of yin (âm) and yang (dương) in the form of the 
divine couple – the goddess Thiên Y A Na, a Vietization of the Cham 
deity (usually addressed as Bà, ‘Lady’), and the Whale Spirit (Ông, ‘Sir’) 
– whose temples were right next to each other on the cliff (see Nguyen 
The Anh 1995; Salemink 2015). As in Chinese thought, for Vietnamese 
people âm and dương constitute a binary hierarchical opposition. Dương
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symbolizes the principle of order, while âm is associated with the pro-
duction, reproduction, and restoration of order (Sangren 1987). Each 
is incomplete in and of itself, and only together do they constitute the 
balance ( Jamieson 1993). The cosmic order represented by a male and 
female spirit on the Forbidden Hill was, however, challenged during the 
Second Indochina War. The access to the spirits’ temples became more 
difficult when the U.S. Army appropriated the Forbidden Hill to be used
as a military base. In order to be able to continue worshipping their sea-
faring guardian spirit, in the late 1960s fishers separated the divine pair 
by moving the Whale Spirit temple to the village proper, while keeping 
the temple of Thiên Y A Na on the cliff. 
To the fishers, the police intervention at Từ Phước pagoda in 1978 
came as an unexpected opportunity to fill a spiritual void left on the 
cliff by the removal of the temple of the Whale Spirit. The men quickly 
seized the opportunity, but the whole operation first was made possible 
by a subtle tactic on the part of the head of the fishing community, 
who negotiated with the police for the rescue of the Quan Âm statue. 
Reluctant to destroy the Buddhist statue themselves, the policemen 
welcomed the fishers’ offer to dispose of it, which gave them the sense 
that they had properly executed their task. Both sides saw Quan Âm’s 
translocation as an opportunity to act in accordance with state policies 
and their own personal preferences. However, twenty-eight years later, 
the presence of Quan Âm on the Forbidden Hill created a problem for 
the new head monk of the Từ Phước pagoda, who found it inappropriate 
that the Buddhist object had been placed in non-Buddhist space and 
demanded that fishers return the statue to its original location. Neither 
villagers nor representatives of the Commune People’s Committee had 
anything against the village monk’s aspiration to promote the ethics of
modern Buddhism, but they also did not share his reformist zeal to sup-
press local devotional practices. 
While the vignette above showcases encounters between state and 
Buddhist authorities and between the state and fishers, its particular 
focus is really the encounter between religious authority and fishers. 
These different confrontations create a theoretical problem because they 
refer to binaries that are experienced as real, but are neither mutually 
exclusive nor stable. This chapter approaches binary oppositions 
not as absolute, eternal, or even inherently antagonistic, but rather as 
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constantly changing and shifting in unpredictable ways within and 
across triadic relationships between the state, villagers, and more or less 
institutionalized versions of religion. I first situate the Forbidden Hill in 
the context of the state’s semiotic ideology and the villagers’ cosmology. 
I then discuss the villagers’ response to the state policy and their strategy 
to defend the local gods. In the final section, I complicate the picture of 
confrontation between the two sides – state and village – as I focus on a 
religious modernizer, the monk Thích Giác Đức. 
Forbidden Hill and Gia’s defence of the Quan Âm statue 
Before 1975, Sa Huỳnh was a part of the Republic of Vietnam – com-
monly known as South Vietnam – and served as a base for the U.S. 
Army. The U.S. forces had been stationed on the Forbidden Hill near 
the Thiên Y A Na Goddess temple because of its strategic location; no 
junk or other type of fishing boat could come into or leave the seaport 
unnoticed. In the beginning the U.S. Army did not permit incense of-
ferings, but the situation eased by 1967–68, when they started to allow 
people to perform simple rituals, burn incense and votive paper, and 
make modest offerings to the goddess on the first and fifteenth day of 
every lunar month. After the unification of the country in 1975, the 
Forbidden Hill was appropriated by the Border Police as a military 
observation post, and access to the place was completely restricted until 
1990, when the state relaxed its enforcement of antisuperstition laws. 
When I arrived in Sa Huỳnh in the mid-autumn of 2006, the climate 
surrounding religion in Vietnam was totally different from 1978. The 
Đổi Mới economic reforms initiated in 1986 by the Communist Party 
brought not only economic but also religious liberalization. Highlighting 
the national aspect of culture, the Party-state reinterpreted ‘folk beliefs’ 
(tín ngương dân gian) as ‘culture’ and, above all, ‘national heritage’ – a 
process I described in detail in Chapter 2. 
The Forbidden Hill is an example of such a process in which local 
worship of the Buddhist deity Quan Âm and seafaring gods such as 
Thiên Y A Na and the Whale Spirit was re-interpreted by Sa Huỳnh 
state representatives in terms of traditional ‘culture’. The Forbidden Hill 
was the very first place where Lợi, a representative of the Commune 
People’s Committee, took me to explain this beautiful Vietnamese 
culture. Pointing at the two-metre-tall statue of the female bodhisat-











tva Quan Âm that stood at the foot of a cement replica of the Bodhi 
tree, Lợi praised the new use of the sacred space which, in accordance 
with the state’s concerns, was properly developed as a place of scenic 
beauty. With the confidence of someone who is knowledgeable about 
coastal culture, Lợi pointed out the precarious location of the port and 
the hazards of the sea and argued that the presence of the statue had a 
positive psychological effect on fishers who were pinning their faith on 
the Buddhist goddess. For Lợi, who was a young, energetic, and devoted 
office worker in the Department of Culture, the Forbidden Hill was the 
epitome of a scenic place enriched with a beautiful cultural blend of 
‘folk’ beliefs and Buddhism. 
For fishers the place was beautiful too, but for a different reason. In 
Th ch By the last vestiges of the đình were wiped out when the gen-
eral secondary school was built on its foundations. The old world of 
symbolic hierarchy and village status epitomized in the đình was gone 
forever, abolished and simplified by the Party-state administration. 
Although fishers tried to recreate the balance of yin and yang by moving 
the Whale Temple close to Từ Phước pagoda, the traditional asymmetry 
had been disrupted and was in urgent need of a new rearrangement.
First, the old order and the hierarchical relationship between the đình
(the male and agriculture ritual domain), the Buddhist pagoda (primar-
ily a female religious domain), and the Whale Temple (the fishers’ ritual 
centre) collapsed along with the last walls of the đình. Second, when 
the Whale Temple was moved from the cliff, the divinities coupled as 
Ông (Sir) and Bà (Lady) were separated. Consequently, the cliff was 
stripped of its masculine aspect and male ritual activity ceased, leaving 
only the goddess Thiên Y A Na, who was losing her power to control the 
sea. This situation created a spiritual vacuum that called for a creative 
reconfiguration of the local cosmology. 
The solution came unexpectedly with the threat of violent action
against the Buddhist deity. The people of Sa Huỳnh did not hesitate over
what to do with the troubling figure of Quan Âm and they knew precisely
where she belonged. By placing the Quan Âm statue on the cliff in 1978,
the fishers were confident that the place had become both sacred and
beautiful. They were aware that according to Buddhist doctrine Quan
Âm was a man who had taken a female form. The androgynous Quan Âm
perfectly filled the void left by the removal of the Whale Spirit and, in the
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absence of a strong female deity, grew in popularity. Since Quan Âm was
moved to the Forbidden Hill, the narratives about the transformation of
the goddess Thiên Y A Na from a fierce to a benevolent spirit started to
circulate among villagers. In the past men did not allow women to per-
form rituals or any other devotional activities to the goddess out of fear
that they would offend her with their earthly female ‘uncleanliness’ such
as menstruation and childbirth (see Chapter 6). Men themselves were
afraid to approach her directly in the temple because she was considered
a fierce deity, quick to punish even minor unintentional misconduct.
Passing the Forbidden Hill on board their vessels, fishers would bow their
heads from afar out of respect and ask for safe passage. In the early 1990s,
fishers recorded that, inspired by the compassionate and merciful nature
of Quan Âm, the goddess went through Buddhist ‘self-cultivation’ (đi tu),
lost her power to control the sea, and finally left the temple to become
a bodhisattva. At that time women began to approach the goddess and
make offerings of fruit and sweets in her temple every month during the
new and full moon. In consequence, the previously male domain of the
Forbidden Hill was appropriated by women, becoming a symbol of their
local vision of religiosity. 

According to the villagers, the activities of geomancers and various 
ritual masters were strictly banned after 1975. Gia (born in 1947) was 
well known in Sa Huỳnh not only as a gifted healer and exorcist (see 
Endres 2008; Kwon 2009), but also as the saviour of the Buddhist 
statue. During my visit to Gia’s house, I learned that in the late 1970s 
fishers chose him to be the head of the van. Villagers later confirmed 
that he was held in high esteem by most people in the village and that 
he was ‘talented and virtuous’ (có tài có đưc). He led an ordinary life 
until the age of twenty-five, when he fell ill. During our conversation 
he recalled that at that time an ‘invisible’ (vô hình), ‘spectral’ (huyên bí) 
being entered his body, controlled him, threatened him, and prevented 
him from working or going fishing for one hundred days. When these 
hundred days had passed, the spirit allowed him to resume his daily 
chores and eat meat again, but on every first and fifteenth day of the 
lunar month Gia was obliged to serve the spirit and cure people. At the 
time of the antisuperstition campaigns in 1978, Gia was arrested several 






times and accused of spreading superstitious practices. He was banned 
from healing and carrying out exorcisms. He recalled, 
I cannot count how many times the police came here and said that I was 
spreading superstition and the occult (huyên bí), that I was uneducated 
and lacking consciousness (vô trí vô giác).1 I wanted to save people. I 
have never taken a single penny; I have been helping the people at large. 
You, young lady, know the people’s level here; they have only finished 
elementary school and even this cannot be certain. During the war, they 
just learned to spell, that was all. And that was why they called it occult 
practice! 
Gia smiled and continued: 
Once, the provincial police sent a letter and summoned me to the com-
mune office. They detained me for two days. During this time, people 
gathered, around 300 people from Sa Huỳnh alone. The police officer 
misunderstood it; he thought that I had alerted them. I answered him: 
‘Honourable officer, I have been sitting here for two days working with 
the cadres. How could I have asked the people to come here?’ Their 
presence reflected that I worked in their interest and it cost nothing. I 
wanted to stop healing but the village and the neighbourhood did not 
let me stop. People came in crowds! I had a lot of work to do, [I could 
not refuse] you know… a sense of community spirit (tình làng nghĩa
xóm). 
Gia bridged political and religious domains and knew how to use 
the semiotic ideology of the state to blur the opposing categories in the 
triadic relationship of state–religion–society. He made himself publicly 
visible through his healing rituals, his service to the fishing organization 
(van), and his ability to deploy various tactics of indiscipline, a capacity 
that made it possible for him to shift identities and represent himself po-
litically and professionally as a different persona in official and unofficial 
situations. When arrested and detained in the People’s Committee of-
fice, Gia politely mocked local authorities, referring to his detention for 
political reasons as ‘work’ (làm viêc) with ‘honourable cadres’, thereby 
reproducing conventional political language. Blurring the state–village 
binary, he revealed the irrationality of the local authorities who accused
1. The antonym of vô giác (lacking consciousness) is giác ngộ, a Buddhist term used 
to describe ‘Buddhist enlightenment’, which has been adopted in Vietnamese 
Marxist discourse to denote ‘class consciousness’. 
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him of mobilizing the masses while he was in fact in detention, preoccu-
pied with ‘raising his socialist moral standards’. The presence of a group 
of villagers in front of the People’s Committee building may have looked 
like subversion, but Gia offered it as proof that his conduct had not been 
exploitative of his fellow villagers. 
He earned credit not only among his co-villagers as a ritual master 
and head of the van, but also demonstrated his capabilities by devising 
a solution for the Buddhist statue. Gia clearly remembered that it was a 
hot summer day in 1978 when the district police arrived at the pagoda 
and ordered villagers to smash the figure of Quan Âm, which stood 
outside and was too big to transport elsewhere. He recounted: 
During the subsidy period (thơi bao cấp) revolutionaries did not rely on 
any religion (tín ngương), any superstitions (mê tín dị đoan). They were 
in the process of eradicating all of them. … I had the opportunity that 
year to represent the fishers of Sa Huỳnh and gained the people’s trust 
and confidence. Hence, I came to the pagoda and stood face to face with 
the police. I showed comradely spirit (tính đ ng chí) and said, ‘This is a 
statue, in fact, cement and plaster only. If you want to smash the statue, 
you will have to hire people. Instead, please give it to me. I will take it to 
the hill to beautify the place!’ 
‘Did the police agree?’ I asked. He answered: 
The police were unanimous in their decision. They said that it was ur-
gent that I transport the statue as soon as possible. I called folks together 
and, first, we transported it close to the Whale Temple. Then we took 
a boat, crossed the channel, and carried the statue up the cliff. I also 
planted a small Bodhi tree in the place where the statue was erected. 
It took five to ten years to grow. But it withered and later people made 
an artificial tree of cement. They wanted the Quan Âm statue to look 
important and older and to make it more dignified. 
When Gia used the semiotic ideology of the state to defend the 
Buddhist statue, it was not the act of resistance against state rule that was
important to him and his co-villagers, but rather the desire to participate 
in local religious life. As other villagers stated very clearly to me, ‘If Gia 
had not interceded for the statue, if it had remained without worship-
pers, all of us would have been guilty (mang tội).’ 
If indiscipline brings into play a kind of rationalism, it is both an ‘art 
of thinking’ and an ‘art of using’ (Certeau 1984: xv; see also Mbembe 





1992).2 Gia’s manipulation of the state’s semiotic ideology was a tactic 
of indiscipline that allowed both the fishers and the police to escape 
this overarching state purification project and avoid the destruction 
of the Buddhist statue by blurring religious and political distinctions. 
Gia’s strategic blend of protestations and simulation of ‘comradely 
spirit’ (tính đ ng chí) presented the police with a dilemma. According 
to Hồ Chí Minh, ‘comradely spirit’ was a crucial part of the critique and 
‘self-critique’ practised among members of the Party, whose aim was 
‘self-improvement’. Pushed to his limits, Gia played with this expression 
in order to convince the policemen to give him the statue. The local 
authorities were also reluctant to reject Gia’s argument on account of
his position as the head of the fishing organization. He practically rep-
resented the fishers – not just ritually – and because of this status it was 
difficult to counter him. Assigned the task of desecrating the local pa-
goda, the police had to decide what to do with the troublesome object, 
which was too cumbersome to take to the People’s Committee. Caught 
in a web of state discipline, the officials could not just leave the statue 
because they had received an order to cleanse the village of ‘supersti-
tion’, but neither were they keen to dirty their hands by destroying it. 
Displaying their own indiscipline towards the state’s semiotic ideology 
by accepting Gia’s proposition, they entered into a form of silent col-
laboration. The policemen ordered Gia to remove the statue as soon as 
possible and, loading the remaining statues onto their truck, they left 
the pagoda empty, maintaining the appearance that their task had been 
carried out properly. 
Keane (2008) observes that semiotic ideologies respond to the ma-
teriality of such practices and objects as texts, offerings, altars, statues, 
temples, and rituals, and are conditioned by social actors’ experiences. 
To ‘purify’ the local pagoda by dispelling its sacred aura and showing 
that Quan Âm was nothing more than a powerless effigy, the policemen 
first had to identify the meaning of the statue with reference to the 
state’s semiotic ideology. Once the statue was defined as a religious and
therefore superstitious object according to the Marxist-Leninist princi-
ples that inspired the antisuperstition campaigns of 1978, it could be 
removed and destroyed. Although Gia regarded the purifying actions of
2. Certeau does not use the term ‘indiscipline’, but he speaks about antidiscipline, 
which he contrasts with discipline (1984: xv). 
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the police as sacrilege, he blurred the categorical boundaries by publicly 
using the political rhetoric and confirming the legitimacy of the state to 
save the statue, which he felt obliged to protect. Aware of the state policy 
of preserving places of historical, cultural, or aesthetic interest and of the
‘socialist beautification programme’ (Harms 2012), he used the argu-
ment that the Quan Âm statue would beautify the local landscape. By 
planting the Bodhi tree, he was acting accordance with the new political 
tradition of ‘National Planting Day’ – inaugurated by Hồ Chí Minh dur-
ing the Land Reform with his famous saying, ‘The forest is gold if one 
knows how to protect it.’3 
In this way, Gia carried out his own counter-purification action in
which he chose to foreground the aesthetic value of the statue while
downplaying its religious value. Moving between the opposing poles of a
secular–religious binary, he displayed his ‘secular’ rationality by pointing
out that, in fact, the statue was matter out of place and nothing more than
a plaster effigy, not worth the effort of smashing and, for that reason, it
belonged to a secular space. Purification is never a finished project, not
because of resistance but because it creates endless ‘hybrids’ across dif-
ferent social fields, mixing objects and categories (Keane 2008: 289; see
also Latour 1993; Douglas 2001). Gia’s work of counter-purification
created such a hybrid object of beauty, culture, and religion; it shifted the
function of the statue from religious to aesthetic and hence moral by us-
ing Communist semiotic ideology to ensure that the Buddhist statue re-
mained in the local village landscape, albeit outside the pagoda grounds.
In this sense, the Quan Âm statue on Forbidden Hill became a hybrid
by-product of the state’s semiotic ideology that prescribed the cleansing
of inappropriate elements from the village space (Douglas 2001: 36). 
Buddhist purifying discipline 
I often witnessed Lợi (born in 1975) authoritatively instructing villagers
on religious policy and superstitious practices. But when I, in the compa-
ny of Lợi, visited the Buddhist pagoda Từ Phước and met the head monk
Thích Giác Đức (born in 1945), the roles of ‘instructor’ and ‘instructed’
3. The Party-state sought to replace local village traditions with more profane cel-
ebrations. Hồ Chí Minh invented the new tradition of a National Planting Day in 
order to replace more traditional festive occasions in village ritual life (Kleinen 
1999a; McElwee 2016). 






were reversed. ‘What’s your name, chú?’ asked Lợi, using, as usual, the
term meaning ‘junior uncle’. At this the monk became indignant:
Anh (you) call me chú. That’s wrong. You call me ‘uncle’, meaning that 
I’m an ordinary person, don’t you? In [Christian] religion, if you go 
to church you must call a priest ‘Reverend Father’ (cha đao). You are 
working on culture but you come to a Buddhist pagoda and you call 
me ‘uncle’. You cannot address me properly, huh? If you come to the 
pagoda you must respect the social status and the religious title of the 
person here. For example, if one is a Venerable (đai đưc), then call him 
‘Venerable’; if one is a Master (thây), call him ‘Master’. 
Vietnamese kinship terminology is usually used to establish hierar-
chy, but in certain contexts it might also be used to circumvent a system 
of asymmetry (Sidnell and Shohet 2013; see also Luong 1988). Being 
thirty years younger than the head monk, Lợi initially used a respectful 
kin term to address the monk. The monk viewed this as a violation of 
the proper hierarchical order not because Lợi used the wrong kin term, 
but because he dared to use a kin term in the first place. Yet this was not
the encounter of a young man who was intentionally misbehaving, as he
later shifted to the term ‘Master’, although for most of the time he stra-
tegically avoided directly addressing the monk with personal pronouns. 
Rather, it was an encounter between a ‘political official’ representing 
secular authority and a Buddhist monk representing religious authority. 
Framing their interaction differently, the monk claimed a higher status 
than the state official, while Lợi sought to circumvent this confrontation 
by refusing to use the surname Thích, which is reserved for Buddhist 
clergy, or the even more proper term in this context, Thây (‘Master’)
(see Sidnell and Shohet 2013). To diminish the monk’s religious author-
ity, Lợi strategically started out using the kin term ‘junior uncle’, which 
implied more proximity and familiarity than the monk was willing to 
tolerate. 
In his study of discursive practices and power structures, Hy Van 
Luong (1988: 251) shows that the diverse use of linguistic forms is not 
‘a passive reflection on the social differentiation’, but ‘an active part of the 
historically specific and power-embedded construction of reality’. This 
is why the monk admonished the young official, reminding him that 
he was in a sacred place and that he was obliged to recognize religious 
authority. However, instead of seeing this relationship as an example 
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of the antagonism between state and religion in Vietnam, I look at the 
two sides as representing semiotic ideologies enacted through different 
power-embedded disciplines of state and religious authority. In the 
previous section I analysed an example of confrontation between state, 
religion, and society, and the tactics Gia used to position himself within 
and across this triadic relationship. The binary opposition is not limited 
to state versus religion or state versus village, but can also be extended to 
the encounter between villagers and religious authorities. 
During the period of High Socialism, some pagodas were considered 
historically significant and for that reason villagers and cadres refrained 
from destroying them (Malarney 2002: 46). According to official di-
rectives, these pagodas qualified as sites of historical interest or scenic 
beauty and came under the direct management of local authorities, 
which decided on their possible renovation. Like many village pagodas 
in Vietnam, Từ Phước was situated in the vicinity of a local market; well 
located, it attracted people and spread Buddhism among the entire Sa 
Huỳnh community. The former bonze (tru trì, ‘head of the pagoda’), 
who established the pagoda in this place in 1956, selected the loca-
tion on the basis of its proximity of the communal house (đình), the 
freshwater stream flowing down the mountains, and ponds suitable for 
growing water spinach (rau muống). However, despite its scenic loca-
tion, Từ Phước pagoda did not have the good fortune of being rated as 
a place of historical importance, nor could the local authorities discern 
any aesthetic qualities. 
In the southern parts of Vietnam, the new communist government 
considered Buddhist pagodas belonging to the Unified Buddhist 
Church of Vietnam (UBCV)4 to be dissident and shut them down. In
most cases, their clergy were arrested and defrocked, and Từ Phước 
pagoda and its monks, who belonged to the UBCV, shared a similar fate
in 1978. From Từ Phước pagoda’s chronicle, to which the head monk 
kindly gave me access, I learned that there were no clergy in the pagoda 
4. In the 1960s the conflict between Buddhists and Catholics unified Buddhists to 
emulate the highly institutionalized organization of the Catholic Church. As a 
result, the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam was established at the An Quang 
pagoda in Saigon in 1963 (Soucy 2012). After 1975, it was suppressed as a dis-
sident Buddhist sect. 






from 1980 until 1999, when the current monk was appointed.5 In 1981,
the Vietnamese Party-state formed the Buddhist Association of Vietnam 
to displace the UBCV. In 1984, Từ Phước pagoda was officially admitted 
into the Vietnamese Buddhist Association, which remains the only offi-
cial Buddhist umbrella organization with legal status in Vietnam (Soucy 
2012). The UBCV is still present in Central and Southern Vietnam, 
although not in Sa Huỳnh proper. 
After the reforms, the People’s Committee of the district returned 
all confiscated statues to the pagoda, with the notable exception of the 
statue of Quan Âm. Thích Giác Đức has ever since sought to return the 
Quan Âm statue to the pagoda, but the villagers have insisted on leaving 
it on the hill. The monk was aware of the official state policy of protect-
ing places of historical and cultural interest, beautifying the landscape, 
and promoting tourism, which Buddhist clergy were expected to sup-
port, but he was nevertheless more interested in advocating so-called 
‘reformed Buddhism’ – a modern version of Buddhism cleansed of non-
Buddhist elements and propagating ascetic forms of self-cultivation. 
The monk explained that when he came to Sa Huỳnh, the village pagoda
did not have a qualified monk. A layperson was in charge of the build-
ing, and the only Buddhist practice taking place was the chanting of the 
sutra, which could not take the place of the teaching of a qualified monk. 
Thích Giác Đức described his role as follows: 
The war was over, but after the miserable time of restrictions and at the 
hands of people who damaged the building, the temple ultimately fell 
into ruin. Then came the years in which the state expanded religious 
freedom and Buddhist activities could spread in the region. Without a 
monk there cannot be any development. … Since I have been here, the 
pagoda has been renovated and become spacious. There are facilities 
to accommodate any group of Buddhist pilgrims who are passing by. I 
mean, they come to bring relief to flood-hit central regions; doing their 
duty, they stop over here. This is the point where the South and the 
North meet. That is why I need to have a place for them when they are 
on their return journey. The purpose of Buddhism is to bring prosperity 
and peace to all people; this is what the Buddha teaches. 
5. See Tiểu sử chùa Từ Phước. (n.d.). Th ch By, xã Phổ Th nh, tỉnh Quảng Ngãi 










The monk did not share Lợi’s interest in the state’s effort to convert 
temples into places of historical and cultural importance or into tourist 
sites. Such a policy aroused reluctance rather than enthusiasm. Instead, 
he stressed his role in reinstating the secular notions of Buddhist prac-
tice that underpin meditation and spirituality by emphasizing personal 
development of the individual rather than a relationship with a god. 
Eloquently and carefully constructing his critique of the presence of the 
Quan Âm statue on Forbidden Hill, the head monk sought to purify not 
just the Buddhist pagoda but also the village landscape by ridding them 
of non-Buddhist elements. 
Alexander Soucy (2007: 361) argues that criticism of local practices 
and the desire to purify Buddhism by eradicating superstitions was part 
of a larger movement of Buddhist reform that took place throughout 
Asia in the twentieth century, a ‘self-conscious reformation process’ in 
which the encounter with Western colonial powers played a role. This 
modernizing trend was not unique to Buddhism, but also affected other 
world religions, such as Islam in Indonesia. Many Javanese religious 
reformists who were strongly influenced by modern ideas coming from 
the Middle East emphasized the importance of original scripture and 
decried local practices that they regarded as non-Islamic (Hefner 1997). 
In the Vietnamese context, both the Đổi Mới programme of political 
and economic changes and the normalization of diplomatic relations 
with the United States in 1995 have significantly increased interaction 
between overseas Vietnamese and Vietnamese in Vietnam and have, at 
the same time, influenced Buddhism there.6 For example, Thích Nhất 
H nh imported a ‘purified’ version of Buddhism that was more in line 
with his Buddhist doctrine developed in exile and which influenced 
Buddhist practice in Vietnam more generally (Chapman 2007).7 
Another example of this trend that dismisses non-Buddhist elements is
a local Vietnamese Buddhist sect which constitutes a religious ‘resurrec-
tion’ of an old and short-lived Zen school known as Bamboo Grove Zen
6. The increasing interaction between overseas Vietnamese and Vietnamese in 
Vietnam is not limited to Buddhism but includes other religions, such as spirit pos-
session or Caodaism. For transnational spirit possession see Fjelstad and Nguyen 
Thi Hien (2006) and for transpacific Caodaism see Hoskins (2015). 
7. Thích Nhất H nh is the world’s most famous Buddhist leader after the Dalai Lama 
(see Chapman 2007). 




(Trúc Lâm Thiên Tong), established by the Vietnamese king Trần Nhân
Tông (1278–1293) in the thirteenth century. The sect was re-established 
in the late 1960s in the South by Thích Thanh Từ, a monk who ‘discov-
ered’ meditative Zen and modified it in his resurrected Bamboo Grove 
Zen school. However, what matters here is that both Thích Nhất H nh 
and Thích Thanh Từ emphasized meditation and greater spirituality in 
their attempts to cleanse Vietnamese Buddhism of alien, non-Buddhist 
elements and to create new orthodoxies and orthopraxes. 
The monk Thích Giác Đức did not explicitly state that he belonged 
to the Bamboo Grove Zen school, but he shared the school’s emphasis 
on meditation in contrast to the more liturgical Buddhist practices of 
northern Vietnam (see Soucy 2007; Taylor 2004). Listening to the 
monk, Lợi asked him whether he considered the Vietnam Buddhist 
Association (headquartered at the Quán Sứ pagoda in Hanoi) to be 
the administrative head of all Buddhist sects in the country.8 Lợi was 
aware of existing Buddhist pagodas around Sa Huỳnh which belonged 
to the ‘unofficial’ UBCV and was discreetly testing the monk. The monk 
answered directly that, in his opinion, the Quán Sứ pagoda was not a 
place of Buddhist devotion, but was, rather, simply a central secretariat 
in which the state monitored the religious congregation, approving and 
publicizing new administrative rules. 
The monk continued his critique of northern pagodas by claiming 
that they remained under strong Chinese cultural influence, which is 
why people selfishly prayed for wealth, health, passing exams, and the 
like instead of engaging in self-cultivation, as is practised in the South.
He then more overtly expressed his disapproval of those northern pago-
das which, according to the state’s vision, had become ‘beauty spots’ and 
destinations for sightseeing tours and conducting business rather than 
places for practising Buddhism – a criticism also shared by the UBCV. 
Lợi listened patiently, but in more awkward moments tried to interrupt 
the monk and asked me to switch off the recorder. However, the monk 
continued his tirade, stating that for him many temples had nothing to 
do with the cultivation of Buddhism and only pretended to be places 
of Buddhist practice; in reality they were simply earning money from 
8. The Vietnamese Party-state mandated that all activities of the Sangha’s Body, 
which is the Buddhist Association, be centrally located in the Quán Sứ pagoda 
(see Soucy 2012). 
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tourism. The monk believed that such places could not develop as sites 
for Buddhist religious cultivation, similar to Từ Phước pagoda which, 
left without clergy, was doomed to decline. 
Eventually, Lợi changed the subject and brought up the issue of the 
Quan Âm statue and its current location above Sa Huỳnh port. Although 
both Lợi and Thích Giác Đức must have known why the statue had been
moved to the top of the cliff instead of remaining in the grounds of the
pagoda, neither of them mentioned the issue. Instead, Lợi talked about 
the villagers’ beautification and decoration of the place on the cliff and
the role of Quan Âm in granting fishers peaceful passage at sea and safe
return. Describing Quan Âm as simultaneously representing ‘Buddhist 
beliefs’ (tín ngương Phât giáo) and ‘folk beliefs’ (tín ngương dân gian), he
stressed that the two sides not only did not clash, but in fact comple-
mented each other. At the same time, by not using the term ‘religion’ (tôn
giáo) with reference to institutionalized Buddhism and emphasizing 
‘beautiful Vietnamese customs’, Lợi undermined the Buddhist monk’s 
authority to decide on the future of the statue. 
For the monk, Quan Âm in the non-Buddhist space of Forbidden 
Hill was matter out of place, but in Lợi’s view the statue was an example 
of the merging of ‘beautiful Vietnamese traditions’ and Buddhism that 
– enriched with local flavour – entered the reality of everyday life and 
expressed itself in daily practices. Lợi declared that he did not identify 
with any of the main religions (tôn giáo), including Buddhism, and in
his view, as a ‘worker of the state’, he ought to represent a secular ori-
entation. However, he disclosed that this had not prevented him from 
honouring his wife’s ancestors during his wedding. In Lợi’s discussions 
with the monk Thích Giác Đức, he stressed that he saw no contradiction 
in claiming to be secular and following ancestor worship (thơ ông bà), 
which for him was a ‘beautiful Vietnamese tradition’. When Lợi asked 
the monk for his opinion on the beautification of the cliff and whether 
he identified himself with the people’s project, the monk replied curtly 
that whatever the villagers were doing had nothing to do with him. In 
this way the monk drew a clear distinction between the villagers’ tín
ngương (religious beliefs) and Buddhist tôn giáo (religion). 
Lợi decided to delve further into the subject and asked the monk if
he would be willing to conduct a ceremony on the cliff, given that peo-
ple might consider him better qualified to perform rituals. In making 
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this invitation, Lợi, who was knowledgeable about local culture, granted 
a form of authority to the monk who, in his view, understood religious 
procedures better than the villagers. The monk diplomatically answered 
that he did not have a clear understanding of the matter, but in the last 
two years he had consistently refused to lead village ceremonies for local 
gods because he found them to be in contradiction to Buddhist teach-
ing, especially as the villagers butchered pigs and prepared elaborate 
feasts. He then used pre-Đổi Mới rhetoric that associated superstition 
with the peasant class, thereby distancing himself from the official 
agenda that prioritizes ‘folk’ religious beliefs as ‘pure and authentic 
Vietnamese traditions’. Playing with the political language of the state’s 
semiotic ideology, he called the ‘folk’ beliefs ‘superstition’ (mê tín gọi là 
tín ngương dân gian) and contrary to Buddhist religion (tôn giáo chỉ là
Phât giáo). In doing so, he quite directly contradicted Lợi’s vision of a 
productive cultural merging of ‘folk’ beliefs and Buddhism. In contrast 
to the local state official, Thích Giác Đức sought a radical break from lo-
cal traditions and, in that sense, he was more dismissive of the villagers’ 
beliefs and practices as heterodox and heteropractic than Lợi. Note that 
when he stressed his role in reinstating ‘pure’ Buddhism, he mentioned 
pilgrims and North–South reconciliation as his project, but not the vil-
lagers, who, apparently, remained outside of his main concern. 
In his insistence on a hardline Buddhist doctrine of personal develop-
ment, Thích Giác Đức sought to purify the villagers’ everyday ritual life 
and space. The monk’s efforts to redirect his followers from devotional 
to more sophisticated practices such as self-cultivation and meditation 
resulted in Sa Huỳnh villagers being sidelined from ritual control over 
the village pagoda. However, they were not willing to surrender their 
ritual control over the cliff which – ‘enchanted’ by the rescued statue of
Quan Âm – had become even more potent. Circumventing the monk’s 
purifying discipline, they commissioned a new statue of Quan Âm 
so that the old one could remain atop the cliff where, they felt, it was 
better suited, even though the monk considered the local pagoda to be 
the more appropriate place for the Buddhist statue. Here we need to 
consider the semiotic ideologies of state and religion together with their 
competing disciplines aiming to control local religious practices. The 
monk’s attack on Lợi undermined the office worker’s authority and beat 
the state at its own game of wielding its doctrine as the only legitimate 
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one. The monk implicitly sought to prove that the Buddhist discipline 
that he had propagated since he came to Sa Huỳnh was doctrinally more 
correct than that of the state-sanctioned Buddhist Association. His 
protest against the state’s appropriation of Buddhist spaces for tourism 
rather than for Buddhist pilgrimages reflected the wider struggle of the 
modernizing movement to bring Buddhism back to its imagined origi-
nal core (Soucy 2012). 
Somewhat paradoxically, the monk’s efforts provided fuel for hetero-
dox rites, as villagers continuously re-enacted their religious practices
in a more unpredictable way than the monk wished, making the work
of purification unfinished business – just like the state’s efforts in 1978.
On the first and fifteenth day of the lunar month, Sa Huỳnh fisher-
women usually made offerings first to the deities on Forbidden Hill and 
afterwards at Từ Phước pagoda, where they listened to sermons given 
by the monk, prepared vegetarian meals, and chanted sutras together 
with other villagers. Knowing the monk’s rigid views on their religious 
practices on Forbidden Hill, the fisherwomen were careful not to men-
tion to the monk their prior visit to the cliff. Despite Thích Giác Đức’s 
orthodox ideas, these fisherwomen saw nothing contradictory in leav-
ing the Quan Âm statue on top of the cliff in the vicinity of the goddess 
Thiên Y A Na. Similarly, fishers felt that they had fulfilled their moral 
obligations by saving the statue from destruction and, following HồChí 
Minh’s instructions, beautifying the local landscape. For them the Quan 
Âm statue made the cliff – a transitional point between Sa Huỳnh and 
the open sea – more sacred and powerful. 
Vernacular religions are never rigid or predetermined, nor, as I 
learned, is the gender of gods entirely defined. The local worldview was 
continuously modified, negotiated, and reinterpreted across and within 
the triadic relationship between state agents, religious modernizers, and
diverse categories of villagers. Even though fishers in Sa Huỳnh consid-
ered Quan Âm a female deity, they were also aware of her old symbolic 
form as a man. By placing her statue on the cliff, men were confident 
that it would not threaten the dương order. But women have their own 
commentary on changes on the Forbidden Hill. For them, Quan Âm 
radically transformed the fierce nature of Thiên Y A Na, who in the 
past only tolerated male devotional practices and did not allow females 
on the cliff at all. Women rendered this transformation with the witty 





words, ‘Even the goddesses have to acknowledge the higher position of 
women and follow the progress of modern society!’ In this way, they 
defeated the men’s religious semiotic ideology with their own version of 
religious practice and subtly shifted the ground of male ritual hegemony 
– a theme I will continue to explore in Chapter 6. 
Shifting binary oppositions 
By underlining the modes in which the binary poles of diverse contesta-
tions come to the fore and shift in the intersections of community, state,
and religion, I have suggested that these binaries are not entirely deter-
mined by the matrix of purifying disciplines to which they are subjected 
(Certeau 1984). The ethnographic examples of Gia and the monk Thích 
Giác Đức show that there were real confrontations, but also temporary 
and pragmatic coalitions and manipulations of semiotic ideologies 
that allowed various categories of actors to achieve often contradictory 
goals within the same ideological frame. If the defence of the Quan Âm 
statue in 1978 put the fishers and policemen at opposite poles of the 
state–society binary, the state-initiated process of purifying the religious 
domain and beautifying local landscapes made them ‘move between 
those poles’ as they explored the situation with an eye to ‘maximiz[ing] 
their positional advantages’ (Harms 2012: 6). 
Nearly thirty years later, both the state official and the monk asserted 
their competing purifying disciplines and modernist rationalities. While
the effects of this divide extended further to involve villagers, those like
Gia did not identify themselves with either form of this top-down mod-
ernist discipline. As I have shown, the villagers’ attachment to spirits and 
their insistence on leaving the statue on the top of the cliff was a devia-
tion from the monk’s version of Buddhist orthodoxy and orthopraxy. 
While the villagers shared Thích Giác Đức’s belief in the importance 
of a pagoda, they did not share his doctrinal view, according to which 
their local cosmologies and devotional practices had little to do with 
Buddhism. In that sense they oddly allied themselves with the state offi-
cial Lợi, who declared himself to be secular. Still, this required that they 
learn how to use political language that would be difficult for the other 
side to refute. In this sense, the shifting contest between the Buddhist 
purists like Thích Giác Đức and the state agents like Lợi for control 
over sacred places was an ideological struggle between their competing 
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purifying disciplines. Villagers were the ones who had to navigate these 
disciplines and rework their religious practices and cosmology to ac-
cord with the present realities of post-socialist Vietnam and those who
asserted that neither cultural interest nor local customs had any place 
in ‘pure’ Buddhism. State and religious semiotic ideologies exist simul-
taneously and do not exclude each other, but index continuing tensions 
between villagers, state representatives, and religious authorities which 
are experienced as real binaries that proliferate, shift, and blur over time. 





C H A P T E R  5  
Making the Paracels and
Spratlys Vietnamese through
Commemoration 
In May 2007, I had a conversation with a member of one of the founding lineages of Lý Sơn Island, who accused a prominent and well-known Hanoi historian of secretly selling historical docu-
ments about the Paracel (Hoàng Sa) and Spratly (Trường Sa) islands 
to the Chinese ‘enemy’. These documents were part of his family annals 
(gia pha), which he had taken to Hanoi for translation into modern 
Vietnamese. He believed that only some of them had been returned and 
declared that, if not for this loss, today his lineage could present valuable 
evidence supporting Vietnam’s claims to the Paracels and Spratlys. In 
2008, the Vietnamese Communist Party was confronted with strik-
ingly similar accusations, lodged by Vietnamese nationalists inside and 
outside the country, of ‘selling’ out Vietnam’s territory to China and 
hence of failing to defend national sovereignty. Many Vietnamese in the 
country and abroad alleged that a diplomatic note sent by the former 
prime minister Ph m Văn Đồng to the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai 
on 14 September 1958 could be interpreted as ceding the Paracels and 
Spratlys to China.1 
In August 2007 I finished my ethnographic field research and re-
turned to Europe. The villagers from Lý Sơn Island phoned me several 
times. I was astonished to hear their thanks for my help in elevating Âm 
1. See ‘China has no reason when citing the 1958 Diplomatic Note’, http://vovworld. 
vn/en-US/current-affairs/china-has-no-reason-when-citing-the-1958-diplo-
matic-note-250365, accessed 12 September 2018. For a defence of Ph m Văn 
Đồng by Lưu Văn Lợi, a retired Vietnamese diplomat, see http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
vietnamese/vietnam/story/2008/09/080917_luuvanloi_inv.shtml, accessed 22 
February 2018. 
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Linh Tư Temple (Temple of the Dead) to the rank of ‘national heritage’. 
Although I protested and tried to explain that I had not played a part 
in this process, they had their own interpretation of the matter. They 
came to the conclusion that the presence of a foreign researcher on the 
island added legitimacy to provincial authorities’ endeavours to obtain 
a ‘National Certificate of Designation of Historical and Cultural Relic’, 
issued by the Ministry of Culture, Sport, and Tourism. 

Taken together, these two seemingly unconnected events serve to il-
lustrate how inhabitants of Lý Sơn Island, 30 km off the coast of Quảng 
Ngãi Province in central Vietnam, project their island as an imagined 
centre of a revised map of the nation’s territory in the context of the 
conflict between China and Vietnam over the Paracels and Spratlys, 
with repercussions at the local, national, and international levels. The
map of Vietnam has been redrawn to include much of the South China
Sea, stretching as far as the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, thereby 
effectively situating Lý Sơn Island in the middle of Vietnam’s combined 
land and sea territory. The state’s appropriation of Lý Sơn’s legacy en-
couraged villagers on the island to rework some of their local narratives 
in such a way that they simultaneously support the state’s claims and 
their individual, lineage, and communal interests. In this way, I focus on
the island community’s dual processes appropriating and reworking na-
tional narratives that build on such presumably binary categories as local
and national, individual and lineage, ancestor and ghost. The process in 
which the Lý Sơn community inscribes itself at the centre of Vietnam’s 
history and geography cannot be fully grasped without an analysis of the 
state’s narratives themselves (Trouillot 1995). 
In Vietnam, the state not only appoints gods and heroes, assigns
sacred spaces, and grants certificates in order to nationalize and institu-
tionalize them, but also sees religious traditions as one of many possible 
ways to achieve national unity. The fact that most of the island’s religious 
structures survived the two Indochina Wars, which barely touched Lý 
Sơn, added legitimacy to both the provincial authorities’ and the lo-
cal community’s endeavours to reinstate the local commemoration of 




Making the Paracels and Spratlys Vietnamese through Commemoration 
Figure 7: Imaginary map of Vietnam’s land and the sea with Lý Sơn in the middle. 
In this chapter I describe how local commemorative projects on
Lý Sơn are employed to add legitimacy to the territorial claims of the 
central Party-state and hence strengthen its arguments in the South 
China Sea dispute. I stress that commemorative practices are not exclu-
sively the purview of the state, but also of the people who hold a stake 
in them. By looking at various state and local initiatives, I go beyond 
‘simplistic polarities’ and ‘static binarism’ (see Herzfeld 2016: 24) that 
reduce state–society relations to straightforward antagonism. In this 
way I show that not only do ‘state’ and ‘village’ come to be treated as 
highly personalized actors that strategically mediate different positions 
of authority and the ‘rationalizing logic of the nation-state’ (ibid.), but 
also that the commemorations become a space where the two poles of 
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the state‒society binary collapse into each other even as they are held 
onto by people as distinct categories. Thus, this chapter demonstrates 
that, while the islanders construe their locality in terms of a ‘unique sea-
faring tradition’, they also realize that its recognition largely depends on 
their participation in wider visions of the past, translated into ‘cultural’ 
and ‘national heritage’. This reflection provides background for a more 
in-depth analysis of strategies undertaken by various lineages to have 
the figures of two local sailors – Ph m Hữu Nhật and Võ Văn Khiết – 
recognized within the provincial pantheon of heroes of the Paracels. I 
focus particularly on the female ancestor of Ph m’s kin group and their 
attempt to present her as a local heroine rather than as a ghost that is 
potentially dangerous to her kinsmen and villagers due to her premature 
and violent death. 
Islanders as guardians of the Paracels and Spratlys 
Although the small atoll of Lý Sơn lies much closer to present-day
Quảng Ngãi Province on Vietnam’s mainland than it does to the Paracel 
Islands, which are some 300 km to the east, in eighteenth-century his-
torical documents the atoll’s proximity to the Paracels was often noted 
(see Chapter 3). The historian Lê Quý Đôn estimated the distance to 
the Paracels as roughly one day’s sailing from Lý Sơn (Lê Quý Đôn 1972 
[1776]: 203). Despite competing claims to the Paracels and Spratlys, up
until the 1990s most East and Southeast Asian fishers considered the 
South China Sea open seas and its fishing grounds common property. 
This has changed as China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan have
all taken more assertive stances (Sheng-Ti Gau 2012). With the discov-
ery of offshore deposits of oil and natural gas in the early 1970s, the rival
states began to extend their claims over the sea in an effort to gain greater 
control over its mineral and marine resources. Open conflict broke out 
in 1974 when Chinese forces overran a South Vietnamese military gar-
rison on the Paracels. In 1988 it broke out again in the Spratlys, resulting 
in the sinking of three Vietnamese naval ships by Chinese forces (Amer 
2002). 
As the economic, political, and military powerhouse in the region, 
China’s assertion of its claims to the territorial waters around the Paracels 
resulted in the enforcement of a fishing ban, the capture and detention 
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Chinese coastguard. The already difficult economic situation of Lý Sơn 
Island, lagging behind the mainland in terms of healthcare, education, 
and infrastructure, worsened after Lý Sơn fishermen were denied rights 
to use fishing grounds that had for generations been considered their 
own. Because of Lý Sơn’s proximity to and historical association with 
the Paracels and Spratlys, Vietnamese authorities designated Lý Sơn a
restricted border zone and prohibited international and domestic tour-
ism. This changed when the island became a putative symbol of the 
‘defence of sovereignty’ over the ‘East Sea’ (i.e., the South China Sea) 
and was developed into a destination for tourists eager to show their 
solidarity with the islanders, who were bearing the brunt of defending 
the nation’s sovereignty. 
China’s seizure of Vietnamese vessels and the arrest and months-long 
detention of Lý Sơn fishermen have been widely covered in Vietnam’s 
mass media, adding fuel to a heated, mostly media-driven debate about 
the disputed areas of the South China Sea and to the dissident-driven 
allegation that the Vietnamese state is weak in its dealings with China. 
Opinions about what constitutes a genuine threat to the country’s 
national interests suggest that economic considerations prevail in 
Vietnam’s overall strategy. While Vietnam is obviously concerned about 
the potential loss of control over offshore oil and gas deposits as well as 
other natural resources, the Vietnamese state simultaneously has a stake 
in maintaining good diplomatic and political relations with its main 
trading partner and the region’s dominant military force, China. The 
state, however, appears to be doing little to create other job opportuni-
ties for Lý Sơn fishers who are denied access to the fishing grounds on 
which they depend. Consequently, Lý Sơn fishers feel abandoned by the 
central state and left to their own devices. 
In his analysis of the local consequences of the international conflict 
on Jinmen Island – known as the Taiwan Strait Crisis of the 1950s – 
Michael Szonyi (2008) vividly illustrates how militarization is slipping 
into the daily lives of people and into individual imaginations. In this 
sense, militarization not only refers to the state’s capacity to exercise 
military power, but also becomes a vehicle for producing and exercis-
ing political power. It creates new spaces for interaction between state 
and society and provides a multitude of ways for people to respond to 
global economic and political discourses (2008: 246). To shore up its 
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legitimacy, in the early 1990s the Vietnamese state turned its attention 
towards Lý Sơn Island as a valuable source of information about the 
history of the Paracel and Spratly flotillas. Many of the Paracel soldiers 
died at sea and their bodies were never returned to their relatives, giving 
rise to special ritual and memorial practices on Lý Sơn. Some of their 
names, however, were preserved in place-names, such as two small 
islets in the Paracel archipelago that bear the names of Captain Ph m 
Quang Ảnh and Captain Ph m Hữu Nhật, who stood out from others 
because of their skills and expertise (Sơn Hồng Đức 1975). In 1994 and 
1995, a group of scholars from the Faculty of History at Hanoi National 
University visited Lý Sơn several times and inquired about the history 
of the island and the Paracel navy. In the context of a large-scale project 
for the preservation of cultural and national ‘heritage’, these scholars 
visited a number of families, collecting various documents and family 
records and recording oral histories. The results of the investigations 
were published by Nguyễn Quang Ngọc and Vũ Văn Quân (1998), who
wrote about the role and activities of the Paracel navy in an article en-
titled ‘Sources on the Origin, Tasks and Activities of the Paracel Army’. 
At the beginning of the publication, they praise the feudal monarchs 
for their deep awareness of the significance of the ‘East Sea’ and their 
efforts to protect and extend their possession over the entire region of 
the two archipelagos. The Paracel navy, which operated in the Paracel 
and Spratly regions, became an example of Vietnamese control and thus 
served to legitimate claims to these islands. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that, on 3 August 2001, the Vietnamese 
prime minister issued a directive establishing and reconstructing a 
‘zone with historical sites’ (khu di tích lịch sử) related to the Paracels and 
Spratlys. The purpose was to preserve all places of historical significance 
regarding the heritage of the forefathers, which supported Vietnam’s 
claims to the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos (Nguyễn Đăng Vũ 2001). 
Facing competition from several states, including China, for control 
over the Paracels and Spratlys, the Vietnamese Party-state chose to 
frame their claims to sovereignty over the archipelagos not in economic 
terms, but with reference to the historical trajectory of the ‘nation’ and 
to the emotional ties of the Vietnamese people to their soil, which, ac-
cording to this directive, includes not only the land but also the sea. In 
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Defence Committee and the Ministry of Culture and Information visited 
the Lý Sơn District in order to ‘explore the current situation of all places 
of historical value’ connected with the flotillas of the two archipelagos 
(2001: 31). In the days that followed, a conference was organized in 
close collaboration with local authorities, including members of the 
Quảng Ngãi People’s Committee, local researchers, and scholars from 
Hanoi National University. Although the anniversary celebration of the 
Paracel and Spratly soldiers was included in commemorative projects, 
the state preferred to maintain a low profile for these ceremonies, as the 
whole issue of contested archipelagos was highly politicized. Indeed, at 
the time of my fieldwork in 2007, the Paracel and Spratly ceremonies 
on Lý Sơn still had a low profile, and Lý Sơn Island itself hardly ever 
appeared on official maps, which did include the Paracels and Spratlys, 
despite the efforts of Quảng Ngãi provincial authorities to present the 
island not only as a historical treasure trove, but also as a potential tour-
ist destination. Although local commemorative traditions attracted the 
attention of regional media, including Đà Nẵng television, which pro-
duced several documentary films about the individual lineages’ religious 
observances, I could hardly find at that time any information about Lý 
Sơn on the Internet. 
However, in 2009, with the heating up of the South China Sea 
dispute, the situation changed dramatically as the island became the 
topic of many Internet debates regarding the unexpected ‘rediscovery’ 
of a cultural and historical legacy ‘preserved for centuries’ by islanders.2 
Widely publicized in the context of the dispute over the Paracels and 
Spratlys, Lý Sơn became a symbol of an imagined, age-old conscious-
ness of the ‘ancestral lands’ in the South China Sea and the struggle 
to protect them, provoking a newfound patriotism, especially among 
students and intellectuals, who staged several peace rallies, tinged with 
anti-Chinese sentiment, to demonstrate their national devotion. In 
2013 Lý Sơn welcomed guided tour groups from the mainland for the 
first time. Considered a historic and contemporary stepping stone to 
the far-flung Paracels, Lý Sơn has become a destination for thousands 
of Vietnamese tourists from all over the country. Just as it did for Lý 
Sơn residents and provincial authorities, for many Vietnamese from the 
2. See https://en.vietnam.com/news/article/ly-son-island-of-history-and-economy. 
html, accessed 12 September 2018. 
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mainland the island came to represent the centre of a re-imagined map 
of the nation’s territory that now included both the land and the sea. 
Paradoxically, the state’s various commemorative projects as well as 
the national and international attention on the Paracels and Spratlys 
dispute opened up new possibilities and space for creativity for both 
provincial authorities and the marginalized community of Lý Sơn fish-
ers. What drew my attention during my fieldwork in 2006 and 2007 was 
that the Vietnamese state had to face not only international but also 
local contestations, as local officials and islanders introduced their own 
accounts of this emotionally charged issue. In this way, the encounters 
between local and central state authorities were bound up with the 
competition between different lineages. The head of the Quảng Ngãi 
Journalists’ Association, along with local historians, archaeologists, and 
authorities, became officially and personally engaged in the process of 
recovering historical materials. Some of the local authorities encouraged 
their kin and fellow villagers to collect all existing written documents 
that might have historical value and contribute to the reconstruction 
of patriotic traditions on the island. Confronted with a large-scale 
campaign and the tremendous amount of effort that had been put into 
the task, many lineages did not remain indifferent towards the official 
initiatives; however, the outpouring of genealogies and documents from 
competing lineages was not always congruent with an official vision of 
the Paracel–Spratly commemorations. I will return to this point in the 
next section of this chapter when I take a closer look at the efforts of 
one of the founding lineages to reaffirm the meritorious service of their 
female ancestor. But let me first turn to the role of commemorations in 
the state’s cultural project. 
Commemoration and ancestor worship 
Commemorations, due to their capacity to shape national memory, 
powerfully represent the past in modern Vietnam. Claims of continu-
ity with the past distinguish commemorations from other ritual forms 
and secure them a special position among official symbolic imagery 
(Connerton 1999). Kertzer (1988) argues that contemporary political 
leaders are eager to use religious rituals and symbols to legitimize their 
power and engage people in institutionalized and emotional forms of 
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come a potent tool for politicians and historians to create the past, write
narratives about national and revolutionary martyrs, and teach ‘proper’ 
Vietnamese religious tradition. However, the state deliberately prevents 
the majority of local commemorations from turning into national-level
events (see Malarney 2007). Instead, state officials keep the number of
attendees relatively small, while at the same time playing their role as
patrons of national/local tradition under the umbrella of national pro-
gress. The state controls and influences commemorations in a number 
of ways: through articles in academic journals, through provincial con-
ferences, by mapping out commemorative locations, and by designing 
the events themselves (Ho Tai 1995, 2001; Malarney 2001; Pelley 2002: 
164; Schwenkel 2009). This process involves selecting and reshaping 
certain narratives of the past, while silencing others. 
In her inspiring essay, Hue Tam Ho Tai (1995) asserts that the 
Vietnamese state exercises complete control over the location, planning, 
and budgeting of commemorative projects, without any participation 
or input from the people. Decisions regarding national monuments 
result not from shared visions or confrontations between ordinary 
citizens and the state, but from multivocality originating within the state 
apparatus itself. In reference to the Vietnam‒America War, Christina 
Schwenkel (2009) persuasively demonstrates that, indeed, the state is 
not a monolithic actor and national history is far from a homogeneous 
experience. State memorials and commemorations in Vietnam are also 
the result of transnational confrontations that take place in museums, 
cemeteries, wartime photography exhibits, former battlefields turned 
into tourist sites, and among American veterans (Schwenkel 2009: 
5‒9). Yet both Ho Tai and Schwenkel are mostly concerned with con-
testations over historical and national representation played out in state 
commemorative practices. By contrast, I map a different landscape of 
commemoration, providing a window into the local history of the South 
China Sea. I argue that such confrontations between the state’s and the 
people’s views do occur at the local level, where commemorations of 
the past are contested and therefore are not the exclusive purview of the 
state. The local narratives can become open to negotiation, as they are 
products of multivocality originating within various competing state 
and non-state groups of Vietnamese, including local officials, lineage 
representatives, descendants, and other individuals. As Kwon (2006, 
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2009) has demonstrated in his study of commemoration in Vietnam, 
the bereavement of families of civilians killed in military operations 
has not been acknowledged in national remembrance ceremonies, but 
it has produced a variety of patterns in the domestic cult of ancestors. 
Modern warfare’s power to totally destroy bodies and the subsequent 
painful impossibility of proper burial has created all sorts of ghosts who 
have to be reunited with the living through family commemorative rites 
(Kwon 2006). National history and heroism only have meaning for the 
people when they are integrated with local history and the genealogical 
heritage of the community (Kwon 2006: 117). It is precisely this space 
of commemorative practice where the binary opposites of state and 
society collapse into each other, drawing religion into the centre. 
The Paracel–Spratly commemorative projects are inscribed in the 
Vietnamese discourse on culture and religion. This discourse, initiated 
by the state, concerns ancestor worship, which is one of those religious 
practices that have received state recognition as ‘national religious 
traditions’. According to the definition by Đăng Nghiêm V n (1998: 
246), ancestor worship is ‘the veneration of those passed away who 
deserve credit for the generation and nurture of their descendants … 
or who have achieved merit in service to their commune or country’. 
Ancestor worship, he observes, is a long-standing religious tradition 
of the Vietnamese people that is deeply rooted in their consciousness, 
especially as it represents national custom and is ‘imbued with a sense of 
duty’ (ibid.: 247). Kwon (2006: 104) notes that ‘the traditional religious 
institution became the technology of national integration. Imagining the 
nation-state became a matter of thinking about dead war heroes within 
the familiar system of ancestor worship.’ In this light, the traditional cult 
of ancestor worship has recurred as a ‘hero-centered political culture’ 
because the state’s focus is on the exemplary service of the ancestors 
rather than on a peaceful afterlife (ibid.). Nevertheless, Vietnamese 
people take a more egalitarian approach to the dead: the spirits of all 
ancestors, regardless of their merit or contribution, and even the ghosts 
of strangers, deserve acknowledgement. Therefore, those who are not 
recognized by the state have not necessarily been forgotten; rather, lo-
cal officials, communities, and individuals often speak on their behalf. 
These groups engage in contestations over memory as they subtly shift 
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dead’, the ‘wandering souls’ – into heroic and meritorious members of 
their locality. 
Local contestations – The competition between lineages 
The prestige associated with historical records of the Paracel and Spratly 
sailors resulted in a ‘commemorative fever’ among various lineages in 
Lý Sơn, which began to compete with each other in demonstrating 
the meritorious and patriotic services of their ancestors and obtaining 
the official recognition known as the ‘Certificate of Designation of 
Historical and Cultural Relic’ (see Ho Tai 2001: 1). Such a certificate 
not only provides state recognition allowing people to worship their 
divinities in any way they wish, but it can also bring in public funding for 
restoration and promotion of a particular site as a tourist attraction. In 
Lý Sơn some of the founding lineages employed scholars to write letters 
to the Provincial Office of Culture, Sport, and Tourism in support of 
claims regarding the cultural and historical value of their legacies. 
One of the most revealing competitions took place between two line-
ages, Võ and Ph m. Both lineages trace their origins to the first families 
of migrants who today are venerated in the village communal house as 
‘pioneers’ and as ‘those who first broke the land’ (tiên hiên). The two 
lineages, both from An Vĩnh village, were proud that their family annals 
(gia pha), which had been preserved, handed down for centuries, and 
re-edited in the process, were taken to Hanoi by scholars and sent to 
the Institute of Sino-Vietnamese Studies for translation. The originals, 
containing descriptions of local events, names, and information about 
the lives of respected ancestors, were later returned to the owners after 
copies were made for the Institute’s library. Whereas the Võ lineage had 
the support of their kinsman – a provincial official devoted to cultural 
studies – the Ph m established good connections with well-known his-
torians and local authorities through the lineage’s representative, the 
fifty-eight-year-old Anh (in 2007). 
The growing attention of intellectuals and officials helped the Võ
lineage restore their sacred places. In 1997, An Vĩnh villagers put all 
their efforts into collecting money and rebuilding the temple that the 
ancestor of the Võ lineage had originally built for the village. Villagers 
installed altars there devoted to worshipping the founder of the temple, 
the tutelary spirit, the spirit of the soil, the spirit of Bach Mã (White 
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Horse), and to the Paracel officer Võ Văn Khiết, just to name a few. To 
obtain the ‘Certification of Designation of Historical and Cultural Relic’, 
one has to prove the artistic and historical value of a place or the merit 
of the ancestor worshipped (Endres 2001: 88). Võ Văn Khiết seemed 
a perfect fit for all official requirements, and the Võ lineage had all the 
necessary documents to prove Võ Văn Khiết’s meritorious service to the 
village as well as to the country. In the Võ family record, dated 1803, we 
can read that, due to Võ Văn Khiết’s virtues, he was appointed head of 
the đình by the villagers of An Vĩnh (Nguyễn Quang Ngọc and Vũ Văn 
Quân 1998). He was described as a straightforward, honest, diligent,
and knowledgeable person. The lineage, together with villagers and 
with the help of their kin and other local authorities from Quảng Ngãi,
prepared the necessary petition. In 2001, the temple was listed in the
official report of the Provincial Office of Culture among other monu-
ments for the commemoration of the Paracel flotilla. The document 
lists Võ Văn Khiết’s temple as a historical site of the Paracels (UBND 
Tỉnh Quảng Ngãi and Sở văn hoá Thông Tin 2001). 
At the same time, members of the Ph m lineage began their efforts
to reaffirm the meritorious service of their female ancestor, Lady
Roi, and her historical value. Although they had not been backed by
the villagers like the Võ kin group had been, in 2003 the Ph m line-
age received official permission and support from local authorities of
the district People’s Committee to apply for recognition of Lady Roi’s
temple as a historic site. A year later, while collecting materials for the
Quảng Ngãi Museum, the members of the lineage unexpectedly came
across additional documents preserved in their ancestral house. The
newly discovered credentials included a genealogy (phô hê), the fam-
ily record, a charter (sắc phong), and altar tablets that not only shed
new light on Lady Roi herself, but also on one of the lineage’s ances-
tors, captain of the Paracel flotilla Ph m Hữu Nhật, after whom one
of the islets of the Paracel archipelago is named. With the help of the
head of the Quảng Ngãi Journalists’ Association, archaeologists from
the local museum, historians, and authorities from the province and
district, celebrations were held in March 2005 for the unveiling of a
commemorative plaque in honour of Ph m Hữu Nhật, who was then
officially recognized as a respected ancestor of the Ph m lineage and a
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not yet concluded. The lineage continued to count on the support of
well-known historians and journalists and even of Đà Nẵng television,
hoping that, with such powerful and unquestioning supporters, success
would quickly follow.
While there was no contestation concerning the heroism of Ph m 
Hữu Nhật, the efforts of the Ph m lineage to recognize their second an-
cestor, Lady Roi, met with strong opposition from the members of the 
Võ lineage, who felt that the Ph m wanted to elevate their lineage over 
others through the deification and official recognition of their female 
ancestor. By acknowledging Võ Văn Khiết as a collective ancestor of the 
whole village, Võ lineage members stressed their self-effacement, which 
contrasted, they believed, with the more individualistic aspirations of 
the Ph m lineage, which sought only its own glory. They stressed that 
Võ Văn Khiết’s temple had been handed over to the village a long time 
ago and it was communal rather than lineage property. Consequently, 
by projecting themselves in relation to the larger entity of the village,
Võ members were able to align themselves with the ‘collective’ position 
while accusing other lineages of ‘individual’ and hence fractious tenden-
cies. However, it would be difficult to deny that this more collective 
aspect of the official recognition of Võ Văn Khiết had in fact elevated the 
Võ lineage status within the local community. 
The above narrative illustrates that power struggles between the 
lineages represent another dimension of the process of recovering local 
memories. Both the Ph m and the Võ lineages first sought local and 
genealogical continuity, as they wanted to point out that their family 
members, as well as the Lý Sơn people more generally, though spatially 
distanced from the mainland, had always contributed to the defence 
of the nation. National continuity was meaningful for them only when 
incorporated into their lineages’ concerns. 
By way of comparison, the Chinese example shows that in the 
volatile post-socialist environment, rural Chinese communities began 
to rebuild their identity around clan, lineage, or religious affiliation 
(Hillman 2004). Susanne Brandtstädter (2003) explains that where 
a state is unable to create trust and state institutions have failed to re-
produce the moral world of a community, new forms of individual and 
collective morality appear. Investment in gifts, kinship rituals, ancestral 
halls, and cultural inventiveness connected with temple reconstruction 
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became an intrinsic part of the process of the restoration of community 
pride and identity and, above all, of prestige and ‘kinship relatedness’ 
(Brandtstädter 2003: 435; Hillman 2004). Referring to northern 
Vietnam, Hy Van Luong (2003: 216) observes a similar phenomenon 
when he reports that by the end of the 1990s Vietnamese people had 
actively established formal organizations to strengthen their own social 
networks and to fill the vacuum left by the Communist state, which in 
the post-socialist era had partially withdrawn from social domains such 
as health care, education, and welfare. Many of those organizations, such
as patrilineages and the exclusively male same-age associations, have 
been recently reinvented.3 My own data are in accord with this state-
ment. As Siu (1989), Brandtstädter (2003), and Hillman (2004) rightly 
point out in the case of China, the ritual revitalization represents a re-
cycling of cultural fragments in a rural society rather than a resurgence 
of traditional practices. At the same time, however, it is intrinsically 
connected with kinship conflicts, rural politics, and strategies of status 
maintenance and prestige building that play out across and within the 
triadic relationship of state–village–religion. In this process, re-enacted 
village rituals articulated with official state categories. Although all part 
of the state semiotic ideology, these state categories mean different 
things to different people (see Siu 1989), as I argue in the case of Lý Sơn. 
With reference to Vietnam, while many recent ethnographic studies 
highlight the re-emergence of village ‘collective identity’ through the
revivification of village rituals, they reject the romantic image of the vil-
lage as a homogeneous, cooperative, and autonomous entity (e.g., Luong 
1992; Kleinen 1999b; Truong Huyen Chi 2001, 2004; DiGregorio 
2007). The ‘collective identity’ and ‘collective response’ to the state’s 
3. In Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn I came across not only lineage associations, but also 
new organizations such as the Association of Elders (Hội ngươi cao tuôi), known 
in pre-revolutionary times as the Association of Longevity (Hội bao thọ), the 
Association of Vietnam War Veterans (Hội cựu chiên bình), and the Committee 
of Grave-visiting Rites (Ban lê Thanh Minh), just to mention a few of them. The 
head of the Association of Elders in Sa Huỳnh stated that these organizations had 
been formed in the late 1990s, and their main purpose was to organize financial 
and moral assistance for the members’ families in case of sickness or death. Luong 
(2003: 216) explains that, ‘[i]n its selective emphasis on tradition as an integral 
part of Vietnamese identity in an age of globalization, the Vietnamese state also 
became more tolerant of the proliferation or nonpolitical reinvention of traditional 
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changing political, economic, and cultural policies result not only from
tensions and interfaces between the villagers and the local state, but also
from debates and contestations between villagers themselves (Truong 
Huyen Chi 2004: 25). Following the relaxation in cultural policy and
the revival of traditional religious practices in Vietnam, it became com-
mon for lineage representatives to compete over ritual space, to invent 
or reinterpret life stories of spirits, and to hire scholars to help prepare 
petitions and ensure good connections with staff at the Ministry of 
Culture, who might facilitate the process of applying for state recogni-
tion (Truong Huyen Chi 2001, 2004; see also Endres 2001; DiGregorio 
2007; Ho Tai Hue Tam and Lê Hồng Lý 2008). Most of the lineages 
seek to formulate their efforts to recover and restore rituals and religious 
sites as reconstitution of community space, but it would be misleading 
to ignore individual interests that lie behind such endeavours. 
Truong Huyen Chi (2004: 24) insists that without an in-depth 
understanding of the particular historical process of a local setting and 
the relationship between lineages, one could hardly comprehend the 
complexity of the ‘deep play’ between different groups. Analogically, I 
argue that we can learn how Lý Sơn people judge the validity of local 
histories and try to promote their own lineage’s interests by the way 
they use their family records to argue their cases. Genealogies not only 
validate present relationships, but they are often modelled on the forms 
of actual relationships (Bohannan 1952). Vietnamese family annals are 
written records, but even in this ‘rigid form’ they remain fluid and change 
substance in response to current situations. As the example of Lý Sơn 
community well illustrates, for villagers, obtaining the certificate not 
only became a source of communal pride, but also served as an occasion 
to display the ‘meritorious past’ of individual lineages and gain financial 
support for the renovation of their temples, which could become tourist 
attractions in the future. 
Provincial authorities and their incentives 
Parallel to the competition between various lineages on Lý Sơn Island, 
provincial authorities saw a chance to promote their own province 
and elevate themselves to higher state positions by catering to Hanoi’s 
‘official interest’ in patriotic traditions on the island. For instance, it is 
not a coincidence that the former head of the Quảng Ngãi Journalists’ 
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Association, and the most active person in the Paracel project, was given 
at least two promotions over the last few years, finally reaching a top 
position in provincial administration. He sought to present Lý Sơn as a 
crucial source of historical documentation supporting Vietnam’s claims 
to sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys. As a result, Quảng Ngãi 
authorities have invested thirteen billion VND (about 500,000 euros) 
since 2007 to build the Paracel and Spratly memorial on Lý Sơn Island, 
a project that includes a museum, a restored communal house, and a 
monument dedicated to the Paracel flotilla. Furthermore, the Provincial 
Cultural Office decided to ‘recover’ local traditions connected with the 
Paracel sailors and even petitioned the Ministry of Culture to give the 
commemoration ceremonies the status of ‘national festival’. The Quảng 
Ngãi provincial officials became directly engaged in helping the Võ and 
Ph m lineages restore their temples, and provided funds for organizing 
traditional ceremonies related to Paracel sailors (see Nguyễn Đăng Vũ 
2002). In the same year, the authorities took over all responsibility for 
preparing the Paracel Tribute Rituals (Lê khao lê thê lính Hoàng Sa) from 
the Lý Sơn villagers, who complained that they were deprived of the 
opportunity to shape the ceremony according to their local views. 
On the other hand, the Quảng Ngãi provincial authorities did not 
shun expressing national devotion and, additionally, fanned the flames 
of a new-found patriotism among islanders by appealing to their sense 
of pride regarding the protection of the ancestral lands of the South 
China Sea. During the preparatory work for the Paracel Tribute Ritual 
Ceremony in April 2010, banners were stretched across the streets of
the provincial capital that announced, ‘Preserving sovereignty over all
islands of the South China Sea’. The banners were intended as a refer-
ence to the Paracel Islands, but could also be understood as a reference 
to Lý Sơn itself, as China, according to local views, claims all islands of 
the South China Sea.4 Three years later the Quảng Ngãi Province went 
even further and organized an international conference, ‘Việt Nam’s 
sovereignty over Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa Archipelagos – legal and 
4. Personal communication from Andrew Hardy, April 2010. China claims over 80 
per cent of the South China Sea; see for example Michael Richardson, ‘Territorial 
Claims in South China: LNG deal with KL shows Beijing may be easing off ’, Strait 
Times, 22 March 2010 http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/mr22mar10.pdf, ac-
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historical aspects’, which served as a platform for presenting historical 
evidence in the dispute over territories in the South China Sea. The 
foreign participants who attended the conference visited all temples on
Lý Sơn Island related to the Paracel and Spratly navy and watched the
Paracel Tribute Ritual, which was carefully prearranged by the province
and district authorities. The strategy of connecting local commemora-
tions with the global dispute paid off when in 2014 the Vietnamese 
Ministry of Culture, Sport, and Tourism selected Lý Sơn Island to host 
the national exhibition of Vietnam’s and China’s historical maps, under 
the slogan ‘Paracels and Spratlys belong to Vietnam – legal and historical 
evidence’. With the aim of raising morale among local fishers and local 
soldiers stationed on the island, the exhibition on Lý Sơn was marked 
by the attendance of representatives from the Vietnam Naval Forces and 
central and local state authorities. 
Adam Chau (2006) observes that in the post-socialist context, the
Chinese local state had increased its power and autonomy noticeably
vis-à-vis the central state, though this trend has been dramatically re-
versed in the last few years as the strong political leadership of President
Xi Jinping expanded central control over local officials. In Chapter 2,
focusing on the antisuperstition campaign of the late 1970s, I noted
that the official authorities had more space within which they could
contest, modify, or even ignore central government policies. With new
means of communication such as the Internet, cell phones, better roads,
and off-road vehicles, I shall argue that the Vietnamese central state is,
as in China, gaining a stronger grip on local government. Therefore,
even if the interests of local governmental authorities are vested in the
local, and the local government might behave differently from the cen-
tral state as Chau argued (2006: 213), the local state agents in Vietnam
are in no position to ignore the central government’s directives. As
in China, in Vietnam local agents not only take on the role of patron
of village rituals and practices, but also facilitate the re-emergence of
specific places as important cultural and historical sites, guaranteeing
that these sites are not perceived by the central government as promot-
ing superstitious cults. In this sense, villagers interact not with the local
state per se, but rather with individual state agents who have a certain
degree of autonomy. Chau draws attention to the guanxi (reciprocal so-
cial relations based on gift-giving and patronage, in Vietnamese called
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quan hê), referring to them as ‘rhizomatic networks’ capable of subvert-
ing the ‘mono-organizational’ state (ibid: 238). The ‘guanxi-pulling’
relations are like rhizomes of a tree that grow inside and alongside the
channels between local state agencies and civic organizations. Thus, it
is up to communities and individuals to work out the ‘channeling zone’
through which they can pay their tributes and respect ‘upward’ – to
the local state – and win official recognition and legitimacy ‘downward’
– for their local ritual spaces (ibid.). This process, which Chau viv-
idly describes, has been observed by many anthropologists working on
Vietnam, who have noted that local communities are eager to establish
good connections with authorities and engage scholars in order to back
their specific legacies (see Endres 2001; DiGregorio 2007; Ho Tai and
Le Hong Ly 2008). As I have shown, in Lý Sơn the competing lineages
tried to establish their networks of social relationships through kins-
men who happened to be in the local government or were well-known
historians or journalists. 
Earlier in this chapter I mentioned that Lý Sơn villagers had attrib-
uted at least part of their success in obtaining national recognition for 
their village temple to my presence in the village. Apparently, I was seen 
as someone who had access to provincial and even central authorities. 
However, I was also seen as someone who might constrain or even 
jeopardize their efforts to get the state certificate. When I asked An 
Vĩnh villagers if I could see a spirit possession organized in Âm Linh Tư
Temple, they debated for weeks about my request, called me from time 
to time, and informed me of the ‘progress’ of negotiations between them 
and village elders. In the end, I learned that the elders had decided not
to show me any religious practices that could be construed as ‘super-
stitious’. Couching their words in pre-Đổi Mới semiotic ideology and 
displaying their own deference towards the state rules, they explained 
that if reports of ‘superstitions’ and ‘outdated practices’ taking place in a 
village temple listed as a ‘national heritage’ were to reach the authorities 
in Hanoi, their petition would be rejected. While my presence on the 
island was useful in promoting the ‘unique local spiritual culture’, Lý Sơn 
people still felt the need to exercise some control over the production of 
the ‘ideal’ Vietnamese culture (Harms 2011a: 25). The elders had to 
carefully calculate the ‘supposed benefit’ of allowing me, as a foreign 
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Ancestors and ghosts of Lý Sοn ˛
 
In Vietnam, as in China (see Wolf 1974), the ancestors of one kin group 
can be dangerous to members of other kin groups, who may view the an-
cestors (tô tiên) simply as ‘ghosts’ (tà ma, h n ma, h n ngươi chêt). Other 
potentially dangerous ghosts who may threaten not only non-kinsmen 
but their own family members as well include those whose lives were 
interrupted unexpectedly and brutally. They cause a particularly seri-
ous problem if their deaths occurred in an unfamiliar place, out of ‘the 
domain of domestic security’ and at a distance from the ancestral altar 
(Kwon 2009: 89). To calm such spirits, Vietnamese people in central 
Vietnam usually erect a small shrine, altar, or gravestone in secluded 
areas such as the Forbidden Hill in Sa Huỳnh, where the grave of Bà 
Lao is located. Typically, the seacoast in the southern part of central 
Vietnam is dotted with elevated platforms, called nghĩa trung or nghĩa
tự, that serve as graveyards for those who died violently, away from their 
homes, but who had merit within the village or the country. Because 
they ‘did good’ (làm viêc nghĩa), people fulfil their duties to them just as 
they do to their ancestors (Nguyễn Đăng Vũ 2006). The soldiers of the 
Paracel navy who never returned to their natal villages and whose bodies 
presumably sank into the deep waters of the South China Sea could be 
included in this category. 
As Lý Sơn people explained, to be ready for the possibility of dying 
away from home, the Paracel soldiers going to sea would prepare a straw 
mat, rattan rope, bamboo poles and a small wooden tablet noting their 
name, age, native village, and designation of their unit. When a man 
died, his comrades would wrap his body in the mat, attach it to the poles 
and lower it from the boat into the waters in the hope that some of the 
living would find the beached corpse and give it a proper burial. Most 
of the time, however, the bodies of soldiers never returned to their kin. 
The Lý Sơn people did not want to leave their loved ones unburied, so 
they would make mannequins and bury them in fake graves in order 
to console the ‘wandering souls’ of those who had died tragic deaths 
(Nguyễn Quang Ngọc and Vũ Văn Quán 1998: 14; Phan Đinh Độ n.d.). 
According to local accounts, a ‘village ritual master’ or ‘master of the 
Dharma’ (thây pháp) would mould mannequins out of clay that were 
supposed to substitute for the bodies of the Paracel sailors. 
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Located in the yard of the Âm Linh Tư temple in An Vĩnh village, 
the burial mounds of the Paracel sailors are still preserved on the island 
and represent an integral part of the community’s collective memory 
(Đoàn Ngọc Khôi 2004). Following surviving oral tradition and family 
annals, every second month of the lunar year villagers organized the 
Paracel Tribute Rituals (lê khao lê thê lính Hoàng Sa) in the Âm Linh 
Tư temple. In the past, the ceremony was dedicated to both the living 
and the dead soldiers. The elders and families of the Paracel sailors who 
were assigned by imperial authorities to replace those who died during 
naval operations offered a leaving feast just before the sailors embarked. 
In the framework of the ceremony, a master of the Dharma would build 
a miniature ship with images of sailors, place offerings on its deck, and 
launch the ship into the sea in the hope that the sailors would return 
safely (Nguyễn Đăng Vũ 2002: 56–57).
 Finally, a potentially dangerous category of ghosts includes the spirits 
of virgin girls who died violent and untimely deaths. They are thought 
to be burdened with memories, unfulfilled desires, and unrequited lust
(Taylor 2004: 201), which make them want to remain among the living.
They pose a problem in terms of ancestor worship because they have 
no descendants to venerate them. If forgotten, they can turn into angry
ghosts and harm the living. Thus, the premature deaths of these young
unmarried girls blur the binary distinction between ghosts and ances-
tors. It is believed that they are especially envious of motherhood and 
therefore can cause the death of children in their patrilineage or even 
in the whole village. In turn, worshipped with care, they may also earn 
reputations for responsiveness and efficacy. Without heeding whether 
the wishes and requests of the living are good or bad, these spirits grant 
all of them in return for the satisfaction of their needs (ibid.). Thus, the 
closest relatives of the dead usually set a separate altar outside the house 
or even build a small shrine where they commemorate and honour these
women by burning incense and offering food in order to achieve peace-
ful coexistence. 
The female ancestor of the Ph m lineage was not the only young 
woman in Lý Sơn who died accidentally. There was another lineage 
that, like the Ph m, stressed its direct relationship with the founders 
of An Vĩnh and had an ambition to elevate its female ancestor to the 
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back their statements with a written genealogy when submitting the life 
story (lý lịch) of their female ancestor to the provincial authorities (see 
Chapter 2). As noted earlier, in Lý Sơn, the Ph m lineage tried to obtain 
recognition not only for its ancestor Ph m Hữu Nhật – the soldier of 
the Paracel flotilla who died violently and whom the Vietnamese state 
ultimately acknowledged – but also for its female ancestor, Lady Roi. I 
found that the individual Ph m family members had different versions 
of her story. One of them in particular riveted my attention: the ver-
sion that Anh, the representative of the Ph m Lineage Association, told 
me, based on ‘recently discovered’ annals. Originally written in Sino-
Vietnamese characters, the annals date back to the seventeenth century. 
The transcribed document, dated 1900, was translated into vernacular 
Vietnamese by a local specialist in the Sino-Vietnamese language (Hán-
Nôm) only in 2004, the same year the document was authorized by an 
official of the Lý Sơn People’s Committee. A lacquered box containing 
the sacred annals was displayed on an ancestor altar of the lineage temple, 
protected from unauthorized persons. However, Anh prepared several 
paper copies of a new modernized version, and he gladly showed them 
to anyone who expressed an interest.5 According to these annals, which 
Anh unexpectedly discovered in the Ph m’s ancestor halls in 2004, 
Lady Roi was a second-generation descendant of the first migrants and 
founders of the village who settled on the island in the early seventeenth 
century. In those times the coastal regions of Vietnam, including Lý Sơn 
Island, were allegedly being harassed by ‘Chinese’ pirates who plundered 
the villages, raped the women, and killed the villagers. Lady Roi, only 
sixteen years old at the time, was a victim of these invasions. 
Anh emphasized supernatural events in his story, noting that Lady 
Roi died on the fifteenth day of the fifth lunar month of 1645. The moon 
on the night of the fifteenth day of lunar months is always a full moon 
(rằm), and on that day Buddhist adherents visit pagodas, burn incense 
on the Buddha’s altar, make offerings to hungry ghosts, and refrain 
from eating meat. Emily Ahern (1975: 206) observed that in Chinese 
culture, on the first and fifteenth day of each month, every household 
performed a modest ceremony for ghosts. Women took responsibility 
for worshipping spirits that might cause sickness and other misfortunes 
5. Gia Pha – Hộ Pham Văn (Family annals – Hộ Pham Văn), kept by the Ph m Văn 
lineage, An Vĩnh commune, Lý Sơn District, Quảng Ngãi Province. 
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if they were not propitiated (1975: 206). In Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn, I 
often witnessed such ceremonies performed by women in front of their
houses. However, in his story, Anh kept silent about his female ances-
tor’s problematic nature as a potentially harmful ghost and, instead, 
emphasized those aspects of Lady Roi’s character that are in keeping 
with Buddhist tradition, such as being a devoted daughter and a sym-
bol of purity and self-sacrifice. Highlighting particular aspects of ideal 
Vietnamese womanhood constituted one of Anh’s first attempts to shift 
the terms of the ghost–ancestor hero binary to achieve state recognition 
for Lady Roi. 
According to Chinese and Vietnamese tradition, filial piety is an 
essential female virtue (see Yü 2001: 466). For example, the goddess 
Quan Âm represents the Buddhist ideal of filial piety and self-sacrifice 
motivated by pure compassion for all beings (2001: 312–347). In 
popular stories, she often takes on the appearance of a faithful daughter 
who sacrifices her own body in order to rescue or cure her parents. Anh 
adapted this motif in the lý lịch of his female ancestor: 
She [Lady Roi] came to the shore to look for her father, whom she had 
tried to warn of the approaching enemy. Surrounded by Chinese pirates, 
she chose death to maintain her virginity and threw herself into the sea. 
Anh said that after her death, Lady Roi appeared in dreams, sitting 
in the lotus position similar to Bodhisattva Quan Âm, and informed the 
village of her tragic death by suicide. Quan Âm is believed to save women 
from sexual attacks; in the case of Lady Roi the suicide served as an es-
cape. In this way, Anh wanted to emphasize that in a critical moment his 
female ancestor, like Quan Âm, who is considered a ‘veritable heroine’, 
sacrificed herself for her parent and did not give up long-standing values 
related to filial piety, the most important components of which are care, 
obedience, and moral vigilance. 
In his study on popular religion, Taylor (2004: 252) notes that many 
tales about female spirits in Vietnam describe them as loyal daughters 
and as virgins who commit suicide when threatened with rape, resist 
marriage when obliged to marry a stranger, and remain faithful to their 
parents, their husbands (if they had one), or their country even after 
death. Margery Wolf (1975: 112), who studied women and suicide 
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Chinese. She gives an example of a woman who took her life because 
a thief had taken refuge under her sleeping couch. She was awarded a 
posthumous tablet for ‘the nobility of her mind’ – a common encomium 
given to unmarried women and placed outside their houses, usually in
temples (ibid.). In the context of Vietnam, Taylor (2004: 209) points 
out that the undefined nature of such women allowed them to be 
venerated as ‘spiritual protectors of the sovereign or bearers of the “na-
tional essence”’. In scholarly discourse on culture, these female spirits 
are understood as maintaining and representing the core values of the 
Vietnamese nation, including patriotism and heroism (2004: 252). As 
depicted in popular Vietnamese tales, their encounters with enemies or 
corrupt state officials usually led them to heroic deaths. 
Thus, in addition to traditional morality, which glorifies virginity and
honour, patriotism and heroism were other important elements of Anh’s 
narratives in the lý lịch of his female ancestor. He demonstrated that by 
choosing death, Lady Roi not only displayed such enduring virtues of 
a Vietnamese woman as chastity and purity, but she also became an 
‘indomitable heroine’ (anh hùng bất khuất) who exhibited ‘awareness of
protecting the dear island’ (ý thưc bao vê hòn đao yêu quý). In his narra-
tive, Anh eloquently combined the supernatural and the real and used 
notions of violent death to show how his female ancestor, the young vir-
gin, proved to be an efficacious and protective spirit during the Second 
Indochina War, when her grave served as a hiding place for stolen weap-
ons. In this sense, she not only heroically confronted ‘Chinese pirates’, 
but also gave her protection to the communist guerrillas. Through the 
simultaneous process of hybridization and purging of those elements 
that were not congruent with the desired political biography, Anh rede-
fined the dubious ‘ghostly’ aspect of his female ancestor into a form of 
patriotic heroism befitting the state’s official semiotic ideology. 
In his analysis of the potential positions of women in the militarized
society of Jinmen, Szonyi (2008: 178) argues that women were expected
to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the nation. Self-sacrifice either as
a wife-mother, a soldier, or a prostitute comforting the army in order
to protect civilian women became a ‘defining element of womanhood’
(ibid.). In Vietnam the national heroines – the Hai Bà Trưng sisters, who
fought against the Chinese – were also introduced as defenders of the
‘sacred land’ of Vietnam in postcolonial narratives. Their bravery and
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‘indomitable spirit’ passing from one generation to the next provide, ac-
cording to official interpretation, an inspiration for Vietnamese women
to revolt against the enemy (Pelley 2002: 181). Taylor (2004: 252)
notes that the Second Indochina War brought a new image of women
as ‘longhaired guerrillas’ (du tích tóc dài) according to which schoolgirls
were seen as patriotic revolutionaries, mothers were considered heroes
(mẹ anh hùng) because they sacrificed their sons for the revolution, and
wives were described as virtuous because they stayed faithful to their
husbands who had fallen in action. Ngo Thi Ngan Binh (2004: 52) re-
ports that Hồ Chí Minh, praising southern women’s revolutionary ability
and their contribution to the national struggle, rewarded them with the
‘eight golden words’: anh hùng (heroic), bất khuất (indomitable), trung
hâu (loyal), đẩm đang (resourceful). Anh’s narratives inevitably drew on
these evocative hybrid images of the Vietnamese woman: active and cou-
rageous on the front lines. Szonyi (2008: 149) argues that militarization
contributes to changing ideas of what kind of identities and behaviour
are appropriate for men and for women. In this light we can see ancestor
worship not only as politicized and militarized, but also in its gendered
dimensions. However, on Lý Sơn Island, it is the state that ultimately
determines which local heroes best suit the national narratives.
Local contestations of the Pha. m’s female ancestor 
Between 2002 and 2006, a number of articles about Lady Roi, the 
Paracel soldier Ph m Hữu Nhật, and the lineage itself appeared in local 
newspapers and magazines. Moreover, Đà Nẵng television produced 
several short films about the Ph m lineage’s family rituals. A large cam-
paign promoting the Ph m ancestors in the local press and TV would 
not have been possible without Anh’s diplomatic skills, eloquence, and 
good connections. Although he was neither head of his lineage nor in 
charge of fulfilling ritual obligations in the ancestral hall, he took on the 
role of lineage spokesman. His revolutionary past helped him win the 
support of, among others, local officials and well-known public figures 
such as the late historian Trần Quốc Vượng. 
Anh told me that among the members of his lineage there were those 
who had sacrificed their lives in the two recent Indochina Wars as well 
as in the remote past. He had collected all the available materials about 
his ancestors, including the annals, newspaper clippings, photographs, 
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letters, and petitions from famous professors and local district- and 
province-level authorities who supported his efforts to gain government 
recognition. Additionally, the bulky collection The Dossier of Historical 
Sites of the Pham Lineage included entries of those who had visited him 
in recent years.6 Anh also asked me to make an entry in his visitors’ book. 
As a keepsake of my visit, a photo was taken and added to his document 
collection. I had unintentionally become the foreign researcher who 
took note of the ‘meritorious past’ of his family. In his detailed dossier, a 
copy of which was later given to me, I read: 
Generations of the Ph m lineage and of the people of Lý Sơn are all 
the more suffused with the significance of history; history is a witness 
of the era, a candle wick of the truth. The vital power of remembrance 
enlightens people’s lives with the memory and awareness of the past. 
In the letters and applications for government recognition of Lady 
Roi’s temple as a historical site, submitted by the lineage to the local 
authorities and to the chairman of Vietnam’s Association of Historians 
in Hanoi, Lady Roi is, above all, cited as a ‘virtuous’ example (có đao 
đưc) ‘showing filial piety’ (có hiêu), and a ‘symbol of unifying patriot-
ism’ (biêu tương cua thương yêu nươc đoàn kêt) ‘having merit with the 
nation’ (có công vơi nươc). One of Anh’s main motivations was to show 
that members of his family had cultivated a ‘national character’ and pa-
triotic traditions for generations. The other aim was to demonstrate the 
historical and communal value of the temple where his female ancestor 
was worshipped. He referred to local solidarity by indicating Lady Roi’s 
‘merit with her hamlet’ when she ‘spiritually supported’ her fellows dur-
ing the boat festival competition, which was recreated on the island by 
the Quảng Ngãi Office of Culture in 2004. Anh maintained that, since 
Lady Roi was respected by the entire community, over time the temple 
developed into a public space for the entire village rather than for the 
lineage. According to his story, the place was converted from a small 
shrine into a proper temple by the members of the Ph m lineage and 
some of the villagers in 1897. He believed that the temple, at more than 
a hundred years old, deserved the rank of historical heritage site. With 
the assistance of local authorities, Anh turned for help to a well-known 
6. H  sơ di tích lịch sử - họ Pham Văn (2005). Tôc họ Ph m Văn. Vĩnh Commune, Lý
Sơn district, Quảng Ngãi Province. 
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historian, Trần Quốc Vượng, who expressed his support by writing 
petitions and even taking part in the celebration of the 359th anniversary of
the death of Lady Roi in 2004. 
However, by 2007, local officials’ and scholars’ interest in Lady Roi
had faded. Although there was no contestation concerning Ph m Hữu 
Nhật, they gradually withdrew their support for Lady Roi as a local 
heroine and her temple as a commemorative site when questions were 
raised regarding Anh’s documentation, leading to uncertainty and hesi-
tation. I was invited to take part in the anniversary commemoration of 
Lady Roi’s death (giỗ bà) on the night of the fifteenth into the sixteenth 
day of the fifth lunar month in 2007, and I found it to be much simpler 
and more modest than I had expected based on the description of the 
celebration three years earlier. There were no guests at all from the 
province. I was warmly welcomed as a foreign researcher by the Ph m 
kin group. As I talked with family members, I discovered that they had 
different, sometimes contrary, versions of her story. Whereas some of 
them claimed that she had died during her encounter with Chinese pi-
rates, others argued that she simply drowned in the sea while collecting 
seaweed.
Anh’s efforts and the great interest in his family on the part of local
state agents, intellectuals, journalists, and even television in previous
years were seen differently by the villagers. Some of them were disap-
pointed, such as those belonging to the other founding lineage that 
has its own claims through a female ancestor who was a contemporary 
of Lady Roi. They thought that I could authenticate their claims for 
governmental recognition and asked if I could intercede for them with 
the Provincial Office of Culture, Sport, and Tourism in Quảng Ngãi. 
Others, like members of the Võ lineage, one of whom was working as
an official in Quảng Ngãi, were sceptical of the accounts of the Ph m 
lineage. When I asked why they were so suspicious, they gave an enig-
matic reply that there appeared to be strong doubts about the accuracy 
and authenticity of the Ph m’s family annals with respect to Lady Roi, 
and that even provincial authorities had to revise their knowledge on 
the matter. They also expressed their concern over the consequences of 
potential acknowledgement of the Ph m’s female ancestor as a divine 
heroine. They believed that it would embolden the descendants of other 
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The villagers I talked to considered Lady Roi to be merely a Ph m 
female ancestor rather than a local heroine and said that they never went
to her shrine to pray. They also questioned whether Lady Roi had really 
lived at the beginning of the seventeenth century, even if there was no 
doubt among them that she had indeed existed. They claimed that their
very old grandparents remembered her from the time they were chil-
dren. One member of the Võ lineage asserted that Chinese pirates had 
not yet been operating along the South China Sea coast in 1645, the year 
of the supposed death of Lady Roi. To convince me of his point of view, 
he took me to the head of the Võ lineage, who showed me their family 
annals in which the first mention of pirates on the island was dated 1789 
– 144 years later than the Ph m documents suggested.7 The document 
was translated from Sino-Vietnamese to Vietnamese and authorized by
the Institute of Hán-Nôm in Hanoi. The Võ members gave me the an-
nals and pointed to a paragraph, where I read: 
Until the sixth day of the tenth month of the Ky Dậu year (1789), the 
year when fifteen vessels of Chinese pirates plundered this quarter, the 
cu [old man] kept all copies of acts. Although all copies of acts were 
soaked and ragged, the cu even so brought and stored them.8 
They refuted Anh’s version about Lady Roi’s reputed death at the 
hands of the Chinese, claiming instead that she had died accidentally 
at sea while she was collecting seaweed. In their eyes, rather than be-
ing a heroine, she was just the ghostly spirit of a young and childless 
girl who might pose a threat to the luck of her descendants if she was 
not worshiped. Moreover, they believed that their own forms of proof 
constituted the only valid history, one which could challenge Anh’s nar-
ratives and annals. 
7. According to Murray (1987), piracy emerged in the South China Sea only in the 
late eighteenth century. Most Cantonese-speaking fishermen, who over time inter-
mingled with the Vietnamese, operated as pirates along the border of Guangdong 
and Fukien provinces around Hainan Island and in the Gulf of Tonkin. In 1773, 
the Tây Sơn Rebellion established its rule in Quảng Nam, Quảng Ngãi, and Bình 
Định provinces and recruited Chinese pirates, who supported the Vietnamese 
rebels (see also Kleinen and Osseweijer 2010). It is very likely that those pirates 
had reached the island of Lý Sơn in 1789, as the Võ lineage argued. 
8. Gia Pha – Hộ Võ Văn (Family annals – The Võ Văn Lineage) kept by the Võ Văn 
lineage, An Vĩnh Commune, Lý Sơn District, Quảng Ngãi Province. 
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A local heroine or ghostly spirit? 
The question arises as to why Anh’s narratives, unlike those of the Võ 
lineage, failed to win the support of the village. Before I try to answer, let 
me first refer to an article by Charles Keyes (2002) in which he analyses 
what is in many respects a similar story. Keyes reports that in March 
1996, thousands of local people from Khorat in north-eastern Thailand 
gathered around a monument honouring the memory of Thao Suranari. 
They wanted to publicly express their outrage against an ‘insult’ to her 
memory. This hostile reaction from local people, officials, and even 
military officers was provoked by the publication of a book by a teacher 
at a local university. The author shows in her book that the national cult 
of Thao Suranari arose due to a political agenda aimed at making the 
people of north-eastern Thailand identify themselves as Thai rather 
than Lao. What is interesting about this story, according to Keyes, 
is that the Thai author explained in her book how, over the years, the 
additional meanings of patriotism, regional loyalty, and gender equality 
were generated within the political framework, and actually eclipsed 
the spiritual import of the original story found in archival documents. 
The author called for remembering Thao Suranari as a spirit rather than 
as a national heroine. However, such a postulate was unacceptable to 
those who wanted to recall the past ‘only in the service of national unity’ 
(Keyes, 2002: 128). 
The narrative of Lady Roi seems to be a mirror image of the Thai 
story. As I have shown, by constructing the narratives about Lady Roi’s 
efforts to protect the island and its inhabitants in all times, the Ph m 
lineage manipulated religious and political categories in order to turn 
her potentially disconcerting ghostly spirit into a respected divinity and 
a local heroine for the entire community of Lý Sơn and even beyond. 
Lady Roi, who tried to warn her father about the Chinese and, in a 
critical moment, chose a heroic death, can be interpreted as a metaphor 
for Vietnam: a victim that always has to defend its sovereignty and inde-
pendence. In his story, Anh used the Chinese plot, which was analogous 
to the contemporary tensions between China and Vietnam and the 
Vietnamese struggle to prove their claims over the Paracel and Spratly 
archipelagos. The Chinese pirates symbolize China’s greedy desires for 
Vietnamese ancestral land. When Anh described his female ancestor 
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island’, he was referring to the centuries-old tradition of resisting foreign 
invaders. In this way, the lý lịch of Lady Roi served him and his lineage 
by crafting and documenting their own moral and patriotic identity (cf. 
Leshkowich 2014). 
Therefore, the question about why the Ph m patrilineage failed 
in its attempt to elevate its female ancestor to the position of heroine 
should be followed by the question: Can women in Vietnam ‘stand for’ 
the patrilineage, community, and nation? Ancient Vietnamese history 
offers a few isolated examples of women who became national heroines, 
such as the Hai Bà Trưng sisters and Bà Triệu, but their heroism refers 
to the distant past when Vietnam was not yet ‘Confucianized’ and did
not yet conform to the Chinese moral and social organizational model.9 
On the other hand, later, when Vietnam adopted Confucian ethics, 
popular legends recorded many examples of women who broke rigid 
Confucian rules and gained autonomous and high positions in society. 
Recent ethnographic accounts report that many female spirits became 
increasingly popular among people precisely because of their ambigu-
ous and undefined nature as young, unmarried women who had died 
violently (see, e.g., Dror 2002a; Taylor 2004; Endres 2008). However, 
what really matters here is that most of them were accepted by the state 
as ‘goddesses’ representing Vietnamese identity rather than as ‘national 
heroines’. 
Nguyên Van Ky (2002) notes that during the Second Indochina War 
hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese women sacrificed their youth and 
responded to the revolutionary call to fight against Americans. Many of 
them died and had no time to ‘savour the taste of love, falling instead into 
the oblivion of history’. In turn, those ‘female warriors’ who survived lost 
the chance for marriage and found themselves ‘in such a state of moral 
and material abandonment that they have often had to form a communi-
ty within the community (village) to cope with the general indifference’ 
(ibid: 87). While the sacrifice and heroism of these women were never 
officially acknowledged, the Vietnamese state recognized the sacrifice 
of mothers whose children were martyrs in the Second Indochina War 
by giving them the honorary title ‘Heroic Vietnamese Mothers’ (Mẹ
Anh Hùng Viêt Nam). In this way the state emphasizes the important 
9. For more information about the Hai Bà Trưng sisters and Bà Triệu, see Taylor 
(1983). 
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role of Vietnamese women as mothers and their highest sacrifice for 
the country – the idealistic, militaristic understanding of womanhood 
glorified by the contemporary Vietnamese state (see Chapter 6). As we 
can see, the state also determines which female heroines would best suit 
the national narratives. 
Despite Anh’s efforts, Lady Roi’s experience did not lie within the 
Paracel and Spratly commemorations’ ambit and did not fit into the 
state’s semiotic ideology of national heritage. Ultimately, she did not 
chase away the Chinese; she was not accepted by provincial authori-
ties and villagers as a local heroine because ‘she did not do anything’; 
‘she just died’, as the villagers said. She behaved according to gender 
expectations and Confucian ideology, which was ‘normal’ rather than 
‘extraordinary’ behaviour. By committing suicide she avoided rape and 
saved the honour of her lineage, but it was not enough to consider her 
act a ‘heroic and meritorious death’ for the sake of the collective. Thus, 
Lady Roi’s death was seen by villagers rather as a sacrifice for the lineage 
than for the village or the nation. 
In contrast to the ‘problematic’ sexuality of women which, from the 
viewpoint of Confucian ethics, if not carefully controlled and guided 
might bring shame upon a family and even an entire lineage, men con-
form more easily to the cultural ideal of the ‘meritorious dead’ and can 
thus become the embodied model for celebrating the nation. Anh’s 
ultimate failure in his campaign to seek recognition for Lady Roi shows 
that only male ancestors of the Võ and Ph m lineages were accepted 
and acceptable as national heroes. In Vietnam’s neo-Confucian kinship 
model, only men can be full-fledged members of the patrilineage – girls 
were expected to leave their paternal patrilineage and marry into their 
husband’s patrilineage while remaining marginal at best in the public 
sphere. Hence only male figures can embody not only the lineage’s 
interests, but potentially also the broader interests of the community, at 
least in the eyes of those who wished to recentre marginal Lý Sơn Island 
in Vietnam’s imagined ‘geo-body’, composed of both territory and na-
tion (Winichakul 1994). By integrating the familiar, gendered system of
ancestor worship with reference to the sacrificed Paracel sailors into the 
national narrative, Lý Sơn villagers as well provincial authorities sought 
to restore the version of ‘collective identity’ of the community that 
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Conclusion 
In the end, the question is not whether Anh’s narratives about Lady Roi 
are truthful, but what his narratives say about the past and the present, 
and how the past is remembered, preserved, and reconstructed in the 
present. As we have seen, the people of Lý Sơn did not remain indif-
ferent to official politics and international dimensions of controversial 
disputes, but stretched them through the subtle tactics of indiscipline to
produce rationalized ancestor worship practices that serve their desired 
ends. They constructed autonomous spaces for their vernacular religious 
practices not at the margins, but in the heart of territories occupied by 
state and religious ideologies (Mbembe 1992: 127). They outwardly 
adopted political language to promote their vision of religion without 
challenging the official rules. They exploit established ideologies, seek-
ing to escape the state discipline without fully leaving it (Certeau 1984: 
xiii). 
The state notions did not clash with the people’s view, but rather 
provoked reconstruction of their memory in terms that were more ac-
ceptable to both sides. The process of constructing the present and the
past was not about ‘what happened’, but about how ‘it may be under-
stood’ (Toren 1988: 696). Local officials often played a crucial role in 
the course of ‘historical production’, as they were also members of the 
village and lineages. Moreover, despite their attempts to follow official 
ideological directives, villagers had personal preferences and preju-
dices that affected the process of restoring local memorials. Villagers 
rethought, subverted, and manipulated national and local narratives 
according to their own culturally constituted desires. Reinstating the
credentials of various lineages shows that villagers were able to selec-
tively and tactically deploy signs and symbols across authoritative lan-
guages such as ancestor worship and state semiotic ideology to further 
their own interests (see Keane 2007). Yet the examples of the Võ and 
Ph m lineages show that remaking the past is not a peaceful process that 
invariably strengthens local or national unity. It is, rather, a process in 
which conflicts and antagonisms cut within and through the state–vil-
lage binary, as various groups and individuals confront one another with 
variable and potentially contradictory memories, understandings, and 
interpretations of history. However, such confrontations are strategi-
cally restricted to specific fields of negotiation, defined by both the state 
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and local initiatives, while other parts of ancient and more recent history 
are passed over in silence. 
Moreover, in this process ancestor worship is not only historically 
and politically constructed, but also gendered. In Lý Sơn, the multifac-
eted interaction between modern cultural policies of the state and tradi-
tional customs generated a creative array of encounters with the ghosts 
of those who died as Paracel sailors or, like Lady Roi, just as young, 
childless women. By integrating the familiar system of ancestor worship 
with reference to the sacrificed Paracel sailors into the national narrative 
(see Kwon 2006), Lý Sơn islanders attempted to relocate their marginal 
island to the centre of Vietnam’s land–sea map. At the same time, they 
sought to rework their narratives in such a way that they backed their 
lineage claims. Anh adapted his narratives about the ‘heroine’ Lady Roi 
to official versions and gave them their own meaning. He emphasized 
the continuity with the past, which plays such an important role in the 
state discourse. But the continuity, he stressed, refers to his lineage, his 
village, and his island. In terms of blood relations, he shows that the 
‘revolutionary spirit’ dates back to the origins of his family and has been 
maintained over generations. His ancestors came to Vietnam’s defence 
whenever the country called them. Moreover, service to the fatherland 
was not only a male matter; exceptional courage also characterized the 
women of Anh’s family. However, as we have seen, in contrast to his 
male ancestor Ph m Hữu Nhật, who was acknowledged by the state as 
a ‘hero of the Paracels’, Anh’s female ancestor Lady Roi did not gain this 
honourable status. According to neo-Confucian ideology, she was no 
more than a ghostly spirit whose experience did not serve to broaden 
the official agenda of ‘national and cultural heritage’. 
Provincial officials’ earlier support and later reservations regarding
 the inclusion of Lady Roi and her temple into the commemorative
project of the Paracel navy shows how the central state, which faces 
international and local challenges, tries to control and shape the com-
memorations by keeping them small. These commemorations underline 
the connection of the modern state with the glorious rulers, with the 
history of ‘resistance’, and with the struggle over Vietnam’s sovereignty 
and autonomy rather than their continuity with the lineage, village, 
or the island. Similarly, the state makes a selection of those narratives 
of heroism and chooses those figures whose celebration best suits the 
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dominant history. The state, aware of the social power of commemo-
rative rituals, did not allow female spirits to become a part of national 
anniversaries. On the other hand, local state agents have an influence 
on the state project. In the case of the Paracel and Spratly anniversaries, 
following both the official political line and their own preferences, they 
deliberately select oral histories, publish articles, hold conferences, and 
assign spaces that, taken together, recover and reconstruct the remote 
past in a way that promotes their interests. Nevertheless, narratives of 
women’s heroism continue to be relegated to specific fields that do not 
gain public recognition. The state commemorations are supposed to 
collectively venerate those whose bodies were lost in the South China 
Sea, whose names sank into oblivion while their bravery and heroism 
are still worth remembering. However, as we have seen, for those who 
live in the present this is not enough. They want the ghostly spirits to 
become the flesh and blood of their kin – both male and female – and 
to have their names carved into stone forever. This calls for a separate 
analysis of how in real life women deal with male claims to exclusive 
authority in the religious domain, which is the focus of the next chapter. 
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C H A P T E R  6  
Women and New Gendered
Ritual Divisions 
One incident that happened during the local ceremony for the goddess Thiên Y A Na confused me for a long time. Before going into the field as an ethnographer, I had prepared myself 
with extensive reading on ritual intensification and the growing role of 
religion in rural areas of Vietnam and China. But what I witnessed on 
the Forbidden Hill in Sa Huỳnh contradicted all my dry knowledge on 
ritual intensification and by no means resembled what, in my naivety, I 
had expected to find in my field setting.
 In my field notes for the last day of the lunar year, I recorded a de-
scription of the Chicken Ceremony (lê cúng gà) performed by six men 
in the Thiên Y A Na temple in Sa Huỳnh. I noted that although the men
were accompanied by one woman, the forty-two-year-old Hảo, it was
largely a male affair. Some of the men performing the ritual were sum-
moned by the head of the van just before the ceremony started. Their 
familiarity with the ritual procedures was limited, which was a source of 
worry for the head of the van, who could not carry out the ritual due to a 
recent death in his family. According to local beliefs, death is one of the 
most polluting events – second only to female menstruation – and can 
disrupt human relations with the gods. 
The whole ceremony took place before the Lunar New Year with 
the intention of thanking the goddess for the passing year and ensur-
ing ‘good weather and wind’ for the year to come. Although she was 
believed to have left the temple and lost her power, fishers still held the 
main ceremony according to the old tradition. Men sometimes called 
her the ‘Goddess of the Past’, referring to her previous powerful status. 
In my field notes, I scrupulously listed ritual offerings prepared by 
women: sticky rice (xôi gao), boiled chicken (gà luộc), plain rice gruel 
(cháo), bananas (chuối), sweets (kẹo), dry pancake (bánh tráng), sugar 
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(đương), rice liquor (rươu), betel (trâu), cigarettes (thuốc lá), incense 
(hương), and gold foil (vàng mã). The last note in my field notes, ‘no 
flowers’ (không có hoa), referred to the disappointment of the head 
of the van, who complained that the women had forgotten about this 
important item. He expressed his worry that the goddess would not be 
willing to listen to their prayers without flowers. Having no other choice, 
the old caretaker of the temple left an empty vase on her altar. 
Finally, in my field notes I noted ‘avian flu chicken’ (gà cúm), which 
was a coded reference to the most confusing incident, which at that time 
I did not know how to interpret. Soon after the men started to arrange 
the offerings on the altar, they found that something was wrong with 
the chicken prepared by the women. Instead of fresh shiny yellow, the 
skin color was matte and blue. The men examined the chicken carefully 
and reached the conclusion that, apparently, the chicken was spoiled. It 
was most likely sick at the time it was killed and cooked. They looked at
each other with astonished expressions on their faces and, after a brief 
moment of hesitation and some hushed conversation, put the chicken 
on the altar and started the ceremony. When the ceremony was finished, 
Hảo took the offerings from the altar, put them on the plates and distrib-
uted them among the men. However, the suspicious chicken was put 
aside. 
I was sitting in the boat on the way back through the channel when 
the old caretaker, along with other men, took the spoiled chicken out 
of the plastic bag and threw it with disgust into the water. They did not 
want to comment on it, but told me that the chicken was not fresh and 
it was better not to eat the meat. It seemed that the men did not attach 
great significance to the event, but for me it was the first time I had ever 
seen Vietnamese people throw away offerings, which generally were 
believed to be sacred after the worship. At that time, I thought that the 
ceremony was a parody. In my head I played with Vietnamese words: 
‘Cúng gà [literally, worship with chicken] … gà cúm [flu chicken] … 
cúng gà cúm [the ceremony for the flu chicken] …’, but I did not dare say 
them out loud. 
Initially, I did not know how to link ‘flu chicken’ either with the 
villagers’ stories about their alleged fear of the goddess’s punishment or 
with the concern of the head of the van, who was so careful not to offend 
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the ritual himself. Nor could I make any sense of how the ‘flu chicken’ 
fit into ethnographic accounts of growing expenditures during the ritual
intensification in Vietnam. How could women be so careless and choose
a sick chicken to offer the goddess? Were they not afraid of her punish-
ment? These thoughts raced through my mind as I sat in the boat. 
The answer came later when I spent more time with women. 
Gradually, I started to understand that they had their own vision of 
what constitutes a proper ritual for the goddess Thiên Y A Na. Women 
were confident that it was inappropriate to offer Thiên Y A Na pork or 
chicken meat – so called ‘salty offerings’ – since the goddess abstains 
from ‘non-Buddhist’ practices in her self-cultivation (đi tu). In that 
sense, women shared the monk Thích Giác Đức’s disdain for elaborated 
village feasts that required slaughtering pigs and chickens (Chapter 4).
However, in contrast to the monk, for whom all local gods were out-
side of ‘pure’ Buddhism, women claimed that Thiên Y A Na had gone 
through a spiritual metamorphosis – largely initiated by Quan Âm, 
who had joined the female pantheon on the Forbidden Hill in the late 
1970s – and had herself become a Buddhist bodhisattva. Consequently, 
women felt a moral obligation to do everything they could to respect 
her Buddhahood achieved through self-cultivation and accumulation of 
merit. To avoid openly confronting the men or questioning their ritual 
legitimacy, the women had provided a chicken to satisfy the symbolic re-
quirements of the old male religious authority, but in practice its spoiled 
condition made it impossible to consume the meaty offerings on the 
goddess’s premises. In this manner, the women subtly undermined the 
men’s power and defended their own vision of the Forbidden Hill – now 
dominated by female religious activity and Buddhist ideas. 

This chapter is intended as an in-depth analysis of women’s religiosity as 
it is played out against a backdrop of exclusively male claims to religious 
practices in the coastal society. I offer some ethnographic vignettes from 
female perspectives and present religious activities as seen by women. 
Male hegemony in the coastal society is not monolithic; it is contested by
women who challenge gender conventions and navigate their own way
through repressive discourses on traditional morality and ‘local produc-
tions’ of femininity and masculinity (Rydstrøm and Drummond 2004: 
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6). Up to this point in my study, women have appeared in the individual 
chapters only briefly and incidentally, as petty traders and as the wives 
of men who played important political roles in the local community. If a 
woman occupied a central position in my analysis, it was only due to her 
ambiguous status either as a goddess or a ghost. In the male perspective, 
such women were confined to the orthodox Confucian ethic and depict-
ed as ‘virgins’ and ‘virtuous’, ‘loyal’, and ‘obedient’ daughters and wives. 
In the previous chapter, I showed that although Ph m’s female ancestor, 
Lady Roi, proved to have all the desirable female virtues and conduct 
required by Confucian ideology, ultimately that was not enough to earn 
her recognition as a local heroine. She was just behaving according to 
gendered expectations. Her death by suicide saved her lineage’s honour, 
but did not equate to actions deserving of the title ‘hero of the collective’ 
at the village or national level. 
This chapter aims to deconstruct the conventional imaginary that 
portrays a woman as an ‘example of virtue’ but denies her any agency 
and power to decide her future (see Ortner 1995, 2001, 2006). Instead 
of virtuous daughters, I offer alternative narratives of ‘flesh and blood’ 
women engaged in confrontation with local standards of sexuality and 
gendered ritual roles. By presenting women as important actors in the 
local arena of village affairs, I want to give them the last word in my anal-
ysis of multi-faceted contestations over religious practices. At the same 
time, I cannot escape the fact that some of the female experiences were 
part of my own experience. Thus, writing about women and analysing 
their perspectives, a female anthropologist is forced to write about her 
own experiences (see, e.g., Tsing 1993). 
Exploring vernacular expressions of religion through the political, 
historical, and economic aspects of male activities, as I have done thus 
far, might give the impression that I fell into the trap of accepting the 
public ritual hegemony of men and their dominant role in the religious 
landscape of the coastal society. Indeed, for the entire duration of my 
fieldwork in Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn, it was men who guided me through 
the local landscape of village affairs, who had an interest in me as a 
foreign researcher, and with whom I spent many hours discussing local 
events, politics, and religious matters. Women simply assumed that it 
was the men’s job – as those who held the knowledge of the place – to 



































Women and New Gendered Ritual Divisions 
Women did not consider themselves inferior, but in comparison to
northern Vietnam they remain socially and ‘religiously disadvantaged’ vis-
à-vis men who hold important political positions and perform commu-
nity-level rituals (see Kirsch 1985: 304). As we observed in the previous
chapters, men in Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn monopolized the most prestigious
religious roles in village temples, carried out ancestral and communal
house rites, and reserved for themselves the role of defining religious
orthodoxy. While male descendants of the lineages were acknowledged,
Lady Roi was not recognized as a heroine. Women neither claimed the
rights to these posts nor showed that they felt excluded or disrespected.
However, it would be wrong to think that they sat by quietly and remained
silent and obedient. From their marginal position, women added their
sharp and witty commentaries on male authority. These commentaries in
a subtle way disrupted male narratives and grabbed my attention because
they transgressed the limitations imposed on the women by the men.
Although in Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn male ritual practices represented
the ‘most articulate, codified and commendable aspects’ of local religious
life, should we assume that men are more religious than women and thus
deny women’s religious agency (Kendall 1985: 30; see also Ortner 1995,
2001, 2006)? According to my observations, women actively entered –
though to a limited extent – the public religious domain with their own
interpretations of conventionally accepted religious beliefs (see Kendall
1985: 24–25). However, there were important limitations that I wish to
point out. Lý Sơn Island, with its impressive legacy of village temples,
including the village communal house, with ‘lenient’ cadres and a histori-
cally ‘mild’ antisuperstition campaign, preserved a much stronger gender
division of ritual roles than mainland villages of Sa Huỳnh. While women
indeed contributed significantly to the reconstruction of the ritual
economy, Lý Sơn men continued to define communal house orthodoxy,
and I never encountered a Lý Sơn woman crossing the doorstep of com-
munal village temples. In Sa Huỳnh, on the other hand, the no-female
taboo was broken by women who took advantage of male notions of the
spiritual impotency of the goddess Thiên Y A Na and entered her temple
to make simple Buddhist offerings and burn incense. As the vignette
above suggests, women did not try to rigorously follow the men’s ‘ritual
offering protocol’, as for them the male ritual performance referred to the
goddess’s violent nature from the past and missed her ongoing Buddhist
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transformation and new vegetarian diet regime. That is why in this
chapter I chiefly focus on Sa Huỳnh. The religious activities of women
in Sa Huỳnh shed an interesting light on the ongoing process of redefin-
ing ritual gender roles in this coastal society and give us a more complex
picture of various dynamics of ritual life in post-socialist Vietnam. 
The event described in the vignette gives us a sense of women’s 
varied possibilities for influencing men’s affairs, possibilities that men
could hardly predict or comprehend (see Tsing 1993: 205). In the pro-
cess of defining local orthodoxy through subtle indiscipline and refusal
to accept of male domination, women seek to give voice to their visions 
of religious practice (cf. Mbembe 1992a; Tsing 1993; Malarney 2002: 
207; DiGregorio 2007). However, I do not see women’s transgressions 
in terms of overt resistance to male-dominated religious ideology and 
practice because women did not usurp the space of the men’s ritual 
performance. By examining various strategies women adopted to chal-
lenge local conventions, I argue that instead of actively resisting, women 
inserted their religious practices and notions into the male-dominated 
religious domain. As Tsing (1993) showed in her ethnography of 
Meratus, women rework the structure of dominant male discourses, 
reconfigure conventional local knowledge of the world, humans, and 
gods, and destabilize those who remained in the centres. 
In the following analysis I explore from two different perspectives 
the question of how women counter male domination, escape from 
difficult social situations, and resolve the mental and emotional conse-
quences of conflicts they face in everyday life. First, I will look at the 
pre-revolutionary division of ritual roles in order to provide a historical 
and political background for the subsequent analysis, which deals with a
post-revolutionary redefinition of women’s status. The second perspec-
tive focuses on Sa Huỳnh women’s interpretation of gender and religious 
practices and their subtle strategies to cope with their marginal status 
and daily concerns. The ‘polarities’ of social status, gender, and spiritual 
hierarchy are not monolithic categories; rather, in everyday practice, 
they intersect and shape each other (cf. Tsing 1993; Kirsch 1985). 
Pre-revolutionary gender divisions in ritual life 
In the case of the Thai society, Kirsch (1985) argues that there was a
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cratic roles, while women specialized in economic–entrepreneurial 
activities that did not have a positive Buddhist valence. In the light of 
Buddhist ideology, women were seen as much more attached to the 
worldly domain than men, not only due to their gender roles as ‘lov-
ers’ and ‘mothers’, but also to their contact with money (see also Keyes 
1984).1 Like in Thailand, in Vietnam women focused on economic– 
entrepreneurial activities that not only sustained their households’ 
budgets, but often enabled men to concentrate on studying in pursuit 
of political–bureaucratic careers (Luong 1998, 2003). Luong (2003) 
notes that Vietnamese women historically played a fundamental role in
the Vietnamese economy and in generating substantial household in-
comes through commerce, handicraft production and agriculture. The 
observation by an astonished seventeenth-century Chinese traveller to 
Hanoi that ‘even wives of high-ranking mandarins were not concerned 
about losing face [through their trading activities]’ (in Luong 2003: 
202) well illustrates the fact that trade was a domain of women. 
Following Malarney (2002), it is correct to say that the position 
of women in the Vietnamese family is similar to that of families in 
Southeast Asia, as women have always been engaged in production and
responsible for the household finances. Yet despite women’s major roles
in economic–entrepreneurial activities and contributions to the family 
budget (Leshkowich 2014), Vietnamese public life, kinship, and house-
hold systems remained strongly male-oriented (Luong 2003: 202). 
Women’s lives were controlled by the Confucian ideology that guided 
women in terms of ‘housework’, ‘appearance’, ‘speech’, and ‘conduct’ 
(Ngo Thi Ngan Binh 2004: 50). The orthodox Confucian texts acted 
as ‘practical tools to assist parents in teaching daughters appropriate 
feminine behaviour’ and instructed women regarding desirable female 
virtues and conduct (ibid.). A woman’s duty was to ensure the happiness 
and well-being of her family through self-sacrifice and self-cultivation as 
a devoted and obedient daughter and well-mannered wife. 
As in China and Korea, Vietnamese women left their own kinship 
setting and entered their husbands’ patrilineage as strangers. They could
1. In contrast to Theravada Buddhism, Buddhism in Vietnam allowed women to en-
ter the monkhood, but it nevertheless reproduced male hierarchy and contributed 
to the view that women and men were diametrically opposed (see DiGregorio 
2001: 193). 
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secure their position in a family by giving birth to a son who would 
perpetuate and extend the husband’s patrilineage and by raising healthy 
children who would take care of the parents in their old age. Women 
were largely denied access to Confucian education and official posi-
tions in the national mandarinate or in local village administration, and 
they were forbidden to enter the village communal house – đình – and 
excluded from local tutelary deity worship (Luong 2003: 202–203; see
also DiGregorio 2001, 2007; Malarney 2002). Female religious activi-
ties were mainly restricted to local Buddhist pagodas and spirit-medium 
cults. It should, therefore, not come as a surprise that, to ensure the safe 
birth and long life of sons, women often turned to the world of spirits for 
assistance (see Kendall 1985: 35). 
Socialist redefinition of women’s status and the Party-state’s
attempt to institutionalize gender equality 
In Vietnam, the attack of the Party-state on the village religious domain
– in which male-oriented kinship played a major role – was implemented 
by undermining patrilineages through the collectivization of land, grant-
ing equal inheritance rights to both sons and daughters, replacing ances-
tor worship with national commemorations, and giving women access
to education (Luong 2003). Moreover, the Confucian traditional ethics
that strictly confined women to the domestic sphere had to be reformu-
lated during the war years. Ngo Thi Ngan Binh (2004: 52) reports that
in its efforts to mobilize the masses to serve the cause of national libera-
tion, the Party-state reformulated the values of Vietnamese femininity 
and encouraged women to break away from the strict Confucian family 
ideology. The Party initiated movements such as ‘moral Education of 
the New Woman’ to educate and transform young women into the ‘new
socialist woman’ (2004: 52). Traditional Confucian values did not mesh
with the image of the ‘new socialist woman’ that the Party promoted in
the time of revolutionary zeal, which entailed women’s active partici-
pation in both production and revolution (ibid.). Ngo Thi Ngan Binh 
notes that in the context of war, a ‘woman with masculine behaviour – 
loud-spoken, straightforward, self-assertive, competent in fighting, and 
fearless of risk – was acceptable and even praiseworthy’ (ibid.). 
However, in the post-war period, and particularly in the period of
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and women were instead encouraged to contribute to the national econ-
omy and development. Paradoxically, in its implementation of the new 
cultural policy, the Party-state returned to a more traditional Confucian 
formula. Consequently, the earlier socialist rhetoric glorifying female 
military participation and women’s revolutionary abilities has gradually 
given way to a discourse of traditional feminine qualities such as loyalty, 
gentleness, elegance, tactfulness, and resourcefulness that corresponds 
more closely to the new image of a ‘proper contemporary Vietnamese 
woman’ (Ngo Thi Ngan Binh 2004: 53). 
Despite the Party-state’s self-glorification as a propagator and patron 
of gender equality, the Vietnamese revolution did not change the fact 
that women bore the main responsibility for their families’ well-being. 
Women still sought solace in the spirit world and engaged in religious 
practices like the Mother Goddess cult or Buddhist worship in order to 
avoid misfortunes and deal with the crises of everyday life (Malarney 
2002: 82). Malarney (2002: 102) points out that women preserved 
religious ideas and practices in spite of the socialist transformation. 
Many of them rejected the Party’s cultural reforms and held Buddhist 
rites or spirit possessions under the veil of secrecy. As a matter of fact, 
in contrast to men, who were more integrated into the Party, women 
remained outside of the political power structure, which allowed 
them to practice religion without serious repercussions. On one hand, 
women’s strong attachment to religion earned them negative labels such 
as ‘superstitious’, ‘traditional’, and even ‘backwards’. On the other hand, 
as Malarney stressed, in the present day women are considered to be 
more specialized than men in the ancestor cult, which supports Nguyễn 
Tuấn Anh’s (2010) thesis on significant changes in kinship relations. 
Nguyễn Tuấn Anh’s (2010: 39) recent research in rural settings of
northern Vietnam shows a noteworthy shift in gender roles: ever since
the Đổi Mới period, women have crossed the gender divide and have
been allowed to sit in patrilineage councils and even to become mem-
bers of the patrilineage, formerly an exclusively male institution. More 
importantly, Nguyễn Tuấn Anh (2010: 225) points out that the change 
in women’s position has taken place in relation to the changes in kinship 
relationships. As I have already noted above, in the pre-socialist period, 
married women were not formally full members of any patrilineage, 
hence their position in the kinship structure was marginal. In the socialist 
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transformation period, women gained the same rights to education and 
participation in the collective system of agriculture and industry as men, 
while the material and ideological foundations of male-oriented kinship 
were undermined (see Luong 2003: 204). In the Đổi Mới period, with 
the resurgence of the kinship system, women gained more economic 
opportunities that enabled them to become patrilineage members ‘in 
their own right’ (Nguyễn Tuấn Anh 2010: 225). 
Nevertheless, it would be too optimistic to conclude that the Party-
state’s efforts to make women equal to men eradicated gender inequality, 
as the male-oriented kinship model remains powerful in shaping gender 
relations. In fact, complete equality between men and women ‘may hold 
rhetorically, but less completely in practice’ (Rydstrøm and Drummond 
2004: 8; see also Luong 2003; Nguyen-vo 2008; Werner 2009). Let me 
illustrate this with a brief example. During my visit to all 13 districts of 
Quảng Ngãi Province in 2006, I noted only one instance of a woman 
holding one of the highest positions in the local administration, namely 
chairperson of a district (chu tịch huyên). It is worth mentioning that 
it was a frontier district in the mountainous area, and the woman was 
of Hrê ethnic background, which might suggest that male dominance 
in and women’s exclusion from politics is largely an ethnic Kinh (Việt) 
affair. This exception, however, proves the rule that women in Vietnam 
remain marginal to men and usually do not hold important political 
positions in local official administrations heavily dominated by men 
(Malarney 2002). 
Women and religious practices in the coastal society 
In the previous section I charted changes in women’s social status, both 
within the family and in Vietnamese society at large, brought about by
the socialist transformation and the postsocialist reforms (Malarney 
2002; Luong 2003; Werner 2009; Nguyễn Tuấn Anh 2010; Leshkowich 
2014). Pointing out a significant shift in gender-constructed relation-
ships, many authors have drawn heavily upon findings from either 
northern or southern Vietnam. I do not intend to make generalizations 
about ‘Vietnamese women’ here; rather, my aim is to point out the sig-
nificance of regional dynamics and differences. In this way, I seek to cast 
some light on gender relations and women’s roles in contestations over 
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The pre-revolutionary situation of women in Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn
was much the same as in other parts of Vietnam. In the land-based vil-
lages women were excluded from worship in the đình. A similar ritual 
prohibition was maintained in the sea-oriented fishing communities – 
van chày. In Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn, it was not only the communal houses 
and the Whale Spirit temples that were typically limited to men, but the 
Thiên Y A Na temples as well. A male medium’s body usually served 
as a vessel for Thiên Y A Na or other spirits to enter and engage with 
villagers. Possession by Thiên Y A Na, called lên đ ng, was an exclusively 
male affair involving the village master of the Dharma (thây pháp), who 
was also the one who, through secret formulas, captured and forced 
a selected spirit – sometimes sent by the goddess – to ‘ride’ a suitable 
person during a séance. This village master would not be possessed by 
the spirits himself, but played the role of mediator between divinity and 
the spirit medium whose body (xác, literally meaning ‘corpse’) served as 
a vessel for supernatural beings. The master of the Dharma, sometimes 
called ‘master of magic water’ (thây phù thuy), also played the role of 
spokesman during communal offerings or used his special powers 
to expel or pacify evil spirits that caused a wide range of diseases and 
misfortunes in the village.2 On Lý Sơn Island the tradition of ‘sorcery’ 
was handed down from father to the eldest son, who learned the ritual 
forms, magic charms and incantations, and the craft of making amulets 
by assisting his father. Women were generally excluded from this circle 
due to their menstrual cycles or pregnancy, which made them ‘unclean’. 
The fact that spirit possession for Thiên Y A Na in Sa Huỳnh and
Lý Sơn was a male affair stood in sharp contrast to the colourful and 
cheerful types of possession rituals performed in the majority of cases 
by women in other parts of Central Vietnam. The cult of the goddess 
Thiên Y A Na – popular all over Central Vietnam – spread in the imperial 
period among upper-class women in Huế who acted as spirit mediums 
for this goddess (Nguyễn Hữu Thông 2001; Salemink 2007, 2008b, 
2015). Nguyễn Hữu Thông (2001) explains the great popularity of the 
cult of the goddess Thiên Y A Na among these women by the fact that 
this group experienced particular difficulties in traditional Vietnamese 
society because of the pressure their husbands’ families exerted upon
2. For more information about the ‘master of the Dharma’, see Cadiere (1955–1957), 
Hickey (1964), Didier (1996), Do (2003). 
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them. He sees possession as women’s compensation for social depriva-
tion and a way out of the impasse between social expectations of them 
as women and their personal aspirations, preferences, and interests as 
individuals (Nguyễn Hữu Thông 2001).3 
In Sa Huỳnh, the spirit possession cult for Thiên Y A Na was dis-
rupted in the early 1960s when the Forbidden Hill was appropriated 
by American forces and completely abandoned after 1975 during the 
antisuperstition campaign launched by the Communist government 
(see Chapter 4). Apparently, the provincial authorities were aware of the
existence of this practice in the past. One of the editors of a cultural mag-
azine published by the Provincial Office of Culture, Sport, and Tourism 
in Quảng Ngãi City told me that the caretaker of Thiên Y A Na’s temple 
in Sa Huỳnh was a very skilful spirit medium, but under strong pres-
sure from local authorities and in fear of being accused of superstition 
(and of being sent to a re-education camp), he had already given up the 
practice by the 1970s and refused the editor’s recent request to organize 
a séance. This is consistent with my own experience in Sa Huỳnh. I have 
never come across this type of possession performed in the Thiên Y A 
Na temple. Villagers claimed that it was not practised anymore, which 
may well be true, given the newly powerless status of the goddess Thiên 
Y A Na in Sa Huỳnh. 
Sa Huỳnh villagers reported that up until 1980s the Thiên Y A Na 
temple had been reserved exclusively for men. When the goddess still 
held power, she had such a reputation for fierceness and violence that 
even men did not have the courage to approach her alone. This had to 
be done with the assistance of the temple’s caretaker or ritual master. 
Women were believed to be particularly ostracized by the goddess and 
banished from her temple due to the ‘uncleanliness’ associated with 
menstruation and female sexuality. 
While in northern Vietnam the beliefs surrounding female ‘pollu-
tion’ are no longer binding, in Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn these beliefs still 
remain strong and sustain male ritual hegemony. Especially in Lý Sơn, 
3. On spirit possession see, for example, Lewis (1966, 2003); for South Korea, see 
Kendall (1985, 1996a, 2009), Van de Port (2005); for Vietnam, see Durand 
(1959), Cadiere (1955–1957), Nguyen Thi Hien (2002), Fjelstad and Nguyen 
Thi Hien (2006), Endres (2007, 2011), Salemink (2007, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 
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menstruating and pregnant women are not allowed to approach temples 
or have contact with the village gods. Consequently, men are the ones 
who perform the act of worship. The presence of menstruating women
is believed to disrupt the rituals to such an extent that mediums might
not be possessed and divinities could give misleading information or 
even cause harm.4 A similar taboo on women’s participation in village 
rituals existed in China. According to Ahern (1975: 196), pollution be-
liefs were intimately connected with the Chinese kinship system. Death, 
birth, and menstruation were seen as pollution because they transgressed 
the bodily boundaries (see Douglas 1966: 122). Ahern (1975) declares 
that women were perceived as particularly ‘unclean’ because they have 
a boundary position in families. Given that the kinship system focused 
on male lines of descendants, women were depicted on the boundaries, 
breaking in as strangers. In this sense, they were perceived as polluting 
and disrupting the relationship between gods and humans (1975: 204). 
Although I was the only woman on the island who was allowed to 
enter the village temples, take part in rituals, sit on the mat and join 
communal feasts, every time I was asked by elders whether I was ‘clean’ 
(sach sẽ). Men warned me that I should leave the temple if I was not. 
Understandably, they were troubled by the uncertainty of whether I, as 
a woman and hence potentially polluting, was telling the truth about my 
bodily status at the time of the ritual. With the development of massive 
tourism on the island in the last few years, elders reluctantly allowed 
female tourists from the mainland to enter selected temples and make 
modest offerings, but they complained that women’s presence and prac-
tices ‘pollute’ (ô nhiêm) sacred spaces. To remedy this situation, once a 
year they performed a special ritual that would chase away the pollution 
caused by ‘mainlanders’ in those temples. 
At the time of my fieldwork, the only male ritual of spirit possession 
I was able to witness was one organized specially for me in the Thiên 
Y A Na temple in An Hải village (Lý Sơn). The performance was quite 
different from the style I know from northern Vietnam or Huế.5 In Lý 
4. For comparative cases, see Wolf (1975), Ahern (1975), Kendall (1985), Yü (2001),
and Lhamo (2003). 
5. Salemink (2008b: 262) notes that in northern Vietnam the spirit-medium cult, 
known also as lên đ ng, has a more individualistic character because it includes 
one spirit medium and his or her audience. In contrast to northern lên đ ng, the 
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Sơn, spirit possession for Thiên Y A Na was devoid of aesthetic ele-
ments like music, dance, and sophisticated costumes, and it was a secret 
business that involved only a few insiders. I discovered that the ritual 
senior of the Thiên Y A Na temple, who was also a descendant of one 
of the founding lineages, served as the spirit medium. During a séance 
held in the temple, he sat in front of the Thiên Y A Na altar and was 
covered with a red scarf. When the séance started the village master of 
the Dharma used magical formulas to capture the divinity and have her 
possess the senior, which was announced by his repeated convulsions. I 
was instructed that I could ask any question regarding my dissertation, 
prospects of getting a job, earning money, or travel abroad, but I should 
not ask about ‘love matters’ (vấn đê tình yêu). Already astonished by the 
list of ‘proper’ questions and the unexpected warning, I asked what was 
wrong with ‘love matters’. The men very seriously answered that the 
goddess might get angry for wasting her time on such ‘trivial’ problems. 
Later, from women, I learned about the men’s ‘serious questions’ that 
did not arouse the goddess’s anger. Women revealed to me that in most 
cases men organized spirit possessions in the local village temples when 
they wanted to inquire about the lucky number of a lottery draw, the 
winner of the boat race between hamlets, illegal business ventures car-
ried out by their relatives abroad such as secret cannabis plantations, 
or to ask the goddess to ‘spiritually’ ensure fishermen’s security while 
passing through contested waters of the Paracels and Spratlys or using 
explosive materials during fishing. Apparently, ‘love matters’ were not 
on their priority list. 
In the context of China, Chün-fang Yü (2001) noted that the pres-
ence of a goddess or feminine symbols in a religion does not translate 
into respect for real women in that culture. Female goddesses such as 
Mazu (in Vietnamese Thiên Hậu), Guan Yin (Quan Âm), and princess 
Miao-shan (analogous to the Vietnamese princess Liễu H nh)6 are
understood as ‘postmenopausal women’, free from the ‘messiness of 
childbirth and the problems of sexual desire’ (2001: 481). Although 
they still retain all that is attractive about femininity, they are devoid of 
‘anything negative which true womanhood entails’ (ibid.). Yü (2001: 
ritual of spirit mediumship in central Vietnam – called hâu vui – has a collective 
character with no sharp distinction between the spirit medium and the audience. 
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492) argues that goddesses like Guan Yin and Miao-shan were seen as 
‘“both a virgin and a mother” (Erndl 1993: 144), a condition that no 
real woman can attain’. Hence, the reluctance of the men of Lý Sơn to 
approach the goddess Thiên Y A Na with a question about love might 
be interpreted as an indication that, in the men’s perception, the goddess 
was completely devoid of ‘stigma’ associated with menstruation, sexual 
intercourse, death, and childbirth and, hence, sexuality (Yü 2001; see 
also Sangren 1983). I assume that asking about love would equate the 
goddess with the earthly female ‘uncleanliness’ and sexual desires, from 
which she was believed to be entirely free. It would also contest the 
idealized pure nature of the goddess Thiên Y A Na, who was assumed to 
have even achieved Buddhahood, as happened in the case of Thiên Y A 
Na in Sa Huỳnh (see Chapter 4). 
The fact that men in Lý Sơn and Sa Huỳnh performed the spirit 
possessions for Thiên Y A Na does not mean that women could not be
spirit mediums. They did so, however, in the domestic domain and, in
contrast to male spirit possession, women did not have the power to 
expel spirits from people’s bodies. Women could heal only certain dis-
eases, read cards, tell futures, and make amulets in the privacy of their 
houses. Many such female spirit mediums were engaged in some sort
of economic–entrepreneurial activities. For example, in Quảng Ngãi 
City I interviewed a man whose mother moved from Nam Định (north-
ern Vietnam) to Quảng Ngãi in the late 1930s, opened a bakery, and 
introduced a northern style of spirit possession with dancing, music, 
and elaborate and expensive attire ordered directly from Hanoi. Quảng 
Ngãi turned out to be an excellent choice; the new bakery was profit-
able enough to build a house and make a good living. The woman was 
convinced that her bakery trade flourished thanks only to her ties with 
the ‘other world’. In Sa Huỳnh, I met another woman who had worked as 
a driver for American forces during the Second Indochina War. She also 
acted as a spirit medium and held séances in the privacy of her home. 
During the antisuperstition campaign of the late 1970s, these
women were forced to abandon their calling as spirit mediums and
were threatened with time in re-education camps. Relatives of the
woman from Quảng Ngãi recalled that after the state began its anti-
superstition campaign, the family burned all her ritual attire for fear
of being accused of spreading ‘outdated customs’. The woman’s son
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clearly remembered that his father forbade her to invite possession by
going into a trance, but he still saw his mother in front of the mirror,
dancing and speaking with spirits. In contrast to the men, such as the
old caretaker in Sa Huỳnh who was under pressure from the Party,
these women resumed their activities as soon as the antisuperstition
campaign relaxed its grip. 
Women’s interpretation of the spirit world 
Villagers in central Vietnam make a distinction between an ancestor (tô
tiên), a ghost (tà ma), and a divine spirit (thân). In contrast to ances-
tors, whose deaths took place at home (chêt nhà) and who received the 
proper rituals from their relatives, ghosts are usually wandering spirits 
of the dead who did not receive proper burials and who do not have 
filial descendents to propitiate them with regular rites and offerings (see 
Chapter 5). However, as Kwon (2008: 24) notes, ‘ghosts in contem-
porary Vietnam do not have a coherent existence’ because they move 
between the place of ancestors and the space for ghosts. In the previous 
chapter I showed that ghosts could inhabit the domain of ancestors 
or the place of heroes, but these are not the only possible destinations 
for ghosts. They can turn into a powerful kindred spirits or even gods 
(thân) for a community or an individual (Kwon 2008: 104).
 Men in the coastal society often explained that most of the gods 
(thân) had been humans and turned into deities only after their death. 
During their earthly existence, some of these deities acted as village 
chiefs or mandarins or performed other important social duties. If they 
had been upright and honest in their service to people, they would enjoy
the merit they had collected through their good acts. A village which 
had a predestined affinity (duyên) with such a god would be blessed 
with prosperity and peace. However, anyone who offended the divinity
would be sure to meet a strict punishment. Not every god was munifi-
cent; a number of them could be harmful as well, and it was up to the 
people to please them, so villagers frequently had to satisfy them with 
lavish offerings. 
Men and women in Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn believed that gods did not
stay forever on this earth. After some time helping – or causing disrup-
tion to – humans, they disappeared unexpectedly, passed to another 
supreme and invisible world (siêu lên cõi tâng cao hơn, lên cõi vô hình 
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cao hơn nữa), or were downgraded to hell (bị đọa xuống địa nguc). Men 
considered that the temple, cave, stone, or tree left by such spirits ceased 
to be sacred and powerful (không còn linh nữa). They stated that at first 
villagers were usually not aware of the god’s travel to the other realm, 
as some of their wishes could still be fulfilled by the soul of the dead 
person (âm h n), which followed and helped the deity or who just 
simply pretended to be a god in order to nibble on some of the offerings 
made to him. However, the power of these helpers was very limited, and 
sooner or later villagers had to recognize that the sacredness of the place 
was gone (hêt linh thiêng), as was the case with the Thiên Y A Na temple 
on the Forbidden Hill in Sa Huỳnh. In Chapter 4, I reported that in 
the early 1980s, Sa Huỳnh fishermen were convinced that the goddess 
Thiên Y A Na had lost her power and left the temple. As I indicated, this 
change in the local perception took place in the context of the social-
ist restructuring of the village political and religious sphere. The đình, 
epitomizing male hegemony, had been destroyed long ago, and the only 
remaining temples were those dedicated to the dead and to the Whale 
Spirit. The seasonal rituals in those temples were still conducted by men 
in a way similar to the celebration of the goddess Thiên Y A Na, which I 
briefly described in the vignette at the beginning of this chapter. 
However, women in Sa Huỳnh had their own explanation and 
interpreted the goddess’s transformation as a natural consequence of 
Buddhist self-cultivation, through which she turned from a fierce deity 
into a benevolent spirit. Women, who for a long time remained outside
of rituals worshipping her and, therefore, outside of her blessing, pro-
jected Buddhist beliefs of compassion and mercy – usually associated 
with the bodhisattva Quan Âm – onto the goddess Thiên Y A Na, and 
in the early 1990s began to visit her temple and make regular offerings 
every month during the new and full moons. They usually combined 
the trip to the Thiên Y A Na temple on the Forbidden Hill with a visit 
to Từ Phước pagoda in Th ch By village (Chapter 4). While they were 
not very concerned about the men’s rituals and offerings, as the vignette 
above illustrated, they never failed to prepare themselves well. Every 
time they would load a light round bamboo basket that served as a boat 
with supplies such as flowers, fruit, incense, and fresh water and then, 
with the help of the old caretaker of the Thiên Y A Na temple, they 
would cross the channel. 
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In contrast to the men, for whom the goddess Thiên Y A Na still 
symbolized protection and securing passage at sea – and hence the past
– women perceived the goddess as a ‘modern spirit’ capable of address-
ing their female concerns. Among women who visited the Thiên Y A Na
temple were middle-aged working women – fish traders, nurses, house-
wives – as well as women who were in their retirement age and had more 
time to devote to religious activities. All of these women made offerings 
to the goddess on behalf of their families, but they also had their private 
incentives. Some of the women believed that the goddess supported 
their fish trade and, thanks to her blessings, they were able to make a 
good living. Some women had been left by husbands and, through the 
goddess, they hoped to secure their future well-being. Older women 
who engaged in the Thiên Y A Na cult prayed for health and peace for 
their families. One of them had lost an adult son in a motorbike accident 
while her husband, who was also a victim of a similar accident, survived 
but was paralyzed. This woman wanted to prevent such tragedies in the 
future.7 
Women were aware of the official Party policy of equality between
men and women, and often used it to justify their religious practices
in the Thiên Y A Na temple. They viewed the prohibition on women’s
participation in village rituals as ‘feudal’ and ‘outdated’. They were
aware of the former ‘misogyny’ felt by the goddess and of the ‘no-
female’ taboo in her temple but, as one of the women commented,
not only the men but also the ‘goddess has to accept the reality and
follow the progress of modern society!’ (Bà phai chấp nhân thưc tê và
theo tiên bộ xã hội hiên đai!). Such a statement sends us back to the
problem of how modern Sa Huỳnh women resolved tensions inti-
mately connected with their gender. In the next section, I tell of a few
women whose stories give a more in-depth picture of the conflicts that
7. Unfortunately, one week before I finished my fieldwork in Sa Huỳnh, I learned that 
her second son was killed in a motorbike accident. When I visited her I could see 
that the death of her second child was a terrible blow to her, and I am not sure how 
she dealt with this disaster. Motorbike accidents, mainly among men, happened 
so often in Sa Huỳnh that it became a real social problem. It was common to meet 
families who had lost two or three sons in this way. These tragedies badly affected 
women, who not only lost their husbands and sons, but also were left on their own 
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Sa Huỳnh women face in their everyday lives and the strategies they
employ to deal with them. 
Negotiating female identity and the quest for divine protection 
Despite the governmental policy aimed at abolishing most of the 
discriminating rules, Sa Huỳnh women were still expected to follow 
traditional principles according to which a woman gained her status 
only after marriage and bearing a son. I noted several cases when women 
were left by their husbands because they gave birth only to girls. Some of 
the husbands never divorced their wives, but started families with other 
women in order to have a son. In most of these cases the ‘two wives’ 
accepted such an arrangement. They stayed in separate houses and the 
husband moved between the two families. Men saw nothing wrong with 
having a second wife and claimed that the situation required them to 
look for such a solution. Moreover, villagers were quite open about such 
polygamous relations.8 
Unmarried women – often called ê ch ng – were described as ‘dif-
ficult’, ‘selfish’, or even ‘abnormal’ (see, e.g., Bélanger 2004: 96). As 
Daniele Bélanger explains, the Vietnamese term ê refers to ‘something 
that does not sell, or something in little demand’ or ‘a shop deserted by
customers. Ch ng means husband and therefore ê ch ng means “being 
on the shelf ” or simply being unable to find a husband’ (2004: 114ff.). 
Thus, in public opinion, women gained social recognition upon becom-
ing wives and mothers, while those who remained single and childless 
defied norms and expectations of femininity as seen from the angle of 
Confucian ideology (ibid: 96). In Sa Huỳnh, children were thought of 
as a guarantee that their parents’ would not be left alone and that they 
would be taken care of in old age and after death. In situations where 
parents could not count on the state pension, having a child gave at least
some kind of security and hope that the adult child would provide mate-
rial support (see also Phinney 2005). 
8. Since the late 1950s, polygamy has been officially forbidden and illegal in Vietnam. 
However, there has been a long tradition of second or ‘minor’ wives (làm lẽ, vơ lẽ), 
which to some extent still survives. Bélanger (2004 114ff) notes that the term 
‘polygamy’ in Vietnam has a different meaning than in other parts of the world. In 
Vietnam it denotes that the first wife has a superior status, while subsequent wives 
are inferior and have fewer privileges. She documented that in present times, tak-
ing a second wife is a strategy for some men to have a son. 
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Hảo, who appeared in the vignette at the beginning of this chapter, 
was a single mother whom I met during my visit to the Thiên Y A Na 
temple. She worked all day as a fish trader in the district market. She 
was proud of the new three-storey house that she had just built. She 
showed me her small altar to the goddess Quan Âm and then said that, 
thanks to Quan Âm and especially Thiên Y A Na, her trade was going 
well and she had been able to save money over the years to build her 
new house. Hảo introduced me to her two sisters and a female friend. 
Her younger unmarried sister, a thirty-six-year-old woman (in 2007), 
was in the advanced stages of pregnancy when I met her. During our 
intimate discussion, Hảo’s sister revealed to me her decision, inspired by 
the desire for a child, to get pregnant. She told the father, a man she met 
by chance, her purpose and promised him that he would not bear any 
responsibility for the child.9 I asked her whether she was stigmatized by 
villagers because she chose the option of bearing a child out of wedlock. 
She explained that if she had been a young girl, she would be seen by 
her neighbours as an immoral person who did not know how to protect 
(giữ) her virginity. However, at the age of thirty-six, she was considered 
past her prime already and had, in effect, lost her chance to marry. In Sa 
Huỳnh, people believed that in the late twenties the body of a woman 
changes, and if she is still unmarried and childless at that time, she will 
become more silent, capricious, and difficult, not to mention the fact 
that her ‘charm is gone’ (hêt duyên). Hảo’s sister talked about herself as
‘ugly’ and ‘old’ and apparently saw her unmarried status as her own ‘fail-
ure’ but, at the same time, she sought to be recognized as a mother. She 
said that her situation was understandable to the villagers, who knew 
that having a child was the only way for her to gain a bit of security in her 
old age. She told me, ‘Without a child there is no one who will feed me’ 
(không có con không có ai nuôi mình). 
Bélanger (2004) observed that being childless in Vietnam may be 
more problematic than being single. As she notes, in Vietnam, ‘[f]er-
tility stands as a fundamental marker of femininity; women who have 
children are thought to be more beautiful, complete, and feminine 
than childless women’ (2004: 108). Due to a shortage of men after the 
Vietnam War, women who could not marry were encouraged to give 
9. I came across quite a few cases in Sa Huỳnh where men did not bear any financial 
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birth to a biological child outside of marriage. Bélanger (ibid.) writes 
that biological motherhood was seen as ‘natural and necessary to all 
women, regardless of their marital status’. Consequently, the right of 
older single women to bear children was legitimized by the 1986 Law on 
Family and Marriage (Phinney 2008). In Bélanger’s own surveys among 
local leaders and community members in two rural settings, participants 
agreed that the best strategy for older single women to have someone to 
take care of them in old age was to have a biological child, even outside 
of wedlock and against the traditional image of a ‘proper’ Vietnamese 
woman (2004: 108). 
It is hard to judge whether all single women in Sa Huỳnh desired 
to have children like Hảo’s sister did, but for those women I met it was 
indeed important. Another unmarried middle-aged woman also shared 
with me her desire to have a child. The woman told me about a dream 
she had a few years ago that was still very significant for her. In her dream 
she saw the goddess Thiên Y A Na appearing over a tree. The goddess 
took her to the Father of Heaven, who held in his hands a small child. 
She looked down and saw crowds of people begging for this child, but 
the goddess pointed her out as the mother. Apparently, marriage and 
motherhood still held deep meaning for this woman, and she looked at 
her own life through the lens of family. Referring to me as a foreigner, 
the woman stated that life in Sa Huỳnh must be much simpler than in 
my country. In the village, she said, ‘the peak of happiness is to marry, 
have children, and earn money’. She said that a free relationship with a 
man was not an option for her because it would be unacceptable in Sa 
Huỳnh. 
Perhaps the woman was correct that, officially, short-term relation-
ships were not accepted, even though I knew that in practice they existed. 
Indeed, in the village, a young unmarried woman having an intimate 
relationship with a man without the prospect of marrying him would be 
criticized. Nevertheless, through men’s jokes and teasing, older women 
were encouraged to have sexual relationships, especially because, in
the male perception, there was no point in these women keeping their
virginity since they had passed the age considered appropriate for mar-
riage.10 Villagers were also more tolerant towards widows. Publicly, it
10. On the tradition of teasing women in Vietnamese folk culture and sexual harass-
ment in Vietnam, see Khuat Thu Hong (2004). 
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was expected that widows would show traditional virtues and faithful-
ness to their late husbands by avoiding karaoke gatherings, taking care of 
their children and their husbands’ parents. However, villagers turned a 
blind eye to their possible ‘love relations’ as long as the women were not 
too open about them. In turn, a woman who had been abandoned by 
her husband was in a much worse situation because having an intimate 
relationship with a man would cast suspicion on her ‘proper behaviour’ 
and might suggest that she had given her husband a reason to leave her. 
Hảo married early and, already at the age of twenty-two, despite giv-
ing birth to a boy, she was abandoned by her husband. She told me that 
when she was still young there was a man in the village for whom she 
felt affection, but because she was afraid of what her neighbours would 
say, she decided not to have an intimate relationship with him and kept 
her distance. She admitted that if she had not been afraid of gossip, she 
would probably now be a married woman. 
Still, childless status caused much anxiety for married women who 
feared abandonment by husbands. Hương, a woman of thirty-one, is an
example. I become acquainted with her when I visited her simple restau-
rant where she sold cheap bowls of beef noodles. I ordered my meal and 
took a table next to a young woman whom I had met during my last visit 
to the Thiên Y A Na temple. The woman poked me in the ribs, smiled, 
and reminded me that the next day would be a full moon and proposed 
that we go together to burn incense on the altar of the goddess. I agreed 
and we made an appointment to meet at the fishing harbour early the 
next morning. In the meantime, Hương brought a bowl of steaming 
soup and joined us at the table. I asked her if she was also planning to 
visit the temple, but she shook her head. She was busy with her small 
business, and had to prepare fresh noodles to sell to passing travellers 
until the late hours of the evening. 
Hương asked me how old I was and, upon hearing my answer, smiled 
with contentment and said that we were the same age. She introduced 
herself to me as a single woman who was too old to find a husband. 
Knowing local Sa Huỳnh customs, I knew that at her age it would be 
extremely difficult for her to find a husband: marriage to a thirty-year-
old woman was considered too risky. There was always the danger that 
she would be too old to give birth to a child. I tried to console Hương, 
saying that she perhaps still had a chance to find a husband, adding that 
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I was also unmarried. The woman looked at me carefully and then burst 
out laughing, probably knowing that I was trying to be nice. The joke 
was on me – Hương admitted she was married and had been for ten 
years! Then she excused herself for making fun of me and said that it 
was probably easier for a foreign woman to find a husband, even later in 
life – in her thirties – but a local woman had the chance only once, when 
she was young. 
Hương’s real worry was about her childless status. She praised her 
husband for being faithful to her when he could have easily found a 
younger woman to have children with. Hương tried to be a good wife 
and daughter-in-law by looking after her husband’s parents, who shared 
their modest house with them. Her husband did not have a stable job; 
he drove the cows to the pasture every morning, where he stayed until 
late afternoon. He usually spent his evenings in male company, drinking 
and discussing village matters while Hương took a short break from 
work to shop. 
After years trying to have a child, Hương and her husband decided 
to look for medical help in a hospital in Ho Chi Minh City. They took 
a very long trip by train and waited for several days for an appointment 
with a gynaecologist. However, the doctor could not find any reason for 
her infertility. Apparently, other possibilities, such as two ‘fertile’ people 
not being able to not have children together because of emotional stress 
or marital difficulties or the husband being infertile, were not even 
considered. Having run out of money, they were forced to return to Sa 
Huỳnh. Hương then turned to local religious specialists, desperate by 
the time she came across a village healer, Gia (he appeared in Chapter 4 
in the context of the Quan Âm statue defence). She started visiting him 
regularly twice a month. 
When I met Hương in her restaurant, she told me that at the new 
and full moon she usually closed her business early in order to do the 
washing-up and to prepare everything for the next day. After her chores 
were done, she went to Gia’s house. On one such day I accompanied 
her. Although it was about ten o’clock in the evening, two rooms were 
packed with people. Gia was sitting behind a big table right in front of 
the family ancestral altar, surrounded by fishermen who came to ask 
him to prepare protective amulets and charms against misfortune at sea. 
They brought fruits, which were piled up on the table as offerings to the 
183 




ghost who foretold and healed through Gia. During the séance the fruit 
was transformed into lộc, a kind of gift from the spirit.11 People believed 
that consuming this fruit would bring them blessings and could even 
cure sickness. 
In the next room I saw about ten women between 20 and 40 years 
of age sitting on the wooden bench waiting for a consultation. Hương 
introduced me and we joined the women on the bench. Soon I learned 
that all of them hoped that Gia could treat their infertility. Two of them 
had become pregnant thanks to Gia’s magic, but still asked for new 
amulets out of fear that they might lose their children. We waited about 
an hour until the healer called Hương. He scrawled mysterious signs 
with red ink on a sheet of paper and ordered her to burn the charm and 
to drink its ashes with water. In the meantime, Gia looked at me and 
proudly emphasized that his scribble originated from the other world 
and was dictated by the ngài (‘Excellency’) who possessed him.12 Hương 
thanked the healer and we left his house. 
On the way back, I asked her what she thought about the effective-
ness of Gia’s magical methods. Hương answered that she hoped that a
terrible burden would be taken from her, but if she did not get pregnant 
before the Lunar New Year (Têt Nguyên Đán), she and her husband 
had decided to adopt a baby. Hương took responsibility for her alleged 
infertility and tried to cope with this feeling by any and all means avail-
able to her. Although she did not really know what to think about Gia’s 
methods, in the regular consultation with the village healer she found 
consolation and relief in her attempt to change her childless status, and 
her actions showed her husband and his parents that she was taking 
some measures to influence her ‘fate’. 
As I have shown, village expectations that define local standards of 
femininity and to which women are compelled to conform can provoke 
conflicts and frustrations. On the other hand, women did not remain 
passive recipients of their ‘fate’, but took the initiative to face such chal-
lenges and to go beyond local conventions. At the same time, we can 
see that family and motherhood are still important points of reference 
in their lives, and women are ready to use any means to fulfil their roles 
11. For a good discussion of lộc, see Soucy (2012). 
12. Ngài, or Excellency, refers to deities and persons of high status. Here, however, Gia 
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as mothers. Religion plays an important role in this process, as it allows 
them to articulate their specific needs and negotiate their conditions 
with gods. Moreover, religion offers women ways of transforming the di-
vine power into protection and turning it to their own purpose (Ortner 
1997; see Leshkowich 2014). In the next part I analyse in greater detail 
spirit possession as one strategy women sometimes adopt in critical 
situations. 
Quest for authority as a gendered process 
Súng was one of the persons in Sa Huỳnh with whom the various spirits
established contact. She did not look for it to happen; it just did. Three 
days before the Lunar New Year in 2007, the people in Sa Huỳnh saw 
Súng spreading water in a magic spell (known as xin phep; literally 
‘asking for permission’) around the yard of her restaurant. Then her 
neighbours, to their surprise, witnessed a mass of cars parking in front 
of the usually deserted restaurant. Guests heading from north to south 
or vice versa on the main road were stopping in greater numbers than 
ever before and choosing Súng’s restaurant from among dozens of oth-
ers. Súng’s was one of the many roadside restaurants that had sprung 
up in the late 1990s. Located next to each other, they fiercely compete 
to attract passing travellers with fresh seafood and the offer of rooms to 
stay overnight. However, at that time even the well-known and popular 
roadhouse owned by my landlady could not attract such crowds of 
people as Súng’s did. 
The Lunar New Year’s Eve was a special night for Súng because that 
was when she discovered her new abilities. When the clock struck mid-
night she started to hear voices reaching her from the other world and
then she saw many divinities (thân), who entered her body simultane-
ously. She called this particular state nhâp vào (literally ‘being entered’), 
which means in this context ‘lending one’s body to the spirit’. She recog-
nized one of them: the Buddha Mother (Bà Phât Mẫu). 
The Buddha Mother continued to appear every afternoon between 
1:00 and 5:00 pm. After some time she introduced her younger sister, 
several other goddesses including Thiên Y A Na, and even fairies (tiên). 
In turn, the newly introduced divinities sent their servants to solve 
particular problems for people who turned to Súng for help. Rumours 
about Súng’s abilities circulated not only among the people of Sa Huỳnh, 
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but also in neighbouring villages. People came from all over the area to 
Súng’s house to get help from the Buddha Mother. The goddess was very 
precise; she never appeared before lunch and always left Súng by dinner 
time, and this gave Súng some space to prepare meals for passing guests. 
People who were unfamiliar with the timetable of the goddess arrived in 
the morning and, having already spent the money for the journey, had to 
wait for hours until she appeared. 
In July 2007 Súng’s daughter, who was studying in Ho Chi Minh 
City, came home for the summer holidays. She could not recognize her
mother during her encounters with the Buddha Mother. During pos-
session Súng’s voice became completely different, her eyes blurred and 
she seemed to be a stranger to her daughter. Indeed, Súng spoke with 
authority and power. During this time, visitors, whom she called ‘heads 
of family’ (gia chu), had to be careful with their queries. Sometimes, 
they were scolded for addressing inappropriate matters, such as a lucky 
combination for the lottery or gambling, which contrasted, for example, 
with the questions approved by elders in the spirit possession on Lý Sơn 
Island. 
Súng’s possession caused confusion and consternation among some 
of her neighbours, especially men. Gia was a recognized and respected 
healer in the village who was regularly visited by rich ship owners and 
other notable men. Súng’s practices of healing and expelling ghosts – 
usually reserved for male ritual specialists – challenged the established 
male authority and destabilized their monopoly over sacred power. 
Men in the village called her practices ‘superstitious’ (mê tín dị đoan), 
though each had his own understanding of the term. A man living in
the immediate vicinity of Súng’s house associated superstition with 
lack of education. He was sure that only education would give Súng the
strength to abandon her profession as a spirit medium. Another neigh-
bour emphasized a slightly different aspect. He interpreted superstition 
not in the terms of ‘backwardness’, ‘ignorance’, or a ‘painful legacy’ of 
the feudal era, as the State-party suggested, but in terms of authenticity 
and authority. He tried to get a clear answer from me about whether I 
believed in her supernatural abilities. He could not accept my reply that 
as a scholar I was more interested in learning about people’s practices 
than verifying their legitimacy. It is noteworthy that none of these men 
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Mattijs van de Port (2011: 75) describes ‘authenticity’ as ‘the “cul-
tural production of the real”: the rhetorical, performative and aesthetic 
practices through which people seek to upgrade the reality calibre of the
stories-they-live-by’. He points out that ‘the cultural production of the
real tends to bring irrefutable facts (“incontestable”) into play, which 
have powerful reality effect’ (2011: 75). In Chapter 5, I showed that
family records turned out to be insufficient to authenticate the ‘meri-
torious death’ of a female member of the Ph m lineage. By emphasizing 
supernatural events in its story, the lineage tried to ‘produce’ evidence 
for its female ancestor, Lady Roi, which could authenticate her as a local 
heroine. However, provincial authorities were more willing to accept 
male ancestors of Lý Sơn lineages as potential heroes of the Paracel and 
Spratly flotilla than their female kin, because men fit better into national 
narratives about the ‘meritorious and heroic dead’. Male ancestors satis-
fied not only the interests of their lineage, but also the broader interests 
of those who sought to reconstruct Lý Sơn’s history and prestige. To 
put my argument in a nutshell, women were not credible because their 
conduct and sexuality were tied and limited to their own lineages, which 
they, as women, could not perpetuate. 
In the previous chapter I observed that religious practices were gen-
dered. Let me take this point further by returning to the case of Súng. 
In Sa Huỳnh, whatever men did in the spiritual realm was seen as valid, 
whereas women’s spiritual practices were perceived as superstitious and 
inauthentic. In order to authenticate herself as a spirit medium vis-à-vis 
men’s religious practices, Súng sought ways to challenge, contest, and 
negotiate male ritual hegemony through the creative appropriation of 
beliefs and practices. Birgit Meyer (2006) analyses how Pentecostal pas-
tors use mass media as a form of mediation between this and the ‘other 
world’ to present religious vision practices as authentic and credible (see 
also Ngô 2016). She observes that ‘belief is no longer opposed to visual 
evidence and hence has lost its grounding in the invisible’ (2006: 433). 
Although Súng did not go so far as to use, for example, a camera or a 
mobile phone to pass on the message from the Divine to people – as 
happens in the case of the Pentecostal Church – she adopted other 
means, often employed by male religious specialists, that authenticated 
her supernatural power and knowledge and her relationship to spirits. 
One such means was ‘divine writings’ – coded messages sent by sprits 
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to Súng. When Súng communicated with a spirit, she noted down its 
message in secret symbols and then translated its meaning to her clients. 
The ‘divine writings’ served to mediate between her and the divine in a 
way that not only validated her person in the face of criticism from men, 
but was also visible to her clients. 
Women were more understanding towards Súng than men. Some of 
them took Súng’s possession seriously and insisted that she was under 
the power of the world of the dead (coi âm), just like Gia. They believed 
that the ghosts with whom Súng had established a relationship were 
coming from Huế because she spoke a Huế accent during possessions. 
Súng, however, denied that she had any contacts with ghosts from the 
ancient capital of Vietnam. Instead, she claimed, she had been chosen 
by the higher world of Buddha and bodhisattvas (coi thiên), who were 
showing their mercy by reducing suffering on Earth. This is similar to
Thailand, where Irvine Walter (1984) has observed that some ‘modern’ 
spirit mediums claimed a higher status by emphasizing their Buddhist 
qualities. They maintained that they were possessed by Guan Yin 
or some other respected figure from the Buddhist pantheon and, at 
the same time, established links with low-ranking spirits outside the 
Buddhist realm. 
Ahern (1975: 206–207) likewise noted that women in Chinese 
culture were free to play a predominant role in the cults of ‘low-ranking’ 
supernatural spirits. Women could worship or even be possessed by 
souls of the dead or the ‘little low goddesses’ who were believed to bring 
sons or to cure sickly children. The close association of such goddesses 
with childbirth made them less ‘clean’ than other spirits. However, in the
context of Vietnam, I do not think that we can talk about such a rigid di-
chotomy. Many authors argue that ‘heavy spiritual fate’ is a precondition 
for one’s possession (e.g., Trần Thị Ngọc Diêp ̣1974; Nguyen Thi Hien 
2002; Norton 2009; Endres 2011). Súng also believed that her spiritual 
fate was heavier than other people’s, though not as heavy as the fate of 
those who were possessed by a ghost, as Gia was. In her view, ghosts that
were just starting to cure people usually chose to work through a person
with a very difficult fate. This helped them accumulate merit and ac-
complish enlightenment, thereby cultivating their spirits and improving 
their chances of being promoted to the Buddha’s heaven. Such a person 
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moves to the other world. However, to find a suitable person who can 
facilitate this metamorphosis is not an easy task. As Súng explained, 
some of these persons should have a sequence of at least seven or eight 
lives stretching back over a long time. In this way Súng emphasized a 
crucial difference between her and Gia. Súng claimed that she was se-
lected by the Buddha Mother who, in contrast to ghosts, did not need to 
improve her karma. Being Buddha herself, the Buddha Mother turned 
to Súng because of her compassion for those who were suffering. Súng’s 
possession, therefore, served a higher purpose than Gia’s possession did 
because it aimed to help humankind by fulfilling the will of the Buddha. 
Súng was possessed by the Buddha Mother, who was considered to 
be the main divinity of the Cao Đài religion (see Hoskins 2015; Ninh 
2017). According to Súng – who had only a very loose connection to 
Cao Đài practices – the Buddha Mother was born from the union of 
Mother of Earth (Địa Mẫu) and Father of the Heavens (Ông Trơi).13 She 
embodied only positive aspects of womanhood (such as motherhood) 
and granted all wishes that were addressed to her with a ‘sincere heart’. 
Nguyen Thi Hien (2002) explains that in the context of spirit posses-
sion cults, a ‘sincere heart’ means an unwavering faith in spirits and their 
supernatural power. In Vietnam, a ‘sincere heart’ is often considered a 
factor determining a spirit’s preference. When Súng’s husband told me 
that his wife had been chosen by the Buddha Mother only because of 
her heart, he was in fact speaking about her fervent and sincere belief 
in the Buddha Mother’s manifestation and compassion. The ‘sincere 
heart’ also formed the basis of Súng’s relationship with her clients. She 
stressed that the medicines she prepared following the instructions of 
the Buddha Mother could only work when one had strong faith. 
Súng considered the Buddha Mother to be ‘sweet’ (ngọt ngao) and
‘compassionate’ (tư bi); she was also the nearest to the Buddha’s heaven.
She was responsive to all who acknowledged her without any discrimi-
nation. This, however, caused some problems when it came to curing. 
Some diseases were caused by malicious ghosts, and effective treat-
13. The Buddha Mother might be identified with the high-status Chinese goddess 
Eternal Mother, who is conceived by Chinese people as ‘preceding in time of cre-
ation, in status, and in authority all the other deities of both Buddhist and Taoist 
pantheons’ (Sangren 1983: 10). Sangren points out that Eternal Mother is a virgin 
unstained by the pollution of childbirth who lacks earthly incarnation since she 
precedes all other deities (1983: 14). 
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ment required that the Buddha Mother be violent. This she ultimately 
resolved by using the power of other goddesses. Therefore, sometimes 
the Buddha Mother sent her younger sister, the Divine Mother of the 
Mountains (Sơn Thánh Mẫu), who, in contrast to the Buddha Mother, 
was violent and fierce (hung), had little pity for ghosts, and dealt harshly 
with them. She mercilessly expelled the evil ghosts causing the sickness 
from the body and thereby cured the person. Depending on the patient’s 
problems, the Divine Mother of the Mountains occasionally used lower-
ranking spirits to cure sick men. If the sick persons were children, then 
other ‘little goddesses’ would be called to help. 
Transforming crisis into accomplishment 
In the previous paragraphs I discussed Súng’s interpretation of her 
possession, her new identity as a spirit medium, and her strategy to au-
thenticate her person. In this section, I develop my analysis further and 
say a few words about the complex and difficult situation in which Súng 
found herself before engaging in religious practices. Súng was a married 
woman in her early forties. Her husband had been a teacher in a primary 
school, but he gave up his profession when they opened the restaurant. 
When I conducted my research in 2006 and 2007, their two youngest 
children, both boys, were still at home, while the eldest child, a daughter, 
had just entered university. According to Súng – and confirmed by other 
people in Sa Huỳnh – her restaurant had not turned a profit since they 
opened the business in 1992. A few years before, she had been forced to 
sell a piece of her land adjacent to the Sa Huỳnh beach to her neighbour, 
the rich owner of the successful roadhouse. This neighbour has since 
constructed a hotel just behind Súng’s house. However, Súng still ran up 
debts and started to suffer from depression. 
The situation became even more difficult when the daughter insisted 
on going to study in Ho Chi Minh City. Súng described her daughter as 
particularly ambitious and determined, and no one could dissuade her 
from studying. She went to Ho Chi Minh City with her teacher from 
grade school, an unmarried thirty-year-old woman who decided to 
complete her education and earn a master’s degree. They rented a small 
room with a kitchen and lived together. In 2006, Súng’s daughter passed 
an examination and started to study banking. She received three million 
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it was not enough and she asked Súng for more money. Súng had to go
into debt again. The situation started to reach a critical point just before 
the Lunar New Year in 2007, when her daughter asked again for an ad-
ditional four million VND (€137) to pay for the second semester, rent, 
and other living expenses. Súng only managed to save up 1.5 million 
VND (€50), which she sent to her daughter. The girl returned home to 
celebrate the Lunar New Year with her family and cried that she would 
have to give up her studies if her parents could not pay for her schooling. 
Súng felt like she was in a dead-end situation: her debts were growing 
by the day and she was on the verge of bankruptcy, while her daughter 
continued demanding money. 
A number of authors argue that many spirit mediums, before adopting
their new role, encounter difficult social situations and look for a solu-
tion to resolve the mental and emotional consequences of the problems
they face in the present social, political, and economic situation (Walter
1984; Kendall 1996a, 2009; Kitiarsa 1999; Salemink 2008c, 2010;
Endres 2011). In the case of Thailand, Walter (1984) observes that the
traditional dominance of Thai women in most forms of small trade is
inextricably linked to the commercialization of the spirit possession cult.
The recent reinvigoration and intensification of the economy in Vietnam
led Taylor (2004: 88) to a similar conclusion. He argued that various
petty traders carry out transactions with spirits in the same way they do
in everyday life: they negotiate a loan, seek advance contributions, and
make a promise to pay off their debts. Such cultivation mirrors their
business with clients, creditors and debtors. In turn, Weller (1994, 1998)
stresses that traditional values seem to be drained from life whenever
market relations begin to dominate social relations. Individuals’ growing
independence and autonomy deepen anxiety because every individual
is in charge of his/her own future. This anxiety is related more to secur-
ing a profit in a constantly changing socio-economic context than it is
to losing orientation in life. This, inevitably, might create tensions that
need to be solved and controlled. Salemink (2008c: 157) observes that
in Vietnam, the spiritual security sought via spirit mediums not only
compensates for the insecurity related to the volatile market but, above
all, creates the ‘social capital necessary for investing confidently in new
(or old) enterprises, thus enhancing economic security of the traders,
their dependants, business partners and clients’.
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Súng’s financial problems found unexpected relief from the Buddha 
Mother, who came down from heaven and appeared in Súng’s body 
on New Year’s Eve. The goddess calmed her down, saying that she 
knew about Súng’s problems and her worries about her daughter, who 
studied at the expense of her family’s health. She said that the ten years 
in which Súng and her husband had lived in want had come to an end. 
Súng was offered lộc (Buddha’s blessing), which she should share with 
other people. Overcome by sadness due to the people’s suffering, the 
Buddha Mother had come back to Earth (Bà ơ trên vê đây) and for the 
next twenty years would use Súng’s body to cure those who were sick. 
Súng’s husband believed that those who were possessed by a ghost 
(tà nhâp vào) or a divine spirit (thân nhâp vào) could not escape their 
fate. Being caught by the ghost or spirit, one had to serve (bất phai làm) 
or he or she would become mad. On the other hand, from the moment 
the person was appropriated by a spirit and became its servant, he or 
she usually experienced a substantial upturn in business. After the Lunar 
New Year’s incident, Súng’s restaurant was inundated for several days 
with customers who spent enough money to pay for the daughter’s se-
mester. On the eighth day of the first lunar month, the girl left Sa Huỳnh 
to continue her studies in Ho Chi Minh City. Since the appearance of 
the Buddha Mother on the eve of the Lunar New Year, Súng’s business 
has improved significantly. Travellers stopped and ordered meals at 
Súng’s restaurant almost every day. Súng began to pay off her debts in 
instalments of 50,000 VND (€1.70), and a small sum of money was 
still left for day-to-day expenses. She was also able to regularly send her 
daughter 1.2 million VND (€40) to cover her expenses. Some villagers 
in Sa Huỳnh took the improvement in Súng’s material situation as proof 
that she really was possessed. 
Súng said that the Buddha Mother did not let her charge people for
her services. However, she was allowed to accept whatever money the 
people offered. On one day, when I was waiting with other women for
the appearance of the Buddha Mother, one of them asked me how much
she should pay to Súng. The people did not expect the spiritual consul-
tation to be free; for them, it was completely natural that they should 
give at least small change to Súng. As in a typical transaction when 
two sides exchange items of certain value, Súng’s service was rewarded 








Women and New Gendered Ritual Divisions 
gratitude and always claimed that the money they earned was spent on 
buying ingredients and preparing medicaments. 
Súng’s clientele was predominantly made up of people from a 
neighbouring commune and Bình Định Province rather than her own
co-villagers, who were not sure how to react to her new role. As in Gia’s
case, fishermen asked for amulets to protect them when fishing; house-
wives enquired about the fate of their children, health, and prospects 
of earning money; traders looked for guarantees and luck in business; 
and sick persons asked for medicine. However, as Súng stated, her most
important task was healing. She stopped eating meat and devoted her-
self to Cao Đài and Buddhist studies. In the evenings she read books, 
made notes, and practised ‘spiritual writing’. The Buddha Mother taught 
Súng to write signs that originated in the ‘other world’. Súng scrawled 
them with red felt-tip pens on a white sheet of paper and then laid a 
twisted string of different coloured threads symbolizing the consecutive 
levels of heaven on the paper and folded it up. Such charms were always
prepared individually for each person. Súng’s husband became her assis-
tant during the possessions. If someone could not understand Súng, he 
interpreted her words. Over time Súng trained herself in the preparation 
of medicaments, her amulets and charms became more colourful, and 
her handwriting became more professional. The surface of the table she 
used for preparing amulets gradually grew to be covered with new felt-
tip pens and threads in all sorts of colours. Her husband prepared them 
for every séance, cut paper into pieces for making charms and amulets, 
gave blessed water to patients and produced medicaments. All charms 
and amulets had their own expiry date (hêt lộc, hêt hàng sử dung), and 
patients who wanted to extend the validity of their powers were advised 
by Súng and her husband to return for new ones. 
In the case of Thailand, Walter (1984) argues that ‘modern’ spirits 
are inclined to emphasize that they are not only possessed by Buddhas
or bodhisattvas, but that they also help decrease people’s sufferings, 
improve their karma, and help them accumulate merit that would allow 
them to enter Buddha’s heaven after death. The possessed persons might 
even change their diet and become vegetarian. Some spirit mediums 
even go so far as to claim that they have stopped menstruating and are 
incapable of having sexual relations with men. When such abstention 
happens, the marital roles are reversed and the male becomes the sub-
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ordinate ritual officiant and servant to the spirit of his wife (1984: 320). 
Soon after the spirit medium resolves the original problem affecting her 
mental condition, she might become ‘an avenue for competition and 
possible material success as part of the process’ (ibid: 322). The spirit 
medium becomes skilled in using ideology convincingly and establishes 
herself as a respected authority who might even attract powerful and 
wealthy clients (ibid: 316). 
Salemink (2008b) observes that during spirit possession ritual in
Vietnam, gender and sexual boundaries are constructed and transgressed.
Women might adopt behaviour that is normally associated with and re-
served for men. I am not sure whether Súng really identified with mascu-
line roles, but she certainly could not be possessed as a ‘real woman’ – the
Buddha Mother ceased to possess her when she was menstruating. Thus,
Súng had to work out her own strategy to validate her person as, above
all, a ‘real’ spirit medium. Similar to what Walter described for Thailand,
during Súng’s spirit séances, the roles of husband and wife were reversed
and Súng adopted the authoritative role of ‘master’, while her husband
was her ritual officiant and servant. Súng considered herself an adept
of Buddhist divinity; this role required her to transform her body into a
pure vessel (xác) that could be ‘ridden’ by the Buddhist deity, so she also
tried to conform to Buddhist prescriptions by becoming vegetarian.
In describing Súng’s possession I have sought to demonstrate how, 
through the everyday encounter with a deity in the privacy of her home, 
Súng not only solved her own economic problems, but also provided an 
explanation for the prior failure of her business, which was caused by 
her heavy spiritual fate. On the verge of a breakdown, she found enough 
strength and creativity to establish herself not so much as a successful 
owner of a restaurant, but rather as a respected and knowledgeable spirit 
medium. In this context, I argue that authentication of ritual identity 
is a gendered process. Súng’s quest for authenticity and authority and 
her ultimate success became possible by constructing and transgressing 
symbolic boundaries and incorporating such practices as preparing 
medicines, perfecting her ‘spiritual writing’, and devising a convincing 
ideology of her spirit possession – means previously reserved exclu-
sively for men in Sa Huỳnh. Moving beyond ordinary limitations, Súng 
employed powerful means to transcend her gender role and sexuality 
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might even challenge men’s control of ‘sacred’ values, power, authority, 
and authenticity in the village. 
Conclusion 
Let me conclude by proposing another way to interpret the vignette at 
the beginning of this chapter. As I illustrated, the goddess Thiên Y A Na 
in Sa Huỳnh was a deity of the past, associated with men’s religiosity; 
she had ceased to represent any threat to the local community, especially 
to women. Thus, the spoiled chicken might be seen as reflecting the 
dramatic change in the local cosmology: the goddess’s decline and her 
powerless status caused by her travel to the Buddhist heaven. In this 
sense, the chicken sacrifice becomes the symbolic representation of 
changes in the power relations between men and women, in which men 
were losing not only the protection and interest of the goddess, but also 
their religious dominance. 
Women’s narratives of Thiên Y A Na’s transformation from a fierce 
spirit to a benevolent one and their notions that the goddess served indi-
vidual rather than communal needs opened up a new space for an alter-
native interpretation. Thus, I read the paradoxes and contestations that 
exist in the ritual domain by looking at women who – located outside
of male authority – demonstrated their agency by challenging prevail-
ing ideas and inserting their own interpretations into the framework of 
dominant local discourses. Relegated to the domestic domain, women 
turned their zone of ritual exclusion and marginality into a space of 
creativity and agency. In this space, they sought alternative meanings for 
themselves other than the domesticity prescribed by the neo-Confucian 
tradition. Instead of openly resisting men’s dominance, they stretched, 
through various kinds of performance, the boundaries of dominant 
ideas about what constitutes religious authenticity and authority and 
created a religious context that involved them as women. In this light, 
the religious practices appear to be constructed, shaped, and reshaped 
not only at the intersection of state and village, but also of gendered 
interpretations and performances. In a nutshell, the ‘authentication’ of 
their ritual identity is a gendered practice involving power relations as 
women construct and validate their new ritual identity and transcend 
the boundaries of the spirit world and their own gender. 
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There is a voluminous literature on religion in Vietnam in which religion is pitched against the state or, alternatively, the state is pitched against society. This book deals with this complex, 
triadic relationship, not by debunking the binary relations that make it
up, but by exploring how various protagonists in this book – state of-
ficials, religious figures, fishermen, and women – enact, debunk, and 
re-enact these relations in shifting alliances and changing contexts. In 
small coastal villages in central Vietnam it is precisely the model of these 
triadic relations – state–religion–village – that I have sought to capture 
in terms of hierarchical opposites and self-contradictory dynamics 
at the intersection of religious and secular frames. I have shown that 
these binaries are unstable and shifting, but can still be harnessed and 
manoeuvred by skilled actors in their practical negotiation of power. 
Based on fine-grained ethnography, this model has allowed me to theo-
rize shifting binaries in ways that go beyond the usual debates over the 
state–society or state–religion oppositions. In Vietnam, embodied and 
enacted religious experience seldom leaves the state out, as the state of-
fers the dominant semiotic ideology (see Keane 2007) in which discus-
sions and negotiations are framed – not necessarily a secular frame, but 
an ‘immanent frame’ (Taylor 2007) that politicizes religious practices 
and turns politics into a religious exercise.1 
1. Charles Taylor (2007) uses the term ‘immanent frame’ to refer to a way of thinking 
about the material word without any reference to transcendent power. 
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The centrality of the maritime periphery 
The ethnographic material for this book comes from a region in central
Vietnam that remains little studied, especially in comparison to the north-
ern Red River Delta or the Mekong Delta in the south, which have been
the focus of the vast majority of foreign and Vietnamese scholars. I have
challenged that preference and shown that the maritime periphery of the
South China Sea is central for anthropological analyses of the relationship
between state, religion, and society in Vietnam. What Erik Harms (2011b:
4) calls ‘peripheral vision as one moment in a mobile field of vision’ and
Salemink (2018a: 1) terms ‘an alternative historical periodization’ with
reference to the regional centrality of Vietnam’s Central Highlands might
turn out to be a useful optic through which to reconfigure the binary
categories of land and sea. By taking the strategic centrality of the South
China Sea in central Vietnam seriously (see Salemink 2018a) and by
taking fishing populations and their relations with the surrounding sea
and land environments as point of departure, I have demonstrated that
Vietnamese society is not exclusively rooted in bounded agrarian village
communities (cf. Scott 1976; Popkin 1979) nor predominantly oriented
towards the sea. This observation goes to the heart of Keith Taylor’s (1998:
951) argument that different modes of being and ‘acting Vietnamese’
exist through times and terrains. Instead of looking at fishers exclusively
through the homogenizing lens of national or regional histories, it is worth
remembering that places – regardless of scale – constitute not monolithic
but rather heterogeneous entities entangled in complex relations through
which they are constructed within and across international, national, and
local encounters (Appadurai 1996). A maritime peripheral optic reveals
that the understudied fringe of the South China Sea in central Vietnam
is important because it is pertinent to understanding the performance of
national sovereignty as it is played out through the triangulate relationships
that exist among state, religion, and society. 
Throughout the book I argue that in the performance of and for 
the nation, the international disputes over the South China Sea have, 
paradoxically, drawn peripheral places such as Lý Sơn Island into the 
centre, turning the old hierarchy between the land and the sea on its 
head. In this changing aesthetics of the nation, the continental landmass 
becomes ex-centric and the margins become centred, culminating in the 
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Viêt Nam)2 and thus shifting the balance of power in the seemingly im-
mutable binary relationship between mainland and island and between 
the agrarian and maritime worlds. Following the new patriotic slogan 
‘The entire Vietnamese nation turns to the sea’ (ca Viêt Nam hương vê 
biên), many Vietnamese citizens now identify with the island and its ter-
ritorial vulnerability – alone out there in the middle of the sea, between 
Vietnam’s land mass and the disputed Paracel and Spratly archipelagos 
– in the belief that fishers are those who bear the brunt of the defence of 
the nation’s sovereignty. 
Taking into account Central Vietnam’s specific regional histories, its 
slower rate of socio-economic transformation compared to that of the 
North and the South, and the geopolitics that plays an increasing role in
the region, fishing communities in central Vietnam do not represent an
‘exemplary’ situation, but rather a peripheral and unsettled one charac-
terized by relations with the state that are not only significantly different 
from those of other parts of Vietnam, but also vary from place to place 
within Central Vietnam. The peripheral status of central Vietnam and, 
thus, of the two fieldsites – Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn – refers not just to 
geographical scale, but to their different levels of (dis)connectedness to 
state power. When I returned to Sa Huỳnh seven years after my doctoral 
fieldwork, the Forbidden Hill – access to which had been relatively free
since the 1990s – had once again been turned into a military observa-
tion post and, therefore, a restricted zone, due to its border status and 
strategic position. In that sense, Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn display the 
historical, social, and political unevenness of both the region and the 
place. Each setting stands out in its own right as a ‘centrality’ marked 
by the distinctive and unique character of the interactions between 
state, religion, and society. As my ethnography shows, it is ultimately 
Lý Sơn Island that, more than mainland Sa Huỳnh, has successfully 
capitalized on its geographical and historical connection to the South 
China Sea, taking advantage of the politically imbued image of what it 
means to be a ‘maritime nation’ at a time when the sea has become a 
2. By the time of my fieldwork from May to August 2014, Lý Sơn had become a 
destination for a new style of patriotic tourism in coastal areas that is increasingly 
popular among urban Vietnamese, mostly from Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. I 
frequently heard the phrase ‘navel of the nation’ used in reference to Lý Sơn during 
my conversations with tourists, including retired high-profile cadres who came 
expressly to demonstrate their solidarity with fishing communities. 
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global geopolitical flashpoint regarding disputed sovereignty over the 
Paracels and Spratlys. Yet this regained centrality of Lý Sơn has become 
a double-edged sword, simultaneously connecting islanders with the 
mainland and sidelining and even marginalizing them through the 
capital investments that flow in and out of the island. The politically and 
economically harnessed remoteness of the island does not necessarily 
decrease with connectivity; rather, it takes centre stage as various social 
actors, including provincial and local officials, ‘hold a stake’ in particular 
visions of development (Saxer and Andersson 2019: 145). In this book 
I have shown how provincial authorities turn Lý Sơn’s religious festivals 
and spaces of worship into axes of cultural-cum-economic capital in the 
newly emerging patriotic tourism industry on the island. This, however, 
is a topic that deserves a separate study. 
The findings presented in this book show that the continuing em-
bodied and enacted tensions between villagers, state representatives, 
and religious authorities are experienced as real binary relations – Việt 
versus Cham, mainland versus island, fishers versus farmers, male versus 
female, and ancestor versus ghost – that proliferate, shift, and blur over
time. But it would be an oversimplification to try to understand fish-
ing communities’ entanglement with these different binary relations 
through the lens of the commonly invoked religious–secular dichotomy. 
If anything, my ethnography indicates the inadequacy of homogeneous 
notions of the religious versus the secular, as well as of state versus soci-
ety and mainland versus island at the local, national, and global scales. 
These are not universal categories, but rather binary relations with spec-
ific histories and genealogies that are constantly enacted, debunked, 
and re-enacted in the present and in the specific geographies that add 
their own weight to these processes. At times, these binaries assume 
sharper contours and become more visible; at other times the opposing 
elements collapse into one another and disappear – it all depends on the 
particular histories, genealogies, and geographies in which the binary 
relations play out. In this book I have sought to capture these relations, 
both in their powerful momentum and at their weakest points. 
Beyond the religious–secular binary 
Much recent scholarship on religion in Asia and the West is framed in 
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religion in Europe has emphasized its gradual marginalization within
an emergent public space that has increasingly been defined as secular
since the Protestant Reformation (Asad 1993, 2003), in Asia, it was pre-
sumed that, until relatively recently, religion shaped entire civilizations, 
moral codes, and social structures, extending into the political sphere 
of ruling dynasties and competing kingdoms. Existing as overlapping 
vernacular traditions or in orthodox, scriptural forms that were often 
non-deistic, religion in non-Islamic Southeast Asia was neither based on 
a shared belief in a unified doctrine nor on the monotheistic notion of 
a ‘jealous God’ demanding exclusive devotion (Salemink 2009a, 2009b; 
DuBois 2011). In contrast to post-Reformation Christian Europe, reli-
gion in imperial-era East Asia – including China and Vietnam – was not 
controlled by religious authorities that were organized independently 
of ‘secular’ authorities. Religion was ‘diffused’ throughout the different 
segments of society and controlled by a political leadership that simulta-
neously represented a cosmic order and acted as mediator between ‘this’ 
and the ‘other’ worlds (Duara 1988: 156). 
In that sense, there was not a religious sphere that was clearly dis-
tinguishable from a secular sphere. The modern understanding of reli-
gion based on ‘conceptual dichotomies between the religious domain 
and this-worldly, secular domains of political and economic practice’ 
(Salemink 2018b: 124; see also DuBois 2009; van der Veer 2013) 
emerged in Asia only through European imperialism and the formation 
of nation-states as the main political entities. As Asian colonies morphed 
into independent nations, vernacular religions became politicized, mod-
ernized, and separated from the ‘secular’ state, which sought to bring 
them in line with new state orthodoxies. In this period of secularization, 
the communist-led countries of China, Vietnam, and Laos were more 
motivated than non-communist ones to reduce and control religions – a 
point to which I will return later. 
The institutional organization of religion and politics in modern 
nation-states in Asia was not limited to vernacular religious practices, 
but also included world religions – Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, 
and Islam – which have been fundamental to the development of na-
tional citizenship and national identity the world over (Turner 2006). 
While the separation of religion from the secular relegated religion to 
the private realm of individual beliefs (Casanova 1994; Asad 2003), 
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the same process also paradoxically allowed religious practices to enter 
the public space under the guise of national identity, thereby ritually 
shoring up political power and instrumentalizing religion. In his book 
Formations of the Secular, the anthropologist Talal Asad advanced the 
following idea about the interdependence of religion and the secular: 
[A]lthough religion is regarded as alien to the secular, the latter is also 
seen to have generated religion. Historians of progress relate that in the 
premodern past secular life created superstitious and oppressive reli-
gion, and in the modern present secularism has produced enlightened 
and tolerant religion. Thus the insistence on a sharp separation between 
the religious and the secular goes with the paradoxical claim that the 
latter continually produces the former. (2003: 193) 
In contrast to the Weberian model according to which religion and poli-
tics became institutionally separated, Asad (2003) argues that neither 
religion nor the secular are historically stable entities, but are, in a dia-
lectical sense, genealogically and historically fluid and co-constitutive. 
In their edited volume Varieties of Secularism in Asia, Niels Bubandt 
and Martijn van Beek (2012: 13) aptly noted that, depending on the 
‘demographic, religious and cultural make-up’ of the nation-state in 
question, the relationship between ‘religions’ and the state is not stable; 
rather, it is constantly redefined and shaped within a given doctrine 
of secularism. Secularism is essential to defining social and political 
forms of the ‘nation’ and to defining citizenship and religious minori-
ties vis-à-vis the imagined ‘nation’ (Bubandt and van Beek 2012). Such 
essentialization and reification of national self-representation is often 
achieved by appropriating the tropes and imaginary of dominant creeds 
such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam, thereby creating 
new orthodoxies and orthopraxies linked to the nation. 
In Vietnam, however, there is no ‘dominant religion’, even though most
of the religious traditions are tied in some way to one or another of the
institutionalized religions. As I have suggested, not all of them formulate
and impose standardized religious knowledge and practice in the sense
of the ‘unified authority’ that exists in scriptural monotheistic traditions
or in the form of an ethno-nationalist ideology. In contrast to notorious
cases of ethno-religious purification in, for example, India and Myanmar,
it could be argued that Vietnam is a relatively peaceful ‘religioscape’, to use
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This book highlights the binary oppositions in the religious–secular rela-
tions in Vietnam that give rise to various shifting pragmatic positions that
cannot be reduced to a single trajectory of authority, power, or resistance
in debates about what counts as authentic religion and national culture,
and what counts as threats to them. What we are dealing with here is,
rather, a transformative aspect within religious–secular binary relations
that is not simply assimilative or adaptive. These relations draw on
‘concealed’ opportunities, political assemblages, cultural repertoires, and
a modern discourse of the nation that asserts people’s right to religious
practices while confirming the legitimacy of the state’s semiotic ideology. 
Blurring the boundaries between religion and politics 
Throughout this book I have shown that in Vietnam the secularizing 
trend took a new course during the most active years of the Đổi Mới 
period of economic reform (1986–mid-1990s), when the state relaxed 
its antisuperstition campaigns and gradually withdrew from a secu-
lar–rationalist interpretation of religion as ‘unscientific’ and ‘irrational’. 
This new course focused on the attempt to transform certain religious 
forms into the more secular concepts of ‘cultural’ and ‘national heritage’, 
thereby politicizing religious practices. The ‘political’ within this frame 
was not necessarily secular, as is clear from numerous rituals adopted by 
the state in Vietnam – during both the High Socialist and reform eras. 
The Vietnamese state’s commemorative initiative to glorify the historic 
Paracel and Spratly navy and to preserve all temples and records related
to its activities on Lý Sơn Island is a case in point (Chapter 5). Thus, I
have shown that the Vietnamese state spared no efforts to connect reli-
gion with nationalism when ‘foreign’ culture became a perceived threat 
during Vietnam’s global integration. Such attempts to validate those 
religious practices that are in line with state objectives and to condemn 
those which bear a ‘superstitious and heterodox’ character could be seen 
as a continuation of the practices of the precolonial monarchy. Among 
these legacies – dating back to imperial times – is the modern practice 
of communist-led Vietnam to grant certificates to heroes, divinities, and 
temples that bear the hallmark of historical and national importance. In
neo-Confucian states such as China and Vietnam, the imperial-era gov-
ernance of and administrative control over religion shielded the interests 
of the ruling elite, including the emperor, by preventing ‘heterodoxy’ 
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– religious beliefs and practices not congruent with the state-approved 
orthodox version of neo-Confucianism (Do 2003; Taylor 2007: 31–32; 
Pham Quynh Phuong 2009; DuBois 2009; Brook 2009). These states 
suppressed and persecuted people who worshipped gods and spirits 
that were not part of the official registry (Yang 1967). Like the imperial 
court, today the current communist state of Vietnam seeks to increase 
its legitimacy through the careful selection and canonization of those 
historic figures who epitomize moral and patriotic values and fit into the 
nation-state semiotic ideology. 
As I tackled the ways in which state and non-state actors sought to 
navigate the state and religious semiotic ideologies by continuously 
making, unmaking, and remaking secular and religious binaries, one 
of the main questions that drove my research referred precisely to 
the regulatory character of the state regarding religious practices. In 
Vietnam, the universal category of religion – tôn giáo – only emerged 
through modern state formation that reconfigured the understanding of 
vernacular religious practices – now also referred to in terms of modern, 
Sino-Vietnamese categories such as tín ngương (religious beliefs) and mê
tín dị đoan (heterodox superstition) – and set them up in opposition 
to science. At the same time, many political categories can trace their 
pedigrees back to religion. One example is the Buddhist term giác ngộ
(enlightenment), which was adopted in Vietnamese Marxist discourse 
as (class/political) consciousness (see Salemink 2018b). Throughout 
the book I have shown that religious practices are permitted precisely at 
the intersection of the modern state’s definition of religion (tôn giáo) and 
the seemingly more individual notion of belief (tín ngương), and allowed 
to enter the secular public sphere only under the banner of ‘culture’ or 
‘national heritage’ (Chapter 2). As in other parts of Asia, in Vietnam the 
communist-led state constructs and controls the space of secularity in 
such a way that religious discourses and practices cannot challenge the 
state’s legitimacy or moral authority (Salemink 2015). 
The politicized and institutionalized religious field in Vietnam 
cannot be fully understood without recognition of the distinctive 
polytheistic character of religious practices that often lack the type of 
orthodoxy and orthopraxy prescribed by scriptural religions in Europe. 
In contrast to Abrahamic traditions, the cosmologies I encountered in 
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traditions, nor do they embody absolute norms and moral imperatives. 
While Confucianism and Buddhism are considered two semiotic reli-
gious ideologies in Vietnam, any discussion of moral conduct – as in the
case of Lady Roi or Gia – involves reference to political rather than reli-
gious norms. For most of the people introduced throughout this book,
Confucianism operates as a ritualized-but-secular form of social control,
as Confucian ethics determine how a person should properly act within
a kin group, within a community, and within society at large, without 
much explicit reference to gods and deities. Hồ Chí Minh recast the
meaning of Confucian virtue by introducing new values into his ‘revo-
lutionary ethics’ (đao đưc cách mang), such as ‘benevolence’, ‘righteous-
ness’, ‘knowledge’, ‘courage’, and ‘incorruptibility’ (Giebel 2004: 182). 
In addition to traditional morality, which extols virginity and honour, 
this ‘new morality’ ideology – which promoted the collective values of 
patriotism and solidarity against individuality – was tactically mobilized 
by Anh, the representative of the Ph m Lineage Association, in his at-
tempt to obtain state recognition for his female ancestor and to have her 
included in the pantheon of Paracel–Spratly heroes. By composing her 
lý lịch (political biography) in a way that emphasized her contribution 
to national history while backgrounding other aspects that were not 
congruent with the desired political image, Anh elegantly manipulated 
religious and political categories. 
From the state’s perspective, the spirits enshrined in temples have 
nothing to do with religion, but rather with the question of what should 
or should not be considered ‘national tradition’. Let me return for a mo-
ment to the book’s opening vignette describing Sa Huỳnh fishers’ desire
to institutionalize their worship of the wooden statue recovered from 
the South China Sea as ‘historical and cultural heritage’ and their ulti-
mate failure to convince the state authorities of the non-superstitious 
character of their religious practice. This vignette further demonstrates 
that when such vernacular religious practices transgress the boundaries 
between public and private, they can appear as matter out of ‘proper’ 
secular or religious place, as defined within a particular national context. 
However, in this book I have tried to transcend the division between 
religion and the secular by demonstrating that encounters between state 
and non-state actors are grounded in social life and specific historical 
and political contexts across global, national, and local scales. An ethno-
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graphic approach that connects discrete events, practices, and places has
allowed me to demonstrate the continuous proliferation of binary oppo-
sitions within the frame of the state–religion–village triadic relationship, 
as well as how this process varies regionally and locally. It is my hope that 
the reader has been able to see the proposed model of triadic relations 
not as static and fixed, but as a changing and changeable construct. In that 
sense, the success of the residents of Lý Sơn to enter the public space 
and secure a ‘proper’ place for their religious practices on the national 
level captures the mutability of tactical positions through which vari-
ous subjectivities are evoked and performed. In turning all temples and 
records related to the activities of ancestors who were part of historic 
Paracel–Spratly flotilla into artefacts proving Vietnam’s ‘cultural’ and 
‘national heritage’ in the South China Sea, Lý Sơn fishers redefined their 
position within binaries of religion and politics, state and society, and 
mainland and island. 
The experience of fishers in Sa Huỳnh also highlights the contingency
and unpredictability of the institutionalization of religion and the state’s
attempt to draw a clear line between acceptable vernacular religious
practices and those considered superstitious. If in Lý Sơn the shift in
geopolitical imaginaries turned all temples related to the Paracel–Spratly
flotilla into ‘national heritage’, in Sa Huỳnh the actual shift of the location
of the Quan Âm statue made the Forbidden Hill a hybrid space of ‘folk’
beliefs and Buddhism that was re-interpreted by local cadres in terms of
traditional ‘culture’ and by the Buddhist monk in terms of ‘superstition’.
While fishers did not identify fully with either of these extreme visions,
they were careful in their practices not to upset either side. The symbolic
potency of the Forbidden Hill was, therefore, produced not only by cir-
culating statues, temples, and ritual practices, but also by the competing
power and visions of fishers, state officials, and Buddhist modernizers. It
is precisely a changing and changeable binary opposition within this triad
that created the ambivalent position of the Forbidden Hill – the hybrid
that is neither the exclusive monopoly of the state nor of the people, but
rather a matter of shifts in dominant semiotic ideologies. 
Navigating authoritative state and religious semiotic ideologies 
Before Nha successfully guided his fellows to the Paracels in 1982 (see 
Chapter 1), he first made a secret pilot trip on his own. Showing me 
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his logbook, Nha pointed out the list of names he gave to all impor-
tant landmarks and features he encountered on this virgin trip to the 
Paracels. He did not have a nautical map and the administrative map 
stolen from the local People’s Committee Office gave him only a rough 
idea of the geography. Making entries in his logbook and putting marks 
on the administrative map, Nha recorded a changing seascape: the rocks 
that emerged during ebbs and flows, a coconut tree growing on a small 
islet, currents, and passing birds – anything that would allow him to 
determine his position and distance from Lý Sơn. In those days, Nha’s 
boat did not have a navigation system; he was not able to specify latitude 
or longitude, nor did he know the speed of his boat. But he had two 
valuable pieces of information, namely that the distance from Lý Sơn 
to a certain point in the Paracels was 147 nautical miles (ca. 272 km) 
and that the length of his boat was 20 metres. He knew that piloting and 
manoeuvring involves information about three factors that are essential 
for navigation: time, speed, and distance. Standing on the bow of the 
boat he counted down seconds to estimate how many nautical miles his 
boat was covering in one hour. Once he estimated how many miles his 
vessel travelled in 60 minutes, he was able to determine the speed of his 
boat and the distance from Lý Sơn to any point in the sea. 
Navigating to the Paracels required Nha to steer his boat carefully 
on a zigzag course to avoid submerged rocks. Throughout the book, I 
have used ‘social navigation’ (Vigh 2010) as a metaphor to illustrate how 
people change their position vis-à-vis the triadic relationship between 
state, religion, and society. Like Nha, who took a ‘zigzag course’ to avoid 
hidden rocks, people carefully navigate their ways through the opposing 
religion‒state or state‒society poles to reach a desired destination. The 
temporary binaries that emerge can be imagined as analogous to the 
mythical Greek monsters Scylla and Charybdis, lying in wait on either 
side of the narrow waters and threatening the navigators, who in turn
act this way or that, depending on their position within the sea ‘terrain’. 
Like these mythical monsters-cum-landmarks in the seascape, the semi-
otic ideologies of state and religious authorities are important and even 
necessary reference points for people; however, if ignored or overlooked 
on the map of everyday politics, they can pose insurmountable hazards 
to the navigator. In that sense ‘social navigation’ is not limited to chronic 
crises created by war, structural poverty, or endemic violence and crime, 
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as Henrik Vigh (2008, 2012) theorizes, but can equally be deployed in
situations where order exists alongside the unpredictability and muta-
bility created by authoritative semiotic ideologies. 
There is also the question of politics. It is important to recognize 
that the art of navigating different binary oppositions requires of ac-
tors the ability to give a political dimension to everyday practice while 
seizing the ‘opportunity’ (Certeau 1984). For that reason, the binaries 
are not just mutually interdependent, but also temporally variable, as 
they materialize and dissolve at various points in time among different 
groups of actors. This is quite different from Harms’s (2011a) argument 
about the persistence of ideal binary categories in Vietnamese society, 
despite people’s everyday experiences that contradict the existence of 
such clear-cut spatial and class-inflicted oppositions in real life. Harms 
shows that people hold onto highly reductionist concepts such as ‘urban’ 
versus ‘rural’ and ‘inside’ versus ‘outside’ because these categories allow 
them to understand the world and to organize their relations within 
society. However, my ethnography points in a rather different direction, 
namely that those binaries are never politically neutral, as fishers use 
them to make claims not just on the state but also on religious authori-
ties and on the hierarchical agrarian society. The poles of these binaries 
are not fixed per se; in practice, fishers construe, construct, enact, and 
deconstruct these oppositions in multiple ways and with different 
effects. The various binaries – spatial, political, social – emerge at the 
same time but with momentary, precarious, and shifting alliances and 
coalitions between different actors. 
In that sense, my argument is closer to Michael Herzfeld’s (2016)
study of residents of Bangkok’s old quarter, who navigate between seem-
ingly self-contradictory positions of authoritarianism and egalitarianism 
in negotiations with authorities over the fate of their neighbourhood.
The ability to adapt authoritative semiotic ideologies in their own inter-
ests is particularly important in the case of marginalized fishing commu-
nities that for centuries were stateless, constituting a subordinate social 
category within the settled hierarchical agrarian society of Vietnam
(see Subramanian 2009). Exhibiting pragmatic choices and allegiances 
within the state–religion–village triadic relation, fishers are not easily 
captured by the simplified state–society or state–religion dyad, as they 
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of inland and coast that kept them outside of the làng system for so long. 
What characterizes fishers is their use of words, signs, and symbols per-
taining to both the state and religious semiotic ideologies. This allows 
them not only to play powerful state and religious modernizers against 
one another, but also to navigate the dominant agrarian Vietnamese so-
ciety to which they have only very recently been admitted as an integral 
part of ‘authentic Vietnamese culture’. 
The cases of Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn do not just display different 
dynamics regarding their relation with the state; they also point out 
nuances regarding the position of such subaltern groups as fishers. 
The state-initiated process of restructuring the religious domain and 
abolishing the hierarchical system of the communal house – formerly 
the religious and political centre of the village – led to the enhancement 
of the social position of fishers vis-à-vis farmers in both places. In the 
context of economic liberalization and due to increasing demands for 
marine products in domestic and international markets, the fishers are 
getting richer and starting to play a more important role in the village 
through ritual investment in agriculture-oriented temples. However, the 
fishers of Lý Sơn, and not those of Sa Huỳnh, have been able to enhance 
their position not only economically, but also as political actors in the 
context of the geopolitical tensions between Vietnam and China. In the 
end, it is the islanders’ fishing operations at sea and their bravery that are 
mediatized on a national and global stage and celebrated by mainland 
tourists. 
The ethnographic examples in these chapters illustrate that, in their
desire to enact their local worship and rituals, fishers willingly engage
with the sophisticated forms of state and religious discipline. Whereas
fishers cannot escape or act as autonomous actors outside the triadic
relationship with state and religious authorities, I have shown that they
often employ tactical improvisations drawing on selected political and
religious repertoires when encountering and countering forms of state
and religious discipline. Rather than openly resisting these disciplinary
regimes, they resort to what Achille Mbembe (1992) called ‘indiscipline’,
a practice of inverting, subverting, and ridiculing official disciplinary
forms while seemingly going along with them. Without using the term
‘indiscipline’, Michel de Certeau (1984: xv) made an important point
about it, namely, that these improvised tactics are ‘multiform and frag-
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mentary, relative to situations and details, insinuated into and concealed
within devices whose mode of usage they constitute, and thus lacking
their own ideologies and institutions’, but still conform to certain rules
and logics.
This observation leads me to Kathrine Bowie’s (2017) historical 
and ethnographic study on the politics of humour and its role in Thai 
peasants’ popular re-enactments of the classic Buddhist text Vessantara 
Jataka. Bowie shows quite persuasively that social actors in feudal 
Thailand sometimes intentionally interjected humour into religious 
performances to criticize the existing political hierarchy of royalty 
and monastic orders, and yet at the same time to conceal the critique. 
Bowie’s (2017: 206) argument about humour as ‘a weapon of the weak’ 
and Certeau’s point about the ability of the ‘weak’ to manipulate events 
in order to turn them into ‘opportunities’ are both brought out clearly 
in my ethnography, which shows that both state and non-state actors 
within local communities frame religion in terms of ‘culture’ and, above 
all, ‘national heritage’, thereby ‘nationalizing’ and ‘politicizing’ religion. 
This mesh of different disciplining strategies and improvised tactics of 
indiscipline allows fishers, state officials, and religious modernizers to 
extract specific cultural practices from a rich repertoire of religious and 
state semiotic ideologies that give legitimacy to the state’s project and 
simultaneously to the fishers’ preferred forms of religious life. 
A closer look at fishers’ religious expressions reveals that religious and 
state semiotic ideologies are used not just to legitimize their vernacular 
religions, but also tacitly to displace the power of the agrarian society, 
male hierarchy, state officials, and religious modernizers. Like fishers, 
women constituted a subaltern group that suffered from discrimination 
in the village religious space but also took advantage of the state’s cultural
policies, though with varying results in Lý Sơn and Sa Huỳnh. In both 
places, female villagers do not openly resist men’s dominance in the reli-
gious landscape of central Vietnam’s coastal society but, through various 
kinds of transgressive performances, create a context that involves them 
as women. However, in contrast to Lý Sơn, where men continued to 
define communal house orthodoxy and women were still perceived in 
terms of the ‘uncleanliness’ associated with menstruation and female 
sexuality, women in Sa Huỳnh were able to break the no-female taboo 
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seizing the ‘opportunity’ of male notions of the spiritual impotence of 
the goddess, Sa Huỳnh women successfully asserted their own religious 
vision of the Forbidden Hill. Thus, I have argued that the authentication 
of women’s religious identity – located outside of male authority – is a 
power-laden gendered practice, as women construct and validate their 
new ritual identity and symbolically cross the boundaries between ‘this 
world’ and the world of imaginative communion with gods and spirits 
from their own gender position. 
Another ethnographic example – that of Gia, a recognized healer in
Sa Huỳnh – indicates how indiscipline brings a kind of rationalism that
allows seemingly opposing sides to enter into a form of silent collabora-
tion. There were actual confrontations, but also short-lived pragmatic 
alliances and manipulations of semiotic ideologies that allowed the 
cadres and religious figures to achieve their contradictory goals within 
the same ideological frame. Defending a Buddhist statue against the 
police, Gia blurred the distinction between the religious and political 
realms – and hence between the opposing poles of a secular–religious 
binary – in such a way that his actions would not be seen by authorities 
as superstitious. By insisting that the statue of the Buddhist bodhisattva 
Quan Âm was worth saving not for its religious potential as an object of 
worship, but rather for its aesthetic qualities and potential to beautify the
landscape, and for that reason rightfully belonged in a secular space, Gia 
insinuated himself into the logic of the more ‘powerful’ state authorities. 
In other words, by articulating his religious desire within the dominant 
semiotic ideology of the state, Gia managed to subvert the latter in an 
act of indiscipline. A different ethnographic example is afforded by the 
Buddhist monk who, promoting a modern vision of religion cleansed of 
non-Buddhist elements and propagating ascetic forms of self-cultivation, 
refused to accept the local folk practices as part of his religious duty of 
ritual care. He sought a radical break from local religious traditions by 
resorting to the pre-Đổi Mới rhetoric that equated ‘superstition’ with 
the ‘peasant class’. The monk’s attitude reflects the dichotomy between 
Buddhist orthodoxy and the fishers’ presumably heterodox and hetero-
practic (from an orthodox point of view) beliefs and practices. It also 
points to a wider issue of competing forms of morality within religious 
and state semiotic ideologies. 

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I have focused on the art of navigating the state and religious authorities 
by fishers in the South China Sea periphery. By attending to the 
complexity of the ethnography, I offer a form of ethnographic theorizing 
that foregrounds fishers in a triangular relationship with figures of state 
and religious authority. These figures sometimes engage in conflicts and
sometimes align with each other, depending on the context and on how
individual actors articulate different aspects of religious and state semi-
otic ideologies and enact indiscipline. In Religion in Contemporary China: 
Revitalization and Innovation, Adam Chau (2011: 8) characterizes the 
relationship between the Chinese Party-state and religion as a ‘politics 
of articulation’ in which a ‘diverse array of religious ideas and activities 
… articulate smoothly with the main body politic of the nation-state’. 
Chau invokes the image of a centipede to depict the nation-state, with its 
body representing the central state apparatus and its legs signifying the 
many diverse actors and their often contradictory visions and desires:
 As long as the centipede is moving forward, it probably doesn’t care if 
a few of its legs have minds of their own or are pretending to be moving 
in synchronicity with the other legs but are in fact moving sideways or 
even backward. (Chau 2011: 8) 
This is a powerful metaphor, but it still presents the state as a mono-
lithic body even as it synchronizes a multitude of visions. If I look more 
closely at local practices of state and non-state actors, I imagine the state– 
society–religion interactions as a beehive composed of a well-organized 
and hierarchical colony of bees that can shift their roles in the hive as 
they act across various complex relationships. In this sense, rather than 
acting as a single monolithic body, the state functions like a beehive that 
consists of a multiplicity of bodies that select different directions and 
mutualistic relationships within their environment, but never lose sight 
of the overall hive, which is captured in a dominant semiotic ideology. 
These different directions and mutualistic relationships become part 
of visions that are authoritative rather than contradictory. This book 
has shown that people do productively engage with rather than ignore 
these ideologies, while still managing to navigate the powerful binaries 
whenever and wherever they arise. 
Moving from the metaphor of the beehive to the wider frame of
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nant semiotic ideologies of the state and orthodox Buddhism, I argue
that religious practices are enacted and co-produced locally by the state
through its diverse agents and agencies, by religious reformers through
their purifying discipline, and by various categories of villagers who use
indiscipline as a local tactic when acting on behalf of their gods. Focusing
on local-level confrontations, I have demonstrated that binary opposi-
tions of various types of discipline, or discipline versus indiscipline, reli-
gious versus secular, or rationalized religious doctrines versus vernacular
religions, do exist, but these distinctions are not clear-cut. By exposing
the extent of improvisation and tactics of legitimation, I have shown that
these binary relations are mutually constitutive, as various categories
of social actors compete to gain advantage against the backdrop of the
process of purification of religion. State agents, religious authorities,
and fishers actively sharpen, interrupt, shift, or blur the binary relations
between them but, at the same time, they continuously seek to maximize
their tactical positions within and across those binaries by selectively
accepting, purifying, and subverting state and religious semiotic ideolo-
gies in ways that best serve their specific locale and interests. Still, when
the Scylla of the powerful state and the Charybdis of religious authority
confront each other in this triadic relationship, local people are the ones
who, little by little, subtly and skilfully navigate the waters and influence
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